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EDITORIAL 
 
TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC AREA OF COOPERATION 
 
Giacinto della Cananea* 
 
More than six decades ago, six countries moved by the 
hope of ensuring peace and rising living standards, agreed on the 
text drafted by Jean Monnet and made public by Robert Schuman 
and later signed the Treaty of Paris establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community. After the failure of the Treaty 
establishing the European Defence Community, two further 
economic communities were created in 1957. The following 
decades have seen the achievement of the initial goals (peace and 
prosperity), the gradual expansion of the tasks of the new bodies, 
and the institutionalization of the European polity. This 
constitutes a “new legal order” – to borrow the famous expression 
used by the Court of Justice in its ruling in Van Gend en Loos – the 
subjects of which do not comprise only the States, but also their 
citizens. An unprecedented process of transformation from an 
interstate union to a “composite”, quasi-federal polity has thus 
taken place. Some similarities with federal polities, such as the 
United States of America, have often been pointed out, though the 
distinctive features cannot be ignored, to begin with the ambition 
to create “an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe”, 
instead of a people.   
 
As the integration process has evolved from the transfer of 
sovereign powers, “albeit in limited fields”, to a more complex 
web of policies, this expanded the external role of the Community. 
Although the Member States retained their powers to negotiate 
unilaterally international treaties, as well as their powers to join 
the international regimes created after World War II, the 
Community has increasingly played a role on the international 
stage.  
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It has exercised its exclusive competence for commercial 
policy, becoming a founding member of the World Trade 
Organization, joining the US in promoting free trade, though not 
without differences and sometimes disputes. Similarly, in the 
environmental field, the European Union (which, after the Lisbon 
treaty, has replaced the Community) has promoted the creation of 
international regimes, such as that of Kyoto, not rarely in 
disagreement with US policies. More recently, the Union has taken 
important steps to ensure the respect of the resolutions adopted 
by the Security Council of the United Nations, and promoted or 
sustained by the US, though in Europe this area has become 
increasingly less insulated from judicial review and has eventually 
required a gradual adjustment of the measures provided by the 
UN.  
 
All this shows that between the EU and the US there are 
important common features, but also distinctive traits. There is 
also an important, increasing potential for closer cooperation 
between the EU and the US. While the common foreign and 
security policy of the EU has been viewed as persistently weak by 
its counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean and the 
external dimension of its internal area of justice and security still 
needs to be strengthened, the role of the Union can be highly 
significant in the economic area not narrowly intended, that is to 
say with important implications for environmental and social 
policies.  
 
The question that thus arises is whether, after the 
(sometimes mainly rhetoric) trans-Atlantic proclamations of 
solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the EU and the US can create a 
more institutionalized pattern of cooperation. An agreement, the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, has been under 
negotiation since 2013. If it is signed and ratified, and if it is 
combined with the trade agreements that already exist on both 
sides of the Atlantic Ocean (in the perspective of a Transatlantic 
Free Trade Area), it could give rise to the wider free trade area of 
the world, with important positive effects not only for the 
contracting parties, but also for the rest of the world. The “if”, 
however, is not merely a manifestation of caution. It also serves to 
point out that several steps must be taken in order to transform 
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those potentials into a reality of closer and institutionalized 
cooperation. What matters is not only the variety of attitudes that 
have emerged within Europe since the Iraqi War or the different 
views that prevail in the EU and the US with regard to the 
relations with other global players.  
 
Looking at the topic from a legal point of view, the attempt 
to create a free trade area, where non-tariff barriers and other 
distortion to competition are eliminated raises, first, the question 
of the goals of competition, of its underlying philosophy. There is, 
second, an increasing divide in an important field, that of data 
protection. Few years ago, the decision by the European Court of 
Justice (in joined cases C-317/04 and 318/04) has annulled the 
decision on adequacy concerns processing of personal data, for its 
contrast with EU law. The Court, consistently with its case law, 
ruled in favour of a strong vision of data protection. This vision is 
in clear collision with the surveillance carried out by the US’ 
National Security Agency (NSA) in the last years. Realists will 
argue that all national governments must, and do, carry out 
surveillance activities. Whatever the intellectual soundness and 
political expediency of this way to consider the question, there is 
evidence that an agreement does not only serve to enhance mutual 
trust between the parties, but it also presupposes such mutual 
trust. This requires concrete steps to harmonize legal and 
administrative provisions in order to ensure that an adequate 
protection has been put in place. Last but not least, remedies for 
citizens and business must be taken into due account. A growth of 
transnational exchange is likely to produce new disputes. Whether 
such disputes can be solved only through the traditional 
instruments of EU law, that is to say the courts, or through 
alternative instruments for solving disputes, it is an important 
question in view of the consolidation of a system of adjudication 
capable of responding to the needs of a transnational society. 
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THE EURO CRISIS JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
Peter M. Huber∗ 
 
 
 
Abstract 
On September 12th 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC) decided on several constitutional complaints and 
applications demanding a temporary injunction against the 
Federal law approving the Treaty on the ESM (TESM), the Federal 
laws implementing that treaty into the national legal order and the 
Federal law approving the treaty on the so called Fiscal Compact 
(TFCP). These demands had been put forward by the vastest 
amount of plaintiffs in the 62 years old history of the FCC – 76 
MPs, several professors of economics, the parliamentary group of 
the Left and more than 41.000 citizens. The decision of September 
12th had already been the fourth significant decision of the FCC 
dealing with the Sovereign Debt Crisis since 2011, and it won´t be 
the last. 
These decisions belong to a long line of jurisprudence 
which started to deal with European integration already in the 
early 1970s. There may have been some change in tone over the 
past 40 years; the cornerstones of the FCC’s approach, however, 
remain unchanged. At the base of this long line of case law is a 
concept which conceives the EU as an association of sovereign 
states (Staatenverbund) in which the Member States are “masters of 
the treaties” and, as far as Germany is concerned, cannot be 
deprived of this role but for an act of the constituent power i.e. a 
referendum according to art. 146 Basic Law. 
 
 
                                            
∗ BVR Prof. Dr. Peter M. Huber, Karlsruhe/München. 
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I. National legislation as basis of European integration 
Against this background EU-law has to be applied because 
and insofar as Parliament has approved it  by ratification 
(Rechtsanwendungsbefehl). Therefore the Federal Act Approving the 
EEC Treaty and its subsequent amendments are the basis of 
Germany´s membership in the EU, and the conceptual basis of the 
precedence EU-law takes over national law. If EU membership is 
based on national legislation, it seems to be inevitable that 
especially national constitutional law may also set limits to 
European integration. Looking at this in more detail there are two 
limits to European integration derived from national 
constitutional law: the constitutional identity on the one hand (1.) 
and the program of integration i. e. the principle of conferral on 
the other (2.). 
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1. Constitutional identity as a limit to integration 
a) Eternity clause of art. 79 (3) GG 
The constitutional identity of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which according to art. 23 (1) third sentence of the Basic 
Law is not open to European integration is determined by and 
only by the so-called eternity clause of art. 79 (3) Basic Law. 
Codifying the jurisprudence of the FCC1 the Basic Law states that 
“[...] the establishment of the European Union as well as changes 
in its treaty foundations [...] that amend or supplement this Basic 
Law or make such amendments or supplements possible, [...] shall 
be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of art. 79”2. Insofar, the 
division of the federation into ‘Länder’, their participation  in the 
legislative process, or the principles laid down in artt. 1 and 20’ 
are off limits even for legislation concerning European integration. 
In other words, the limits the legislator has to abide by when 
amending the constitution apply to the advancement of European 
Integration as well. 
 b) Content of the guarantees 
In the Lisbon Judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court 
tried to further sort this out and elaborated that the Basic Law also 
guarantees the sovereign statehood of the Federal Republic of 
Germany.3 Consequently, Parliament, Federal Council, and the 
Government, the so-called pouvoirs constitutes, do not possess the 
power to abolish the sovereign nation state over the heads of the 
German people;  this would require an act of the constituent 
power, the pouvoir constituant (art. 79 (3), 146 Basic Law)4. It 
further stated that, in spite of all the utopias surrounding the term 
‘multi-level-constitutionalism’, the European Union remains an 
association of sovereign states based on public international law. 
In the future, it will therefore continue to be steered by the 
                                            
1 BVerfGE 37, 271 ff. – Solange I; 73, 339 ff. – Solange II; 75, 223 ff. – 6. UStRiL; 
80, 74 ff. – e. A. Fernsehrichtlinie; 89, 155 ff. – Maastricht; 123, 267 ff. – Lissabon. 
2 Für einen eher spielerischen Umgang mit diesen Grenzen J. Schwarze, Ist das 
Grundgesetz ein Hindernis auf dem Weg nach Europa?, JZ 1999, 637 (640). 
3 BVerfGE 123, 267 (346 ff.) – Lissabon; früher schon P.M. Huber, Maastricht – 
ein Staatsstreich?, 1993, S. 22 ff. 
4 BVerfGE 123, 267 (348 f.) – Lissabon; erstmals wohl P.M. Huber, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof als Hüter der 
gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kompetenzordnung, AöR 116 (1991), 210 (250); ders., 
in: Sachs (Hrsg.), GG, 1. Aufl. 1996, art. 146 Rn. 19; H. Dreier, in: ders. (Hrsg.), 
GG, Band III, 1. Aufl. 2000, art. 146 Rn. 16. 
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Member States, who, as former judgments had put it, are and will 
continue to be the ‘Masters of the Treaties’5, and that the principle 
of democracy (art. 20 (1) and (2) Basic Law) entails a special 
responsibility for parliament when it comes to integration; it 
demands that national parliaments have to take an active part in 
European matters. These requirements, laid down in art. 23 (2) to 
(6) Basic Law resemble what art. 12 TEU and the Protocols on the 
Role of National Parliaments in the EU and on the Application of 
the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality require under an 
EU perspective6. 
aa) As far as the distribution of competences between the 
EU and the Member States is concerned, this means that the latter 
have to retain the right to unilaterally withdraw from the union, 
which is now expressly established in art. 50 TEU, that the EU 
cannot be granted the ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, but rather that the 
allocation of competences is to be based on the principle of 
conferral7 and that the ‘majority of functions and powers’ must 
remain with the Member States8. The Lisbon Judgment tried to 
substantiate this – admittedly intangible – phrase by listing 
examples of areas of policy – citizenship, the civil and the military 
monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expenditure including 
external financing and all elements of encroachment that are 
decisive for the realization of fundamental rights. 
bb) Because of the ongoing Euro-crisis the Court has had 
the opportunity to further shape the budgetary dimension of the 
constitutional identity. In its decisions concerning the aid 
measures for Greece and the Euro rescue package9 as well as the 
ESM10 it has identified the budget autonomy of the German 
parliament as a fundamental part of the constitutional identity 
and declared the Bundestag’s overall fiscal autonomy to be 
inalienable. It stated verbatim: “Against this background, the 
German Bundestag must not transfer its budget autonomy to 
other participants by granting indefinite authorisations concerning 
                                            
5 BVerfGE 75, 223 (242) – 6. USt.-RiL; 89, 155 (190) – Maastricht; P.M. Huber, 
Recht der Europäischen Integration, 2002, § 5 Rn. 13 ff. 
6 Siehe dazu BVerfG, NVwZ 2012, 954 Rn. 98 – Informationsrechte. 
7 Früher schon BVerfGE 75, 223 (242) – 6. USt.-RiL. 
8 BVerfGE 89, 155 (186) – Maastricht. 
9 BVerfGE 129, 124 (179 ff.) – Griechenlandhilfe und Euro-Rettungsschirm. 
10 BVerfG, NJW 2012, 3145 ff. – ESM-Vertrag, Fiskalpakt. 
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fiscal policy. In particular, it may not – not even by statute – 
subject itself to mechanisms of financial importance which – be it 
because of the general concept or the result of an overall 
evaluation of individual measures – could lead to incalculable 
burdens on the budget (expenditure or loss of revenue) without 
the essential prior approval. Prohibiting the Bundestag from 
relinquishing its budget autonomy in this way is not an 
inadmissible restriction of the legislator’s budgetary competence, 
but is in fact aimed at its protection”11. 
 
 
2. The principle of Conferral and the ultra-vires-problem 
If national legislation is the basis of EU-law, the EU can 
only possess such competences that have been conferred upon it 
by the Member States (principle of conferral). Activities of the EU 
and its organs are therefore democratically legitimate only insofar 
as they keep within the scope of the programme of integration 
approved by national parliaments - as far as Germany is 
concerned by Bundestag and Bundesrat. This applies to all organs 
of the EU, to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Commission, the ECJ and also to the European Central Bank. It is 
the ground on which several plaintiffs have challenged the ECB´s 
OMT-Decision of sept. 6th 2012 before the Federal Constitutional 
Court. 
The limit of competences conferred on EU institutions, i.e. 
the scope of the programme of integration, is inevitably a 
recurring source of conflict. This becomes a constitutional law 
issue of some explosiveness especially when the ECJ, who inter 
alia possesses the competence to adjudicate on whether the EU 
institutions keep within their competences (art. 19 (1) second 
sentence TEU), approves acts that exceed the conferred 
competences and thus acts ultra vires itself.  
This was enunciated explicitly for the first time in the 
Maastricht Judgment12 and has since been confirmed in the Lisbon 
Judgment13 and outlined in more detail in the Honeywell ruling14. 
                                            
11 BVerfGE 129, 124 (179 ff.) – Griechenlandhilfe und Euro-Rettungsschirm. 
12 BVerfGE 89, 155 (188, 195, 210) – Maastricht. 
13 BVerfGE 123, 267 (398 ff.) – Lissabon. 
14 BVerfGE 126, 286 ff. – Honeywell; dazu A. Proelß, Zur 
verfassungsgerichtlichen Kontrolle der Kompetenzmäßigkeit von Maßnahmen 
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It has gained a large following among other Member States´ 
constitutional or Supreme Courts. In 2012 the Czech 
Constitutional Court, for the first time, even considered an ECJ 
judgment to be ultra vires15.  
Although this case has remained an exception so far – the 
FCC has namely rejected ultra vires claims by the majority16 with 
regard to the ECJ’s Mangold line of case in 2010,– this does not 
mean that the court’s reserve control is ineffective. The mere fact 
that the majority of national (constitutional) courts claims to apply 
the standards of national law to determine whether the ECJ had 
acted ultra vires has been  incentive enough for the ECJ to avoid 
such conflicts. It has thus – with a somewhat clumsy reasoning – 
upheld the Irish Constitution’s prohibition of abortion, and did 
only classify the prohibition of women’s armed military service, 
which was included in the German Basic Law until 2000 (art. 12a 
(4) third sentence), as an infringement of Directive 76/207/EEC 
after the Advocate General had realized that this prohibition is not 
a provision in the sense of art. 79 (3) Basic Law. The Omega case 
may be another example17. It will however be interesting to see 
how things will develop after the Akerberg/Franson judgment of 
26th February 201318. 
 
 
II. The key role of the democratic principle 
Until the 1990s the main constitutional concern in Germany 
was that European integration would endanger the level of 
protection the fundamental rights as they are laid down in the 
Basic law. This has become a lesser concern in the past 20 years 
whereas the democratic issue has turned out to be the key 
question of European integration – at least under a German 
perspective. 
 
 
                                                                                                           
der Europäischen Union: Der ausbrechende Rechtsakt“ in der Praxis des 
BVerfG, EuR 46 (2011), 241 ff. 
15 Tschech.VerfG Pl. ÚS 5/12 – Slovak Pensions. 
16 BVerfGE 126, 286 (308 ff.); see Dissenting opinion of Landau S. 318 ff. 
17 ECJ, Rs. C-36/02, Omega, Slg. 2004, I-9609 Rn. 39. 
18 ECJ Rs. C 617/10 – Akerberg/Fransson Slg. 0000.  
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1. Basics 
Behind this line of adjudication seems to be a uniquely 
German concept – critics might say exaggeration - of democracy. 
Its origins can be traced back to the KPD-judgement of 195419 but 
it did not emerge clearly until after reunification. The other 
Member States’̕ democratic principles if they are theoretically 
recognized at all, are less intense and doctrinally elaborated.20 
Europe’s ‘most democratic’ state, Switzerland, does not even 
recognise any principle of democracy21. Democracy does not 
extend past the application of the procedures provided for the 
forming of the political will. 
The German concept substantially amounts to the 
proposition that the principle of democracy and the sovereignty of 
the people (art. 20 (1) and (2) Basic Law) are based on the 
individual right to political self-determination which itself is 
based on human dignity (art. 1 (1) Basic Law) and, just as all 
fundamental rights, has a tendency to strive for an expansion of 
the range of opportunities that it involves22. Therefore, democracy 
in Germany is not merely an abstract principle that is given effect 
to by elections of some kind; it means taking the individual 
seriously as a voter and as a citizen, in fact aiming to free him 
from being a subject who is controlled and patronized by the state, 
the European Union or other political institutions. It is aimed at 
optimizing the possibilities for political participation and at 
maintaining the political value of the right to vote in national 
elections (as elections to the European Parliament do not amount 
to a comparable level of participation for the individual). 
  
 
                                            
19 BVerfGE 5, 85 (204 f.) – KPD-Urteil. 
20 P.M. Huber in: Streinz (Hrsg.), EUV/AEUV, 2. Aufl. 2011, art. 10 EUV Rn. 9 
ff. 
21 K.P. Sommermann, Demokratiekonzepte im Vergleich, in: 
Bauer/Huber/ders. (Hrsg.), Demokratie in Europa (Hrsg.), S. 191 ff. 
22 Grundlegend BVerfGE 107, 59 (91 f.) – Wasserverbände NRW; 123, 267 (342 
ff.) – Lissabon; P.M. Huber, Demokratie in Europa – Zusammenfassung und 
Ausblick, in: Bauer/ders./Sommermann (Hrsg.), Demokratie in Europa (Hrsg.), 
2005, S. 491 (495 f.); S. Unger, Das Verfassungsprinzip der Demokratie, 2008, 
passim. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW – VOL. 5  ISSUE 2/2013 
91 
 
2. Practical Consequences 
Democratic legitimation – seen from the point of view of 
the Basic law - is realized primarily through decisions of 
parliament (“Wesentlichkeitsdoktrin”) and through the 
involvement of the Bundestag in the decision making process of 
the EU. The national Parliament is considered the center of 
democracy and an essential part of our constitutional identity23.  If 
the Bundestag therefore loses competences, the right to vote 
guaranteed in art. 38 par 1 1 GG loses substance. The capacity of 
the individual to  political self-determination is diminished and he 
or she must be therefore entitled to make a constitutional 
complaint arguing that the treaty or the measure at stake would 
go too far and violate the constitutional identity of the Basic Law. 
This concept of democracy, laid down in art. 20 (1 and 2) of the 
Basic law, is part of the constitutional identity and therefore 
unalienable for the ordinary legislator as well as for the 
constitution amending legislator or the legislator in European 
affairs. 
 
 
III. Euro crisis – jurisprudence 
1. Decision of September 7th 2011 
In a more specific way the democratic principle as it is laid 
down in art. 20 par 1 and 2 of the Basic law entails the requirement 
that the Bundestag remains the place where decisions on the 
amount of loans and guaranties which Germany may give for 
other countries, their duration and their conditions have to be 
decided on in order to make a public debate and accountability 
possible. 
The Federal Constitutional Court’s judgement concerning 
the aid measures for Greece and Germany’s participation in the 
EFSF24 (7th September 2011) is the most important case so far in 
which these questions have arisen in practice. The Federal 
Constitutional Court has not only made clear that the limits to 
integration cannot be skirted by switching to treaties of 
international public law, but stated moreover, that the individual 
has a right that said limits are obeyed. This continued expansion 
                                            
23 Siehe P.M. Huber, § 26 Rn. 83 ff. 
24 BVerfGE 129, 124 ff. – Griechenlandhilfe und Euro-Rettungsschirm. 
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of the standing is defended against scholarly criticism as follows: 
“The citizen’s right to democracy which is ultimately based on 
human dignity […] would be ineffective if the parliament 
relinquished core parts of political self-determination and thus 
permanently deprived the citizen of the possibility of democratic 
participation. The Basic Law has declared the connection between 
the right to vote and the government in art. 79 (3) and art. 20 (1) 
and (2) Basic Law to be inviolable […]. The legislator has made 
clear when revising art. 23 Basic Law that the obligation to 
develop the European Union is tied to the adherence to structural 
requirements of constitutional law (art. 23 (1) first sentence Basic 
Law) and that art. 79 (3) has set an absolute limit in order to 
protect the constitutional identity (art. 23 (1) third sentence) which 
is transgressed not just when there is an impending seizure of 
power by totalitarian forces. The citizen must have a recourse of 
constitutional law against a transfer of competences by the 
parliament that is in breach of art. 79 (3) Basic Law. The Basic Law 
does not provide for a more extensive right to complain. Art. 38 
(1) Basic Law becomes important in situations in which there is a 
danger of the competences of the present or future bundestag 
being undermined in a way that would make the realization of the 
citizen’s political will legally or practically impossible. The 
applicant is only entitled to make an application if he can 
substantiate that his right to elect the Bundestag may be devalued. 
There may be a right to lodge a constitutional complaint via art. 38 
(1) Basic Law as well, if, what is alleged in this case, the 
authorizations to give guarantees, can have a substantial 
detrimental effect on budget autonomy, either by their nature or 
by their amount!”25. 
At the centre of this decision, which is primarily based on 
art. 20 (1) and (2) as well as art. 79 (3) GG, is the proposition that 
the Bundestag must not transfer its budget autonomy to other 
entities or subject itself to mechanisms of financial importance 
which, “be it because of the general concept or the result of an 
overall evaluation of individual measures, could lead to 
incalculable burdens on the budget (expenditure or loss of 
revenue) without the essential prior approval”26. Against this 
                                            
25 BVerfGE 129, 124 (169 f.) – Griechenlandhilfe und Euro-Rettungsschirm. 
26 BVerfGE 129, 124 (179 f.) – Griechenlandhilfe und Euro-Rettungsschirm. 
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background, the Court has stated that the legislature is prohibited 
from establishing permanent mechanisms under the law of 
international agreements which result in an assumption of liability 
for other states’ voluntary decisions, especially if they have 
consequences whose impact is difficult to calculate. Sufficient 
parliamentary influence must also be ensured with regard to the 
manner in which the funds that are made available are dealt 
with27. With regard to the possibility of having to make payments 
in a guarantee event, the legislature has a considerable margin of 
appreciation. The Federal Constitutional Court has to respect this 
as well as the legislature’s assessment of the future sustainability 
of the federal budget and of the economic performance of the 
Federal Republic of Germany28. 
The Senate could uphold the statutes in question – the 
Monetary Union and Financial Stability29 Act and the EFSF Act30 – 
mostly because the possible liabilities arising from those Acts were 
sufficiently definite – because of a limit regarding the sum, a time 
limit, a strict conditionality and the requirement of unanimity31. 
Against this background, it seemed sufficient to put the budget 
commission in charge of the control of the execution of namely the 
EFSF Act. However, that approval of the budget committee had to 
be obtained prior to giving guarantees which could only be 
ensured by interpreting § 1 (4) first sentence of the EFSF Act in 
conformity with the constitution and by pushing the boundaries 
of interpretation32. 
 
 
2. Decision of February 28th 2012 
After the FCC had allowed to transfer the responsibility for 
details of state guarantees and aids on the budget committee the 
legislator planned to organise the parliamentary supervision of 
the sovereign debt crisis as whole in a special committee of nine 
elected Members of Parliament. 
                                            
27 BVerfGE 129, 124 (180 f.) – Griechenlandhilfe und Euro-Rettungsschirm, 
unter Hinweis auf BVerfGE 123, 267 (356 ff.) – Lissabon. 
28 BVerfG, a. a. O. 
29 BGBl. I 2010, 537. 
30 BGBl. I 2010, 627. 
31 BVerfGE 129, 124, (184 ff.) – Griechenlandhilfe und Euro-Rettungsschirm. 
32 BVerfGE 129, 124, (186) – Griechenlandhilfe und Euro-Rettungsschirm. 
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This has prompted the Federal Constitutional Court to issue 
a temporary injunction against the entering into force of the 
amendment of § 3 (3) StabMechG33 and has lead to an essential 
decision regarding the internal organisation of the Bundestag34. At 
the core of this decision is the principle that the Bundestag 
complies with its function as a body of representation in its 
entirety, i.e. by participation of all its members, and not by single 
members of parliament, a group of members, or the majority of 
parliament. This holds true especially when it comes to the 
budget. 
The German Bundestag’s right to decide on the budget and 
its overall budgetary responsibility are, in principle, exercised 
through deliberation and decision-making in the plenary sitting 
“[…], through deciding on the Budget Act, statutes with financial 
importance or any other constitutive decision of the plenum […]. 
Every member of parliament has the right to assess the draft 
budget of the federal government and the proposed amendments 
(art. 38 (1) in conjunction with art. 77 (1) first sentence and art. 110 
(2) first sentence Basic Law). A member of parliament shall be able 
to present his views on how the budgetary funds should be spent 
und thereby influence the decision on a budget […]. Moreover, the 
members of the German Bundestag have the right and the 
obligation to comply with their function to control fundamental 
decisions on budgetary politics […]”35. 
However, this is not an absolute guarantee. A restriction of 
the member of parliament’s equal participation (art. 38 par 1 S. 2 
GG) can be justified by other legal interests of constitutional rank, 
as the parliament’s ability to function. This amounts to a gradual 
guideline which is based on the idea of essentiality and directed 
by the principle of proportionality – in the words of the Federal 
Constitutional Court. 
“If members of parliament are excluded from participating 
in parliamentary decision-making by a transfer of decision-
making competences to an executive committee, this is admissible 
only in order to protect other legal interests of constitutional rank 
and only if the principle of proportionality is strictly observed. 
                                            
33 BVerfGE 129, 284 ff. – e. A. EFSF. 
34 BVerfG, NVwZ 2012, 495 ff. – Sondergremium. 
35 BVerfG, NVwZ 2012, 495 ff. – Sondergremium, Rn. 110. 
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The competence to internal organization does not permit to 
completely deprive a member of parliament of his rights”36. 
 
 
3. Decision of June 19th 2012 
In its judgment pronounced of June 19th 2012, the FCC 
considered well-founded the applications made by the Alliance 
90/The Greens parliamentary group with which it asserted that 
the Bundestag’s rights to be informed by the Federal Government 
have been infringed in connection with the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and the Euro Plus Pact (EPP).  
According to art. 23 par 2 sentence 2 of the Basic law, the 
Federal Government shall keep the Bundestag informed, 
comprehensively and at the earliest possible time, “in matters 
concerning the European Union”.  The first application was aimed 
at the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The applicant applied 
for a declaration that the Federal Government infringed the 
Bundestag’s rights under art. 23 par 2 GG by omitting to inform 
immediately before and after the European Council of 4 February 
2011 comprehensively, at the earliest possible time and 
continuously, about the configuration of the ESM, and that it in 
particular omitted to send the Draft Treaty establishing the ESM to 
the Bundestag on 6 April 2011 at the latest.  
The second application concerned what is known as the 
Euro Plus Pact, which was presented to the public for the first time 
at the European Council of 4 February 2011. This agreement is 
intended to reduce the risk of currency crises in the euro area. In 
this context, the parliamentary group applied for a declaration 
that the Federal Government infringed the Bundestag’s rights 
under art. 23.2 GG by omitting to inform the Bundestag before the 
European Council of 4 February 2011 about the Federal 
Chancellor’s initiative for an enhanced economic coordination.  
Against this backdrop, the FCC had to clarify whether the 
rights of participation and the rights to be informed under art. 23 
par 2 of the Basic law can also apply to intergovernmental 
instruments of the nature described which are dealt with by the 
Federal Government in the context of European integration and 
which are related to the European Union. The Senate ruled that 
                                            
36 BVerfG, NVwZ 2012, 495 ff. – Sondergremium, Rn. 119. 
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the Federal Government infringed the Bundestag’s rights to be 
informed under art. 23.2 sentence 2 of the Basic law with regard to 
the ESM and with regard to the agreement on the Euro Plus Pact.  
Art. 23 of the Basic law confers to the  Bundestag far-
reaching rights of participation and rights to be informed in 
matters concerning the European Union. The strong involvement 
of Parliament in the process of European integration serves as a 
compensation for the competence shifts in favour of the 
governments that result from Europeanisation. The Federal 
Government’s duty, to keep the Bundestag informed 
comprehensively and at the earliest possible time intends to make 
it possible for Parliament to exercise its right to participate in 
matters concerning the European Union. The information must 
make it possible to influence the Government’s opinion-forming 
early and effectively; information must be provided in such a way 
that Parliament’s role is not reduced to merely exercising indirect 
influence. Apart from this, the interpretation and application of 
art. 23.2 must take into account that the provision also serves the 
publicity of parliamentary work, a requirement which is derived 
from the democratic principle laid down in art. 20.2 of the Basic 
law. The more complex a matter is, the deeper it intervenes in the 
legislative’s area of competences and the closer it gets to formal 
decision-making or to a formal agreement, the more intensive the 
required information has to be.  
The indication “at the earliest possible time” in art. 23.2 
sentence 2 means that the Bundestag must receive the Federal 
Government’s information at the latest at a point in time that 
enables it to deal with the matter in a substantiated manner and to 
prepare a statement before the Federal Government makes 
declarations which have an effect on third parties, in particular 
binding declarations concerning legislative acts of the European 
Union and intergovernmental agreements. Boundaries of the duty 
to inform result from the principle of the separation of powers. As 
long as the Federal Government’s internal formation of opinion 
has not come to an end, Parliament has no right to be informed. If, 
however, the Federal Government’s opinion-forming has reached 
a stadium in which it can communicate interim or partial results to 
the public or would like to set out on a process of concertation 
with third parties with a position of its own, a project no longer 
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falls within the core area of the Federal Government’s own 
executive responsibility that is shielded from the Bundestag.  
With regard to the establishment of the ESM the 
Government had infringed the Bundestag’s rights to be informed 
under art. 23 par 2 sentence 2 of the Basic law.  
The establishment and configuration of the ESM were a 
matter concerning the European Union because in an overall 
perspective, the characteristics which define it show substantial 
connections with the integration program of the European 
Treaties. Though its being intertwined with supranational 
elements and its hybrid nature it has to be considered a matter 
concerning the European Union. The establishment of the ESM is 
to be safeguarded by amending the TFEU, furthermore, the treaty 
to be concluded for its establishment assigns to the institutions of 
the EU, in particular to the European Commission and the ECJ 
new responsibilities concerning the identification, realization and 
monitoring of the financing program for Member States in need of 
assistance. The ESM is to serve to complement and safeguard the 
economic and monetary policy, which has been assigned to the EU 
as an exclusive responsibility.  
The Federal Government infringed the rights of the 
Bundestag under art. 23.2 sentence 2 of the Basic Law by omitting 
to submit a text of the European Commission on the establishment 
of the ESM, which was available to the Federal Government on 21 
February 2011 at the latest, and the Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of 6 April 2011. Oral and 
written information, in particular sending the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, which had 
already been discussed in the extended Eurogroup on 17 or 18 
May 2011 came too late and did therefore not compensate the 
infringement. The duty to inform could not be exercised “in an 
overall package” with regard to processes of the nature existing. 
The Federal Government was obliged to supply the Bundestag not 
merely with the text of a treaty when deliberations had already 
been concluded, or after the treaty has been adopted, but had to 
submit it at the earliest possible time.  
The Federal Government also infringed the Bundestag’s 
rights under art. 23.2 sentence 2 by not informing it 
comprehensively and at the earliest possible time on the Euro Plus 
Pact.  
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4. Decision of September 12th 2012 
On September 12th 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court 
pronounced its judgment regarding several applications for a 
temporary injunction. The main objective of the applications was 
to prohibit the Federal President from signing the statutes 
approving the Treaty establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism (TESM) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TFCP) passed 
by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat on 29 June 2012 until the 
decision in the principal proceedings. The Second Senate of the 
Federal Constitutional Court refused the applications with two 
provisos. The TESM could only be ratified if it was ensured at the 
same time under international law that: 
1. the limitation of liability set out under art. 8 (5) sentence 1 
of the ESM Treaty (TESM) limits the amount of all payment 
obligations arising to the Federal Republic of Germany from this 
Treaty to its share in the authorized capital stock of the ESM (EUR 
190 024 800 000) and that no provision of this Treaty may be 
interpreted in a way that establishes higher payment obligations 
for the Federal Republic of Germany without the agreement of the 
German representative; 
2. the provisions of the ESM Treaty concerning the 
inviolability of the documents of the ESM (Art. 32 (5), art. 34 and 
art. 35 (1) TESM) and the professional secrecy of all persons 
working for the ESM (art. 34 TESM) do not stand in the way of the 
comprehensive information of the Bundestag and of the 
Bundesrat.  
The Federal Republic of Germany was obliged to express to 
the other members of the ESM that she does not wish to be bound 
by the TESM as a whole if the reservations made by it should 
prove to be ineffective.  
 
a) Extent of review/Admissibility of the main action  
Diverging from the usual extent of review in temporary 
injunction proceedings, the Senate did not restrict its review to a 
mere weighing of the consequences. Instead, it performed a 
summary review of the challenged Acts of assent and of the 
accompanying laws under the aspect of whether the violations of 
their rights which the applicants admissibly assert can indeed be 
proven. This was necessary because with the ratification of the 
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Treaties Germany was to enter commitments under international 
law whose cancellation would not be easily possible in the event 
that violations of the constitution should be found out in the 
principal proceedings. The principal proceedings were held 
admissible to the extent that the applicants, relying on art. 38 of 
the Basic law, assert a violation of the overall budgetary 
responsibility of the Bundestag, which is entrenched in 
constitutional law through the principle of democracy (art. 20 (1) 
and 2, art. 79 (3) of the Basic law).  
 
b) Standard of review  
As the Senate already held in its decision regarding the aid 
for Greece and the EFSF of 7 September 2011, art. 38 of the Basic 
law in conjunction with the principle of democracy (art. 20 (1) and 
(2), art. 79 (3)) demands that the decision on public revenue and 
public expenditure must remain with the Bundestag. As elected 
representatives of the people, the Members of Parliament must 
retain control of fundamental budgetary decisions even in a 
system of intergovernmental governance. In this respect, the 
Bundestag is not allowed to establishing mechanisms of 
considerable financial importance which may result in 
incalculable burdens with budget significance being incurred 
without its mandatory approval. On the contrary: The Bundestag 
must individually approve every large-scale federal aid measure 
on the international or European Union level made in solidarity 
resulting in expenditure. Sufficient parliamentary influence must 
also be ensured on the manner of dealing with the funds 
provided.  
 
c) Subsumption  
Measured against these standards, the applications proved 
to be unfounded for the most part.  
aa) The Act of approval to the insertion of art. 136 (3) TFEU 
did not impair the principle of democracy. It was provided for by 
the European Council decision of 25 March 2011 and contains the 
authorization to establish a permanent mechanism for mutual aid 
between the Member States of the euro currency area. Different 
from the ECJ the FCC was convinced that the establishment of the 
ESM changes the design of the economic and monetary union in a 
way that it moves away from the principle of the independence of 
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national budgets which has characterized the monetary union so 
far. This may be wise or not. It is important, that it does not result 
in a loss of national budget autonomy because through the 
challenged Act of assent, the Bundestag does not transfer budget 
competences to bodies of the EU or to institutions created in 
connection with the EU.  
bb) The approval of the TESM essentially takes account of 
the requirements set out under constitutional law with regard to 
the safeguarding of the overall budgetary responsibility of the 
German Bundestag.  
However, the FCC thought it to be necessary to ensure in 
the framework of the ratification procedure under international 
law that the provisions of the TESM may only be interpreted or 
applied in a way that the liability of the Federal Republic of 
Germany cannot be increased beyond its share in the authorized 
capital stock of the ESM of 190 bn € without the approval of the 
Bundestag and that the information of the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat according to the constitutional requirements is ensured. 
Admittedly, it can be assumed that the express limitation of the 
liability of the ESM Members to their respective portions of the 
authorized capital stock, which is provided for in art. 8 (5) 
sentence 1 TESM, bindingly limits the Federal Republic of 
Germany’s budget commitments undertaken in connection with 
the activities of the ESM to EUR 190 024 800 000. However, it 
cannot be ruled out that the TESM will be interpreted in a sense 
that in the case of a revised increased capital call, the ESM 
Members cannot rely on the liability ceiling. 
Such a reservation in the ratification procedure was also 
required with regard to the provisions of the TESM on the 
inviolability of the documents (art. 32 (5), art. 35 (1) TESM) and on 
the professional secrecy of the legal representatives of the ESM 
and of all persons working for the ESM (art. 34 TESM). Also in this 
respect one could argue that these provisions are above all 
intended to prevent a flow of information to unauthorized third 
parties but not to national parliaments that  must bear political 
responsibility for the commitments based on the TESM vis-à-vis 
their citizens also during further treaty implementation. However, 
again the provisions do not explicitly address the information of 
the national parliaments by the ESM and constitutional law as 
regards the parliament’s rights of participation and its rights to be 
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informed is quite different in the Member States. It therefore is not 
unconceivable that those prescriptions could have stopped the 
Bundestag from monitoring the ESM. 
On the other hand the amount of the payment obligations 
of a total nominal value of EUR 190 024 800 000 did not exceed the 
limit of the burden on the budget to such an extent that the budget 
autonomy would run void. This even applies if Germany’s overall 
commitment undertaken with regard to the stabilization of the 
Eurozone of approximately 310 bn € is taken into consideration. 
As had already been pointed out in the decision of 7 September 
2011 legislature has a broad scope of assessment in this respect, 
which entails the assessment of the future soundness of the 
Federal budget and the economic performance capacity of the 
Federal Republic of Germany.  
 
 
IV. ECB-Case 
The Applicants to the FCC who object to euro rescue 
measures taken by the European Central Bank, in particular to the 
acquisition of government bonds on the secondary market, 
arguing that the measures go beyond the authorization by the 
program of integration laid down in the TFEU, did not ask for a 
temporary injunction. To what extent the decision taken by the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank on 6 September 
2012 on a programme concerning the purchase of government 
bonds of financially weak Member States (OMT-program) 
complies with the legal requirements of the treaty was therefore 
not a matter for decision in the proceedings for the issue of a 
temporary injunctions.  
Their constitutional complaints and application are 
consequently reviewed in the principal proceedings. The oral 
hearing in this case has taken place in June 2013. So, the next 
question which will have to be answered is whether the ECB´s 
policy to buy government bonds of distinguished members of the 
Eurozone under specific conditions is in accordance with the 
TFEU and its constitutional foundations in the Basic Law. 
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V. Outlook 
The Basic Law sets substantial requirements for the division 
of competences between the EU and the Member States and, as a 
necessary consequence, for the democratic legitimation and 
control of EU decisions as well.  
As far as Germany is concerned, this has to be put into 
effect primarily through the Bundestag. These requirements are 
also valid for other supranational organizations such as the ESM. 
In a more specific way the democratic principle as it is laid down 
in art. 20 par 1 and 2 of the Basic law entails the requirement that 
the Bundestag remains the place where decisions on the amount 
of loans and guaranties which Germany may give for other 
countries, their duration and their conditions have to be decided 
on in order to make a public debate and accountability possible.  
During the ongoing crisis, this may slow down responses to 
the financial markets̕ actual or perceived demands and may, as the 
president of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, has stated in an 
interview, mean that democracy is indeed proving to be an 
impediment to overcoming the crisis. Yet, this is a price we must 
be willing to pay for the sake of our and our children’s freedom 
and self determination. 
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GOVERNMENT DEFICITS AND INVESTMENTS: 
A EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
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Abstract  
In the academic and institutional debates concerning the 
role of the European Union with regard to national budgetary 
policies, there is an increasing concern for the limits that the EU 
has imposed on government debts and deficits. Much has been 
written, especially in economic literature, about the conventional 
nature of such limits. While this literature contains some useful 
insights, it will be argued that two central aspects of the topic have 
been insufficiently examined and only partially understood: one is 
the rule concerning government expenditure for investments, the 
other is its connection not only with the ‘guiding principle’ 
according to which financial conditions must be sound, but also 
with the common constitutional tradition which is reflected in 
such principle, that is to say financial stability. It will be argued, 
therefore, that the critique according to which the EMU has a 
negative impact on national policies aiming at financing 
investments is neither normatively nor empirically sound. 
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1. Dilemmas of Government Deficits 
There is little doubt that the development of a European 
legal framework for government debts and deficits has been one 
of the most significant achievements of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), whilst being one of the most 
controversial ones. 
According to its advocates, such legal framework is a 
necessary element in the strategy of the European Union (EU) to 
ensure that government failures do not preclude a more integrated 
Europe. It has provided a set of common principles, standards, 
and legal procedures, though respecting the requisites of 
subsidiarity (1). At the same time, it has provided national policy-
makers with an important, additional strength in order to 
overcome the opposition of vested interests to the necessary 
reforms of government policies, especially those that have a 
stronger impact on public expenditure, in the logic by which the 
EU serves to rescue the States from their weaknesses (2). 
                                                 
1 S. Cassese, La nuova costituzione economica (1994), 145. 
2 For this line of reasoning, see A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation – 
State (2000, 2nd ed.).  
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For other commentators and political leaders, the EU legal 
framework, in particular for its component concerning 
government debts and deficits, is intrinsically flawed, because it 
codifies debt-reduction policies. The underlying assumption is, 
first, that as a matter of principle no constitutional provision 
should codify a certain vision of political economy (3). Second, 
debt-reduction policies sooner or later imply constraints on public 
expenditure, with a huge and negative impact on social programs 
(4). A variant of this argument is that EU rules weaken the rights, 
especially social rights, recognized by national constitutions and 
statutes (5). Another variant, and a very questionable one, is that 
EMU has a negative impact on national policies aiming at 
financing infrastructures, thus reducing the capacity of the Union 
as a whole to face the economic and financial crisis.  
This article will seek to explore why and how the EU has 
imposed certain limits on government debts and deficits. Much 
has been written, especially in economic literature, about the 
conventional nature of such limits. While this literature contains 
many useful insights, it will be argued that two central aspects of 
the topic have been insufficiently examined and only partially 
understood. 
 
 
2. Government Deficits in Economics, Political, and Legal 
Theories 
An interesting way to introduce the discussion concerning 
government deficits can be that of pointing out, first, how the 
substantial convergence of views between lawyers and economists 
at the end of the Nineteenth century was modified by Keynesian 
theories and, second, how the budgetary policies that allegedly 
followed such theories raised a number of difficulties. This will 
                                                 
3 For a thorough discussion of this argument, see A. Wildavsky, How to Limit 
Government Spending (1980). 
4, But see V. de Rugy, Is Austerity the Answer to Europe’s Crisis?, 33 Cato Journal 
244 (2013) (observing that debt-reduction packages are dominated either by tax 
increases or by spending restraints). 
5 This is not only a sort of leit-motiv in legal literature, especially in field of 
constitutional law. It is a topic increasingly referred to by public institutions: see 
the European Economic and Social Committe’s opinion “Pour une dimension 
sociale de l’Union économique et monétaire” (doc. n. 1566/2013). 
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provide a basis for understanding the rationales underlying the 
legal principles that regulate government deficits. 
 
 
A) Infrastructures and Deficits in Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations 
Without going too far in the history of ideas, the roots of the 
traditional thoughts about the role of governments in the economy 
can be found in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, one of the most 
influential works of Western civilization. Though emphasizing the 
virtues of markets, Smith did not neglect the role of the Sovereign. 
He identified three kinds of activities that could be regarded as 
being inherently public functions (6). While the first function 
concerned the protection of citizens against external and internal 
threats, that is to say defence and order, and the second consisted 
in the administration of justice, the third regarded public works. 
Smith focused, in particular, on works such as the construction of 
bridges and roads. Interestingly, he distinguished between those 
public works which were necessary either for the defence of the 
society or for the administration of justice, that is to say the first 
two categories on public functions, and the other works that were 
necessary, “chiefly those for facilitating the commerce of the 
society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people (7). 
He acknowledged that, as a matter of principle, these works could 
be, and sometimes were in fact, carried out by individuals. 
However, he observed that it was, as it still is, often difficult for 
them to obtain an adequate profit.  
This empirical finding had important normative 
advantages. First, as realists have long maintained, it reflected a 
legal reality, that is to say that the role of the State was not limited 
to the regulation of market forces. It was, rather, during the 
                                                 
6 A. Smith, An Inqury into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1789, 5th 
ed) (hereinafter Wealth of Nations), book IV, chapter IX.  
7 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, cit. at 6, book V, chapter I, third part (Smith 
referred to the “erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those 
public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous 
to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never 
repay the expense to any individual or small group of individuals”) (emphasis 
added). See, however, R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (1959), 563 
(criticizing Smith on the questionable assumption that he considered only 
goods, neglecting services, notably those related to education) 
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Nineteenth century that laissez-faire theories took place. Second, 
Smith was interested in ascertaining the rationales underlying the 
role of the State as a builder, owner and manager of some essential 
infrastructures. Third, as Smith concluded, the money for funding 
such works could derive from taxation. It could also derive from 
borrowing, he added, provided that this did not generate an 
“enormous debt”, in contrast with the safeguard of public trust in 
government bonds (8).  
This is, of course, an oversimplification of Smith’s thoughts 
about the State. However, it may at least give a glimpse of the 
theories that were regarded as “natural” not only by economist, 
but also by public lawyers at the end of the Nineteenth century (9). 
It may, in particular, shed some light on one issue. Although John 
Maynard Keynes observed that the rights of property and of free 
trade, as conceived during the eighteenth century, “accorded with 
the practical notions of conservatives and of lawyers” and that “a 
change [was] in the air” after the end of the Belle époque (10), the 
thoughts of public lawyers did not rest necessarily on the ideals of 
laissez-faire. They rested, rather, on the idea that the State – acting 
as a sovereign - has the power and the duty not only to lay down 
rules governing the market, in order to ensure its proper 
functioning, but also, in certain cases, to carry out economic 
activities.  
According to Carl Schmitt’s Nomos der Erde, there was a sort 
of compromise between the national sovereignty of the State, of 
each State, and the shared constitutional principles concerning the 
regulation of the economy. Schmitt argued that it was Maurice 
Hauriou, in his Précis de droit public, who masterly gave a 
theoretical basis to this institutional framework (11). He added 
                                                 
8 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, cit. at 6, book V, chapter III. 
9 For a bird’s eye view of the shift from the legal theories of the State prevailing 
in the nineteenth century to those of the twentieth, see J. Rivero, Droit 
administratif (1987, 12th ed.) 28 and M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory 
(1992).  
10 See J.M. Keynes, The End of Laissez-faire (1926), in Essays in Persuasion (1931).  
11 C. Schmitt, Das Nomos der Erde im Volkerrecht der Jus Publicum Europeum 
(1950), translated by G.L. Ulmen, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law 
of Jus Publicum Europaeum (2003), 140. In the burgeoning literature on Schmitt, 
an important study is R. Howse, Europe and the New World Order: Lessons from 
Alexandre Kojeve’s Engagement with Schmitt’s ‘Nomos der Erde’, 19 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 93 (2006).  
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that the “common constitutional standard ... was more important 
than was the political sovereignty of the individual ... self-
contained, and territorial continental states” (12).  
This commonality was widely recognized by public 
lawyers at the end of the nineteenth century, with the notable 
exception of Albert Venn Dicey’s overemphasis on the peculiarity 
of the English Constitution, and little point would be served by its 
repetition. The object of the present analysis is rather different. It 
is to observe that, for all the support given by public lawyers to 
laissez faire ideals, they did not believe that the (unwritten) 
economic constitution of their epoch excluded a more direct 
intervention by public authorities (13). Nor did they believe that 
government loans were unlawful. Rather, they thought that only 
extraordinary expenditure, such as those for infrastructures 
(railways, channels) could justify extraordinary revenues, such as 
loans (14).  
 
 
B) Infrastructures and Deficits:  Keynes and His Critics 
Whether and the extent to that Keynes’ critique to “classic” 
economists brought him to conceive a radically different theory it 
is an important question, but it is a question which falls beyond 
the limits of this article, and more generally beyond the limits of a 
legal analysis. The aim of this article is, rather, to argue that 
Keynesian economics undoubtedly gave much more importance 
to deficit spending although it did not necessarily implied the 
rejection of free market values (15).  
                                                 
12 C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, cit. at 11, 211.  
13 See, in particular, S. Romano, La libertà di commercio nei mercati municipali 
(1925), in Scritti minori (Milan, Giuffrè, 1950), II, 275.  
14 See, among others, A. Wagner, Three Extracts on Public Finance, in R.A. 
Musgrave – A.T. Peacock, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (1958), 7 (raising 
the question whether public expenditure “can be allowed to become so high 
that the requisite taxation becomes an oppressive burden to the people”); G. 
Ricca Salerno, Scienza delle finanze (1890, II ed.), 99-102. In more recent economic 
literature, see R.A. Musgrave, P.A. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice (1989, V ed.), 553.  
15 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), 379 
(holding that “apart from the necessity of central controls to bring about an 
adjustment between the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest, 
there is no more reason to socialize economic life than there was before”).  
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From the first point of view, which is of more direct interest 
for our purposes, Keynes pointed out the growing importance of 
the  
“[i]nvestments entered upon by, or at the risk of, public 
authorities, which are frankly influenced in making the 
investment by a general presumption of there being prospective 
social advantages from the investment, whatever its commercial 
yield may prove to be within a wide range, and without seeking to 
be satisfied that the mathematical expectation of the yield is at 
least equal to the current rate of interest, — though the rate which 
the public authority has to pay may still play a decisive part in 
determining the scale of investment operations which it can 
afford” (16). 
Keynes then went on to argue that, for all the importance of 
monetary policy, he was skeptical about its chances of success. He 
expected:  
“[t]o see the State, which is in a position to calculate the 
marginal efficiency of capital-goods on long views and on the 
basis of the general social advantage, taking an ever greater 
responsibility for directly organising investment; since it seems likely 
that the fluctuations in the market estimation of the marginal 
efficiency of different types of capital, calculated on the principles 
I have described above, will be too great to be offset by any 
practicable changes in the rate of interest” (17).  
In sum, Keynes argued that government expenditure was a 
key component of fiscal policy. Public authorities had, therefore, 
to use it as a policy instrument, in order to stimulate growth and, 
thus, ensure full employment. This did not mean, for sure, that 
any kind of measure is indifferent for government. Keynes 
referred to government investment in infrastructure. He argued 
that governments can, and should finance the funds for such 
investments by borrowing money through the issue of bonds, 
underlying assumption that the outcomes of investments, through 
taxation, sooner or later will repay the capital and the interests to 
be given to lenders. Even Keynes’ criticized remark about paying 
                                                 
16 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, cit. at 15, 
chapter 12, § 8.  
17 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, cit. at 15.  
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people to dig holes could be regarded as a metaphor for works in 
the public interest. 
This line of reasoning is not, however, without problems. 
The first, and most obvious, problem is whether such public 
expenditure is really productive. This problem was highlighted 
not only by Friedrich von Hayek, but also by Lionel Robbins in a 
famous letter to “The Times” (18). According to them, a second 
problem with deficit spending is closely related to its impact on 
financial markets. They pointed out the need to safeguard the 
supply of capital to private industry. They objected, therefore, to 
the creation of “public debt on a large scale”. Thirdly, they 
criticized Keynes (and Pigou) for affirming that “this is a time for 
new municipal swimming baths, etc., merely because people ‘feel 
they want’ such amenities”. Hayek and Robbins held that there 
was no reason for central and local authorities to engage in such 
activities.  
 
 
C) From Democracy in Deficit to the Deficit of Democracy 
The fourth problem with relying on government deficits 
per se is rather different in nature from the three that have already 
been considered. It regards neither the economic sphere nor the 
conditions which must be met for governments to take a 
“responsibility for directly organising investment”, to borrow again 
Keynes’ words. Rather, it regards its political and constitutional 
implications. There is an extensive body of literature concerning 
the proper relationship between government revenues and 
expenditure. In particular, the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell 
argued that a problem which had “never received the attention it 
deserve[d]” was, on the one hand, how to ensure that a public 
expenditure “holds out any prospect at all of creating utility 
exceeding the cost” and, on the other hand, how to ensure the 
observance, in this respect, of the principle of voluntary consent to 
taxation (19). He added that, if loans are used instead of taxes, 
“there is a clear case for the requirement of full unanimity of all 
parties as the only possible guarantee against prejudicing their 
                                                 
18 Letter to the Editor of the “The Times”, October 17, 1932.  
19 K. Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation (1896), in R.A. Musgrave – A.T. 
Peacock, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, cit. at 14, 72, 89 and 91.  
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interests” (20). What Hayek and Robbins, as well as others, argued 
was coherent with this literature. They argued that: 
“[m]any of the troubles of the world at the present time are 
due to imprudent borrowing and spending on the part of the 
public authorities. We do not desire to see a renewal of such 
practices. At best they and they tend to drive up the rate of 
interest”. 
What matters, for our purposes, is not the remark 
concerning the risk that interest rates are driven up, and thus have 
a negative impact on financial markets. What matters is, rather, 
the observation that growing and “imprudent” borrowing 
measures may “mortgage the Budgets of the future” (21). 
Importantly, this critique does not focus on the deviation from the 
traditional doctrine according to which government budget must 
be balanced or in surplus. It argues that, although governments 
have always requested and obtained loans from bankers, there are 
limits to the exercise of this kind of power. If such power is 
exercised unlimitedly, this can lead to a tension with a more 
fundamental value that liberal democracies must safeguard. If the 
machinery of government, so the argument goes, generates a high, 
increasing, and instable public debt, this will inevitably impinge 
on future governments’ capacity to deal with the debt and to be 
responsive to their citizens’ future demands.  
In this line of reasoning there are two related, but distinct, 
normative arguments. First, as observed earlier, there is a 
normative argument based on the ideals of a limited government. 
More precisely, constitutions serve to ensure that those who 
govern us take decisions in a manner that makes their costs and 
benefits as clear as possible and are thus accountable. Deficit 
spending, instead, tends to generate “fiscal illusions”, that is to say 
to hide more or less significant parts of the costs. In this sense, 
deficit spending is regarded as jeopardizing the proper 
functioning of representative institutions (22). This normative 
argument has a moral component, though not explicit, that is to 
                                                 
20 K. Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation, cit. at 19, 106 (explicitly referring 
to Wagner’s analysis, quoted earlier).  
21 Letter to the Editor of the “The Times”, October 17, 1932.  
22 G. Sartori, Democrazia. Cosa è (1994), 315. See also J.E. Buchanan – R. Wagner, 
Democracy in Deficit. The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (1978) (for the thesis that 
the changes in US budgetary policies were based on Keynes’ theories). 
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say, the need to protect democracy, seen as the worst of all 
possible forms of government, except the others, to borrow 
Winston Churchill’s well known aphorism.  
The moral component is even stronger in the second 
normative argument. A political system that extensively and 
increasingly relies on deficit spending, especially if public 
expenditure funds consumption as opposed to infrastructures, 
cannot achieve the goal of generating an economic growth that, 
within a certain period of time, repays capital and interest. It 
would be obviously difficult to determine empirically what is the 
limit that should not be crossed. However, there is evidence that 
the more public expenditure is funded by borrowing money for 
purposes of consumption, the more it has only distributive effects, 
instead of increasing the general wealth. In other words, it tends 
to favor particular groups, if not individuals (23). The question that 
thus arises, which is a moral question, as observed by John Rawls, 
probably the most influential political philosopher of the last fifty 
years, is what justifies the choice to ensure some benefits to those 
particular groups and individuals today, at the expenses of other 
groups and individuals in the future, that is to say of another 
generation, which receives little or no benefit from deficit 
spending (24). In both these respects, excessive government 
deficits, or a democracy in deficit, may transcend into a deficit of 
democracy. 
 
 
3. Constitutional Limits on Government Deficits: A Comparative 
Analysis  
There is little doubt that the development of new economic 
theories gradually influenced the law. New interpretations of 
existing constitutions were elaborated, discussed, and enforced. 
New constitutional provisions were introduced, in order to 
achieve social justice. Much has been written on the way in which 
the concept of Welfare State has spread throughout Western 
                                                 
23 For an analysis from the point of view of political science, see J. White – A. 
Wildavsky, The Deficit and the Public Interest. The Search for Responsible Budgeting 
in the 1980s (1989). 
24 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), § 44 (for an analysis of justice between 
generations). 
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Europe since its inception. While this literature contains many 
useful insights, it will be argued that two central aspects of the 
topic have been insufficiently examined and only rarely 
adequately understood.  
The first of the issues which will be considered concerns the 
rationales for the introduction of constitutional limits to the 
discretionary powers enjoyed by parliaments. Legal systems have 
two or three principal mechanisms through which such 
discretionary powers can be limited and structured, in order to 
ensure accountability to the public. Notwithstanding the 
differences, which are not only of detail, it is common for 
constitutions to exclude that parliaments may decide about public 
expenditure without the consent of the executive.  
The second of the issues which will be examined concerns, 
more specifically, the constitutional limits concerning the 
expansion of government deficit or debt. It is well known that this 
expansion has taken place for a variety of economic and political 
reasons and little point would be served by its repetition. The 
object of the present analysis is rather different. It is to consider 
whether, whatever the differences concerning the form of State 
and the structure of government, there are at least some shared 
understandings about the need to limit the expansion of debt and 
deficit.  
 
 
A) Public Expenditure and the Limits to the Will of the Majority 
When considering public expenditure, the ‘standard’ 
remark is that not only its size but also its composition varies form 
one State to another and that such variables depend on history 
and culture, as well as on ethical criteria concerning the role of 
individual and social groups within a given State. In a general 
sense this is true, but this explanation does not give a full 
representation of a more complex reality. It neglects some aspects 
that could suggest a more nuanced and perhaps interesting story. 
It can be argued that, for all the importance of parliaments’ role as 
‘theatres’ of differentiated societies and more specifically as 
budgetary authorities (25), European constitutions set limits to the 
                                                 
25 Without parliamentary consent, government budgets cannot be approved 
and ministries and agencies cannot spend outside a provisional and limited 
part of the preceding year’s budget. For a comparative analysis, see D. Coombes 
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will of parliamentary majorities with regard to the increase of 
public expenditure.  
The unwritten or “historic” constitution of the United 
Kingdom has a special relevance in this respect, because for a long 
period of time it has been considered by academics and politicians 
as a sort of model. The members of the House of Commons do not 
have the right to propose money bills, which are reserved to the 
executive branch of government. The underlying reason is still 
that which was indicated by Walter Bagehot soon after the 
fundamental electoral reforms of the Nineteenth century. The 
House was not anymore a guardian of the treasury, in order to 
limit taxation. It was, rather, more interested in spending (26). 
Whatever the institutional and political distinctive traits 
between democracy in the UK and Germany, the latter is not 
based on a radically different philosophy. The mechanism 
governing the functioning of political decision-making processes 
is to be found in Article 113 (1) of the Grundgesetz (1949) (27). 
Under Article 113 (1), it is for Parliament to approve spending 
bills. However, it allows Parliament to do so only if the executive 
approves the acts that increase the expenditure proposed in the 
federal budget or that imply new expenditure or, finally, that 
imply them for the future. Interestingly, the Spanish Constitution 
(1978) follows the same logic. It requires that every proposal or 
amendment that may alter the balance established by the budget 
must be accepted by the executive (Article 134 (6)). The French 
Constitution (1958) probably goes one step further. It lays down a 
prohibition to accept the proposals and amendments formulated 
by the members or Parliament if their adoption implies either a 
reduction of public revenues or the increase of expenditure 
(Article 40) (28). Only apparently does the Italian Constitution 
                                                                                                                       
(ed.), The Power of the Purse. The Role of European Parliaments in Budgetary 
Decisions (1976). 
26 W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (1867), chapter IV (“The House of 
Commons … has long ceased to be the checking, sparing economical body it 
once was”). 
27 See A. Zunker, Consequences of the Federal System for the Parliamentary Control of 
the Budget in the Federal republic of Germany, in D. Coombes (ed.), The Power of the 
Purse. The Role of European Parliaments in Budgetary Decisions, cit. at 25, 46. 
28 For further remarks, see P. Lalumiere, Parliamentary Control of the Budget in 
France, in D. Coombes (ed.), The Power of the Purse. The Role of European 
Parliaments in Budgetary Decisions, cit. at 25, 128, 133. 
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(1948) lay down the same principle. Indeed, following the 
Wicksellian theory, it allows Parliament to increase public 
expenditure or to introduce new programmes only if the 
corresponding revenues are indicated (Article 81). However, the 
related goal to protect the role of the executive has only partially 
been achieved (29). Only many years later, in 1988, have some 
limits been introduced by ordinary legislation, which – by virtue 
of the principle lex posterior derogat legi priori - can be modified by 
any subsequent act of Parliament. 
In sum, the solutions envisaged by national constitutions to 
prevent an uncontrolled growth of public expenditure vary 
between an extreme, the absence of a parliamentary initiative 
concerning money bills, to another, the simple need to indicate the 
corresponding public revenues. Moreover, the effectiveness of 
these limits depends on a variety of institutional and political 
factors, including the willingness of assemblies’ presidents, 
auditing bodies, and the courts to enforce them. Only some 
constitutions, such as that of Germany, allow individuals to bring 
actions before constitutional courts. However, it can be said that 
the issue indicated by less and more recent economic theory, that 
is to say the need to ensure that a proper relationship is kept 
between expenditure and revenues, is not neglected by the 
constitutions of Europe. In this sense, and within these limits, it 
can be said that there is a common constitutional tradition (30).  
 
 
B) Limits to Government Deficits and Debts 
It was pointed out earlier that the division of powers 
between the legislative and executive branch of government is not 
the only way through which modern European constitutions seek 
to limit the expansion of public debt and deficit. It will be argued 
now that other limits derive from a variety of constitutional norms 
that fulfil different functions. Furthermore it will be argued that 
the development of such limits has not only preceded, but also 
                                                 
29 See V. Onida, The Historical and Constitutional Foundations of the Budgetary 
System in Italy, in D. Coombes (ed.), The Power of the Purse. The Role of European 
Parliaments in Budgetary Decisions, cit. at 25, 215 and his fundamental and 
ponderous monograph Le leggi di spesa nella Costituzione (1969). 
30 For this thesis, see G. della Cananea, Lex Fiscalis Europea, in Quaderni 
costituzionali 15 (2014), forthcoming. 
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followed the achievement of the EMU and the more recent steps 
taken by the vast majority of its members.  
The first function that is performed by this second group of 
constitutional norms is a variation on the theme just explored, that 
is to say the maintenance of a proper relationship between 
expenditure and revenues. As Wicksell put it, “no public 
expenditure [should] ever be voted upon without simultaneous 
determination of the means of covering their cost” (31). This 
implies prescribing the antecedence of revenues with respect to 
expenditure. Parliamentary majorities cannot, therefore, choose 
revenues only after determining a certain level of public 
expenditure (32). Article 34 of the French Constitution is 
particularly explicit in this respect, while similar mechanisms are 
established elsewhere either by legislation or by parliamentary 
rules.  
The second function that is performed by constitutional 
norms is a limiting function. Sometimes, this limiting function is 
expressed in very broad terms, such as the duty to take the overall 
economic balance into due account (Article 109 of the Grundgesetz; 
Article 13 of the Austrian Constitution). Sometimes, this limiting 
function is performed more precisely, as it happened in the recent 
revision of the German Grundgesetz (33). 
A third function that is performed by constitutional norms 
is at the same time a limiting function and one of incentive. 
Consider, for example, Article 119 (6) of the Italian Constitution. It 
establishes that “Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Cities 
and Regions (…) may resort to indebtedness only as a means of 
financing investment expenditure. State guarantees on loans 
contracted for this purpose are not permitted”. While the first rule 
is a variant of the golden rule, according to which local authorities 
can only (here lies the limitation) contract loans, and thus produce 
                                                 
31 K. Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation, cit. at 19, 91.  
32 See F.A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, I, Rules and Order (1973), 
Chapter 6 (arguing that the contrary practice runs against the fundamental 
principles of a just government).  
33 For further details, see L.P. Feld – T. Daskaran, Federalism, Budget Defict and 
Public Debt: on the Reform of Germany’s Fiscal Constitution, 6 Review of L. & Econ, 
365 (2010). For a comparison with the US, see R. Kiewet – K. Szakaly, 
Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: an Analysis of State Bonded Indebtness, 12 J. 
Law, Econ & Org. 62 (1996). 
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debt, for funding investment (here lies the incentive), the other 
excludes any State guarantee on such loans. Considered as a 
whole, both rules aim at avoiding moral hazard and safeguarding 
financial stability. 
 
 
C) Financial Stability: A Common Constitutional Tradition? 
At this stage, some words are required in order to prevent 
any possible misunderstanding of the argument adumbrated 
above. Such argument is neither that the liberal democracies of 
Europe public authorities are placed under the same rules nor that 
their budgetary policies are largely the same. Indeed, there are 
important differences concerning the size of public expenditure, 
its distribution between the various public policies, and the 
respective weight of the various kinds of revenues. Such 
differences reflect national traditions, political preferences and, 
ultimately, moral choices about the role of individuals and social 
groups.  
The foregoing discussion is intended, rather, to lay the 
proper foundations for an adequate understanding of the 
principles and rules of law in the context of the EU. The Union’s 
principles and rules of law have not emerged ex nihilo. The EU is 
not simply to be viewed as a compact between States, as an area of 
economic integration that could be established by nations situated 
in every corner of the world. Quite the contrary, it is a community 
based on a set of common values. Such values include not only 
democracy and the rule of law, liberty and fundamental rights, 
but also at least a broad concept of stability of public finances. It is 
in this sense and within these limits that it can be said that a 
common constitutional tradition has emerged, imposing political 
institutions not to conduct their budgetary policies in ways which 
jeopardise financial stability in the medium run. 
Precisely because common constitutional traditions are 
general principles of Community law (34), as opposed to detailed 
                                                 
34 It is an established doctrine of the ECJ, codified by Article 6 TEU, that 
common constitutional traditions have the status of general principles of 
Community law. See G. Pizzorusso, Il patrimonio costituzionale europeo (2002). 
See also K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and 
Implications, EUI working paper n. 2012/28 (pointing out the interaction 
between the Constitution of the EU and those of its Member States ). 
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rules, they leave wide margins of manoeuvre to national policy-
makers. However, their impact must not be neglected. As the 
European Court of Justice argued in Van Gend en Loos, the Member 
States have agreed to mutually limit their sovereign rights (35). 
Accordingly, their constitutional rules concerning the 
determination and conduct of budgetary policies must be 
interpreted coherently with the engagements stemming from both 
the European treaties and the acts issued by the institutions of the 
EU. The commonalities that already existed before such treaties 
and acts came into being, therefore, are strengthened by them.  
 
 
4. Government Deficits in the Economic and Monetary Union 
Before considering how the shared value of financial 
stability is reflected in the law of the EU, it is useful to clarify that 
such law applies differently within the EMU, also in the light of 
the recent Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty of 2011, 
known as the Fiscal Compact. Next, two aspects will be 
considered. They are of particular interest, not only for their 
inherent importance as far as government deficits are considered, 
but also because of the more general light that they cast on EMU. 
The first of the aspects that will be considered concerns the 
rationale for distinguishing the expenditure for government 
investments from other parts of public expenditure. The second of 
the issues that will be examined concerns the effects of the rule 
enshrined into the Treaty. It will be argued that, whatever the 
conventional nature of the distinction between government 
expenditure for consumption and investment, the latter has a 
specific legal status.  
 
 
A) EMU and Differentiated Integration 
Descriptively, it can be said that: i) all the Member States of 
the EU have agreed to create the EMU, in addition to the Single 
Market, as instruments for achieving the “ever closer union 
between European peoples” provided by the preamble to the 
Treaty of Rome, and; ii) all of them, consequently, are subject to 
                                                 
35 ECJ, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 
(1963). 
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the “guiding principles” that govern the actions of the EU and of 
its Member States, but iii) only some of them have decided to 
renounce to their national currency, in favour of the euro, after 
satisfying the conditions and limits established by the Treaties.  
The EU is, therefore, much more fragmented than it is 
usually believed. The usual metaphor of the concentric circles can 
be used to convey the sense of this differentiation. Alternatively, 
to borrow the metaphor of the club (36), it can be said that the 
Union does not prevent its members from creating more 
integrated clubs, such as that of the countries whose currency is 
the euro (37). However, from a legal point of view, it is more 
correct to say that within the EU membership, which is the first 
and main element of a legal order (38), is differentiated. Nothing 
prevents the establishment of areas of closer or enhanced 
cooperation (39). Other forms of closer integration, moreover, can 
be established between the countries whose currency is the euro 
and the others. This is precisely the case of the recent form of 
cooperation established by the Stability, Coordination and 
Governance Treaty of 2011 between the Member States whose 
currency is the euro and some of the others, which do not adopt 
the euro (40). Although only England and the Czech Republic 
decided not to sign the new Treaty (41), formally this leaves it 
outside the area of EU law. As a consequence, the Fiscal Compact 
does not enjoy, under national constitutions, the legal status which 
                                                 
36 For this metaphor, see R.O. Keohane – J.S. Nye, Between Centralization and 
Fragmentation: the Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of 
Democratic Legitimacy, in R.B. Porter et al (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: 
The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium (2001), 286. 
37 See F.G. Snyder, EMU - integration and differentiation: metaphor for European 
Union, in P. Craig – G. de Búrca (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law (2011), 687. 
38 For this thesis, see S. Romano, L’ordinamento giuridico (1946, 2nd ed.).  
39 The preamble of the Fiscal Compact explicitly notes “the wish of the 
Contracting Parties to make a more active use of enhanced cooperation”.  
40 This differentiation is recognized and emphasized by Article 1 (2) of the Fiscal 
Compact, according to which “[T]his Treaty shall apply in full to the 
Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. It shall also apply to the other 
Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14”. 
The last recital of the Preamble refers specifically to such countries. 
41 See P. Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics 
and Pragmatism, 37 Eur. L. Rev. 231 (2012) (discussing the reasons for British 
refusal to sign the Treaty).  
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is recognized to EU law, but, more generally, that of international 
agreements 
The picture which emerges is an interesting one. The new 
Treaty is genetically and intrinsically distinct from the treaties 
upon which the EU is founded and cannot alter the obligations 
deriving from them, but it specifies such obligations and 
strengthens them. There is, moreover, a sort of “norme passerelle”. 
The distinction between the Fiscal Compact and the EU treaties, 
therefore, does not exclude a correlation. 
 
 
B) The Guiding Principle of Financial Stability 
With regard to the treaties, Articles 119 and 126 TFEU 
combine to lay down the fundamental principles of EU law 
concerning public finances.  
Article 119 is the Treaty (TFEU) provision that governs the 
economic policies of the EU and of its Member States. It is the 
provision that, in the past, has attained by far the highest profile in 
this area of EU law and the fiercest criticism, because it sets the 
four “guiding principles”. Such principles include stable prices, 
sound public finances and monetary conditions and, finally, a 
sustainable balance of payments. The increasing political 
opposition to those that were perceived as the guiding principles 
of neo-liberal economic constitution, in conjunction with free 
competition, probably explains why the drafters of the Lisbon 
Treaty decided to move this provision from Article 4 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, to the sector-specific 
provisions concerning the EMU.  
Whether its intrinsic importance has decreased, however, is 
questionable. On a formal level, what matters is that the other 
provisions of the TFEU still refer to Article 119, as a source of 
guiding principles. In particular, when dealing with the economic 
policies of both the Union and its Member States, Article 120 refers 
to the objectives of the Union and to “the principles set out in 
Article 119”. On a substantive level, the persisting high profile of 
Article 119 is demonstrated by the fact that the institutions of the 
EU constantly refer to those principles, in particular to sound 
public finances and monetary conditions. 
It is important to stress, again, that the limits introduced by 
the EU do not depend on a specific view about the level of public 
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expenditure. They depend, rather, on the more general 
preoccupation to prevent any moral hazard (42), which may 
jeopardise economic integration (43). Provided that the principle of 
financial stability is respected, in the logic of subsidiarity national 
budgetary policies can and do differ in many other respects. 
 
 
C) The Prohibition of Excessive Government Deficits 
Article 126 TFEU implements the “guiding principle” 
according to which public finances must be sound, by laying 
down a more specific principle. Its text is quite concise – “Member 
States shall avoid excessive government deficits”. Its content is 
clarified by the specific Protocol, which defines the concept of 
deficit and that of “government”, by combining the subjective 
criterion (the State, regions and local authorities) and the objective 
criterion (the funds concerning social security).  
Leaving aside for a moment what is meant by “excessive”, 
the effects of the provision regulating national deficits can be 
appreciated from a twofold point of view. First, the word “shall” 
does not leave any doubt as to whether the provision has binding 
effects. This is confirmed by the provision concerning the UK, 
according to which it must simply “endeavour” to avoid excessive 
government deficits. In other words, the special rule concerning 
the UK, which merely establishes a duty of conduct, clarifies the 
content and effects of the general rule, which instead establishes 
an effect-based prohibition, and by all means a broad provision. 
Second, the derogation from the infringement procedures set by 
the Treaty does not mean that the respect of such rule is simply 
left to the good will of the States. Indeed, a specific procedure is 
provided. It introduces a “multilateral surveillance”, which is in 
the hands of the Commission and the Council. In short, it is the 
Commission that proposes and the Council that decides whether a 
Member State has an excessive government deficit. 
Several academics and politicians have stressed the 
negative nature of the norm – a prohibition – and the fact that it is 
                                                 
42 J. von Hagen, I. Harden, National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance, in 
European Economy Reports and Studies, 1994, 311, 339. 
43 For further remarks, see I. Harden, The Constitutional Framework of the Euro: the 
Fiscal Constitution of EMU, in P. Beaumont – N. Walker, Legal Framework of the 
Euro (1999), 78 (arguing that the EMU has a “post-Keynesian constitution”). 
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unconditional, with the intent of affirming that such norm should 
be regarded as a rule, not as a principle. However, whatever the 
intellectual soundness and political desirability of a sort of 
automatic mechanism of enforcement, neither the Treaty nor 
institutional practice sustain this interpretation. To begin with, the 
institutions of the EU possess the minimum of interpretative 
leeway that is inherent in any system of legal norms. Even a quick 
look at the Treaty shows that, for all the importance of the 
quantitative standards referred to therein, such standards do not 
have the effects of precluding to a Member State the access to the 
third stage of EMU (44). Legally, it is not without significance that 
neither the 60% ratio between the debt and gross national product 
nor the 3% ratio between the deficit and the GNP is established by 
the Treaty itself, but by the specific Protocol, which can be 
amended more easily. It is still more significant that those 
quantitative standards must be weighed with other standards, of 
qualitative nature. To the extent that these standards include for 
example the substantial decline of the ratio between the deficit 
and the GNP or the level of the debt approaches “the reference 
value at a satisfactory pace” (45), it can be argued that they serve 
precisely to leave a sufficient leeway to the institutions of the EU 
(46), particularly to the Council. Institutional practice confirms this 
interpretation, even though the Court of Justice has punctually 
held that the discretionary powers enjoyed by the Council regard 
the merit of its decisions, not the procedure for assessing whether 
a deficit exists. The whole procedure cannot, therefore, be put in 
abeyance (47). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 See W. Buitler, G. Corsini, and N. Roubini, Excessive Deficits: Sense and 
Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht, Economic Policy, 1993, 60. 
45 Article 126 (2) (a) and (b) TFEU.  
46 See P. De Grauwe, The Economics of Monetary Integration (1994, 2nd ed.), 202 
(observing that “whereas the Delors Committe considered these rules to be 
binding, the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty abandonded the idea of strictly 
binding rules”).  
47 See ECJ, Case C-27/04, Commission v. Council (2004). For further remarks, see 
R. Perez, Corte di giustizia e regole fiscali dell’Unione, 10 Giorn. dir. amm., 1073 
(2004). 
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D) The Pro-Investment Choice and Its Rationales 
Within this procedure, if a Member State does not fulfil the 
requirements under one of those criteria, the Commission shall 
prepare a report and such report shall refer to a variety of 
“relevant factors”. The first of such factors is “whether the 
government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure”, 
as provided by Article 125 (3). The rationale for this norm will be 
considered more fully below. For the present, it is worthwhile 
reflecting a little on some aspects.  
First, government investment expenditure is a key element 
in the Commission’s assessment of national budgetary 
performance. While the Treaty refers generically and vaguely to 
the “relevant factors which the Commission must take into 
account, government investments are specifically referred to, 
unlike “all other relevant factors”, except the medium-term 
position of the budget.  
Second, whatever the intellectual soundness and practical 
operability of the distinction between the two components of 
government expenditure, consumption and investments, such 
distinction is not only legally relevant, but it produces very 
important effects. When the Commission assesses national deficits, 
it has the duty (expressed by the word “shall”) to take into 
account the component of government expenditure that is related 
to investments. The Commission’s role is, therefore, to operate not 
only to assess “whether the government deficit exceeds 
government investment expenditure”, but also to ensure that the 
public finances of each Member State fulfil the guiding principle 
of financial stability (48). 
Thirdly, the rule laid down by Article 126 (3) is not a 
mandatory rule, that is to say one that requires the States to spend 
public money for investments. It is, rather, a rule that 
discriminates between government expenditure for consumption 
and investment, in order to encourage or incentive the latter. 
Another way, probably more precise, of putting the same point is 
that the Treaty lays down a sort of golden rule that encourages the 
                                                 
48 O.J. Blanchard - F. Giavazzi, Improving the SGP Through a Proper Accounting of 
Public Investment, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4220. 
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Member States to have recourse to borrowing only for funding 
investments. It is, therefore, a pro-investment choice (49).  
Its underlying reasons can be explained as follows. Legal 
systems have two principal mechanisms through which to protect 
and promote those public works that Adam Smith regarded as 
necessary “for facilitating the commerce of the society, and (…) for 
promoting the instruction of the people”. They may, first, 
introduce legal norms that work as incentives. To rely solely on 
this kind of instrument can, however, be inefficacious. For this 
reason, during the twentieth century new economic theories – 
inspired by Keynes - have emphasized the more direct 
involvement of governments in the financing of investments, 
particularly in infrastructures.  
Of course, the functions of the EU in this respect cannot be 
the same as those of the States. The main differences are the 
limited competence of the Union, in the logic of subsidiarity, as 
well as its limited financial capacity. Notwithstanding these 
differences, which are not of detail, the EU can “contribute to the 
development of trans-European networks in the areas of transport, 
telecommunications and energy infrastructures” (50), that is to say 
the main services for modern industrial democracies. It may in 
particular “support project of common interests supported by 
Member States” through loan guarantees or interests-rate 
subsidies to the financing of specific projects in the area of 
transport infrastructure (51). For all the significance that such 
support may have in the perspective of providing European 
‘public goods’, it is a support limited both in scope and financial 
dimension. Much ought to be done by encouraging private actions 
brought by business holding infrastructure networks or providing 
public utilities. Much can be done also by encouraging national 
policy-makers to invest money in public works.  
The main mechanism for encouraging government 
investment expenditure contained in the Treaty is to be found in 
Article 126 (3). Under such norm any responsibility for choosing a 
                                                 
49 For the contrary opinion, see F. Balassone – D. Franco, Public Investment, the 
Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’, 21 Fiscal Studies 207, 226 (2000) (alleging that 
the rules set out in the Treaty and the SGP may negatively influence public 
investment). 
50 Article 170 (1) TFEU.  
51 Article 171 (2), third indent, TFEU.  
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certain level of public expenditure and its composition is reserved 
to national policy-makers, coherently with the principle of 
subsidiarity. What the Treaty does, rather, is to incentive them to 
use borrowing solely for investment expenditure. The underlying 
rationale is that only government investments are generally 
regarded as being capable of promoting and sustaining economic 
growth. Government expenditure for consumption has, instead, 
merely redistributive effects. Seen from this point of view, the 
distinction laid down by the Treaty reflects the preoccupation for 
any unjustified increase of government loans, although it does not 
exclude the possibility that investments are used for the purposes 
of fiscal policy.  
At this point, it is useful to clarify that the observations 
made thus far aim at providing an interpretation of the legal 
provisions of the EU concerning government investment 
expenditure. Their aim is not to consider critically neither the EU 
standards concerning government deficits nor the actions carried 
out by the institutions of the EU, particularly in the context of the 
economic and financial crisis (52). Whether there are deficiencies in 
those standards, as well as in the institutions’ manner of enforcing 
the Treaty is an important issue, but it is another one.  
For our purposes, what matters is to provide a reasonable 
interpretation of the Treaty. It is also interesting to add that 
neither the various versions of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) (53), nor the Fiscal Compact have attenuated the importance 
attached to government investments. When the Commission made 
the proposal for the first revision of the SGP, in 2004, it explicitly 
referred to government investments and the Council accepted 
such proposal (54). More recently, Regulation n. 1175/2011, which 
has confirmed the balanced-budget rule (imposing that the 
budgets of the contracting parties must be either balanced or in 
surplus), has reiterated the need that the States provide 
information concerning the main economic variables that are 
relevant for the achievement of the stability program, including 
                                                 
52 See M. Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, 48 Common 
Market L. Rev., 1777, 1786 (2011) (criticizing the measures taken by the EU to 
deal with the debt crisis, precisely because they endanger financial stability). 
53 For further details and remarks, see J.V. Louis, The Review of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, 43 Common Market L. Rev. 85, 94 (2006).  
54 Regulation n. 1055/2005 (amending Regulation n. 1466/97), Article 2-bis. 
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government investments (55). This serves to permit the States to 
have a margin of manoeuvre, especially in view of the need of 
public investments (56). The Fiscal Compact has not introduced 
any change in this legal framework. This limitation is explicitly 
acknowledged by Article 2 (1) of the Fiscal Compact, according to 
which the Treaty “shall be applied and interpreted by the 
Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded”. This is confirmed by the following 
paragraph, which provides that the Treaty “[s]hall apply insofar 
as it is compatible with the Treaties on which the European Union 
is founded and with European Law”. In conclusion, the choice 
made by the constitutional provision, Article 126 (3), has been 
confirmed by the subsequent norms and agreements. 
 
 
E) External Constraints on National Constitutions? 
A final question must be considered. It is the question 
whether the mechanism established by the Treaty and left 
unchanged by the Fiscal Compact produces undue external 
constraints on national constitutions. This question should be 
considered on both formal and substantive grounds.  
Formally, neither the Treaty of Maastricht nor the Fiscal 
Compact required the Member States to amend their constitutions. 
Rather, the former required them to take the necessary steps in 
order to ensure that the obligations stemming from the Treaty 
could be fulfilled (57) and the latter does not impose any 
constitutional change. In particular, the “heart” of the Fiscal 
Compact (58), that is to say the “balanced budget” rule and the 
obligation to introduce automatic corrective mechanisms, requires 
the contracting parties to adopt norms of permanent and binding 
nature, “preferably constitutional”. Furthermore, it explicitly adds 
                                                 
55 See Article 3 (b), of Regulation n. 1466/97, as recently amended. See also the 
Commission’s Communication A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and 
monetary union. Launching a European debate, COM(2012) 777 final/2. 
56 See the seventeenth indent preceding the text of the Regulation n. 1466/97. 
57 Article 3, Protocol on excessive government deficits.  
58 P. Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty, cit. at 41, 234.  
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that the corrective mechanism must “respect the prerogatives of 
national Parliaments” (59).  
On more substantive grounds, it may be argued that any 
mechanism of conditional incentive, such as that contained in the 
Treaty, inevitably influences the conduct of those who are subject 
to it. But this is an argument that proves too much, first, because 
this is not a mechanism of conditional funding, but of regulation, 
which is justified by a shared value, that of financial stability, and, 
second, because it largely corresponds to the ‘golden rules’ 
enacted by several legal orders, as observed earlier (60).   
There are, therefore, no legal grounds for affirming that the 
EU treaties and the Fiscal Compact have limited national 
governments’ capacity to promote investments, though from an 
economic perspective it can be argued that the latter should be 
amended (61). It is political economy or political science that may 
explain why in some countries, taxes have been cut in order to 
attract new investments, while elsewhere the high level of the debt 
accumulated in the past precludes any cut, or even requires higher 
or new taxes. It would be interesting also to understand why in 
some countries new financial resources are distributed not only to 
infrastructures, but also to education and research, while 
elsewhere pension schemes absorb an increasing portion of public 
budgets. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
No attempt will be made to summarize the entirety of the 
preceding analysis. Nor will any attempt made to set out at least 
the main lines of a legal theory of government investments. This 
would require an extensive analysis in its own right, and not just 
one or few paragraphs at the end of an article that focuses, rather, 
on the limits laid down by legal orders, those of the EU and its 
Member States, on government borrowing. Only a brief word is, 
probably, useful in order to clarify the main aspects of the 
                                                 
59 Article 3 (2) of the Fiscal Compact. See, however, F. Fabbrini, The Fiscal 
Compact, the “Golden Rule” and the Paradox of European Federalism, 36 Boston 
College Int’l & Comp. L.Rev. 1, 25 (2013) (arguing that the new legal regime is 
less respectful of state sovereignty than that of the US). 
60 Supra, § 3 B).  
61 See R. Masera, Eurobond per le infrastrutture, La Repubblica, April 16, 2012, 10.  
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argument presented above. National budgets differ in many 
respects, because their reflect distinct traditions, as well as 
divergent political preferences with regard to the size and 
composition of public expenditure. However, the powers of 
budgetary authorities are not unlimited. Quite the contrary, they 
are limited by written and unwritten constitutional norms in 
several manners. Such limits reflect a shared value, that of 
financial stability. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that the Treaty 
refers to such value, including it among the guiding principles of 
EU and national policies. It is this value that justifies the pro-
investment choice, on the underlying assumption that government 
investment expenditure can have a positive impact on growth, 
whilst ensuring that financial conditions are sound. It remains to 
be seen, of course, whether such assumption is realistic and this 
depends more on the actions of national policy-makers than on 
those of the EU, which can allow, incentive, and sustain their 
choices, but not replace them. 
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The recent sovereign debt crisis has raised further concern 
about democracy in the European Union. The paper aims at 
considering some aspects of the European economic governance 
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1. Background 
The recent sovereign debt crisis, which has put the euro 
under so much pressure, has raised further concern amongst 
scholars about democracy in the European Union1. 
The roots of the crisis can be traced back to the unsound 
fiscal policies of some Member States which forced other Member 
States and the European Union to adopt a rather hefty programme 
of financial assistance to countries threatened by insolvency. 
Democratic concerns have come to the fore in the wake of such 
                                                           
1See The Editorial, Debt and Democracy: “United States then, Europe now”?, in 
CMLR, 1833 ss.; M. Poiares Maduro, B. De Witte, M. Kumm, The Euro Crisis and 
the Democratic Governance of the Euro: Legal and Political Issues of a Fiscal Crisis, in 
RSCAS, Policy Papers, 2012/08. There are many studies concerning the legal 
aspects of the euro crisis and the effects it has had at institutional level in 
Europe. Amongst the most recent, see, K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis – 
Constitutional Aspects and Implications, EIU Working Papers, Law 2012/28, 1 ss.; 
G.L. Tosato, L’integrazione europea ai tempi della crisi dell’euro, in Riv. dir. intern., 
2012, 681 ss.; G. Napolitano, La crisi del debito sovrano e il rafforzamento della 
governance europea, in G. Napolitano (ed.), Uscire dalla crisi. Politiche pubbliche e 
trasformazioni istituzionali, (2012) 383 ss.; E. Chiti, A. Mendez, P. Teixeira (ed.), 
The European Rescue of the European Union, (2012); A. De Gregorio Merino, Legal 
Developments in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The 
Mechanism of Financial Assistance, in CMLR, 2012, 1613 ss.; H. Overbeek, 
Sovereign Debt Crisis in Euroland: Root Causes and Implications for European 
Integration, in The International Spectator, 2012, 39 ss.; M. Ruffert, The European 
Debt Crisis and European Union Law, in CMLR, 2011, 1777 ss; P. Athanassiou, Of 
Past Measures and Future Plans for Europe Exit from the Sovereign Debt. Crisis: What 
is Legally Possible (and What is Not), in Eur. L. Rev., 2011, 2 ss.; G. Grasso, Il 
costituzionalismo della crisi. Uno studio sui limiti del potere e sulla sua legittimazione 
al tempo della globalizzazione, (2012), spec. 114 ss; G. Pitruzzella, Chi governa la 
finanza pubblica in Europa, in Quad. cost., 2012, 9 ss.; E. Chiti, Le risposte alla crisi 
della finanza pubblica e il riequilibrio dei poteri nell’Unione, in Gior. dir. amm., 2011, 
311 ss.; G. della Cananea, L’ordinamento giuridico dell’Unione europea dopo i nuovi 
accordi intergovernativi, in La Comunità internazionale, 2012, 3 ss.; G. Peroni, Il 
Trattato di Lisbona e la crisi dell’euro: considerazioni critiche, in Dir. Un. Eur., 2011, 
971 ss.; A. Viterbo – R. Cisotta, La crisi del debito sovrano e gli interventi dell’U.E.: 
dai primi strumenti finanziari al Fiscal Compact, in Dir. Un. Eur., 2012, 323 ss. R. 
Baratta, Legal Issue of the Fiscal Compact – Searching for a mature democratic 
governance of the euro, in Dir. Un. eur., 2012, 647 ss.; L.S. Rossi, Fiscal Compact e 
Trattato sul meccanismo di stabilità: aspetti istituzionali e conseguenze 
dell’integrazione differenziata nell’UE, in Dir. Un. eur., 2012, 293 ss.; L. Besselink, 
The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: Europe Speaking German, in Eur. 
Const. L. Rev., 2012, 1 ss.; P. Bilancia, La nuova governance dell’eurozona: alla 
ricerca del demos, in F. Angelini – M. Benvenuti, (ed.), Il diritto costituzionale alla 
prova della crisi economica, (2012) 19 ss. 
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intervention, as seen also in the reactions of wide sectors of public 
opinion in Europe. An obvious instance are the protests in Greece 
against the austerity measures imposed by the Government to put 
into place reform programs which, it is claimed, have been drawn 
up in an emergency situation and without adequate public 
debate2. Public opinion in better-performing countries also is 
critical about having to bear the costs of dealing with the results of 
poor budgetary discipline of other Member States. 
The crisis, moreover, has also revealed the weaknesses of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) model drawn up at 
Maastricht, a model based on the distinction between monetary 
policy, the exclusive competence of the Union and entrusted to the 
European Central Bank (ECB), fiscal and economic policy, over 
which each member State still has sovereignty. The reason for the 
distinction lies in the idea that monetary policy, which must 
guarantee price stability, should be entrusted to a technical body 
operating absolutely independently of political influence by 
representative bodies. Decisions regarding economic and fiscal 
policies, on the other hand, which have redistributive impact, 
necessarily require a solid base of democratic legitimacy which 
only national political process guarantees3. This “asymmetric”4 
system, which gives monetary policy over to the exclusive 
competence of the Union but retains member States' sovereignty 
in matters of economic and budgetary policy, has not succeeded in 
preventing some States from running into such debt as to pose a 
threat to the single currency itself. Hence the need to introduce 
new mechanisms to ensure greater coordination of economic and 
fiscal policies in the countries of the euro area. Reinforcement of 
European economic governance clearly requires a corresponding 
reinforcement of democratic legitimacy in the European Union. 
I shall go on to consider some aspects of the European 
economic governance model which has emerged in response to 
                                                           
2 See the recent B. Spinelli, Se anche Keynes è un estremista, in La Repubblica 6 
February 2013, referring to the writing on the walls in Athens: “Save us no 
more!”. 
3 See E. Chiti, A. Mendez, P. Teixeira, The European Rescue of the European Union, 
cit. at 1, 397 ss. 
4 See K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and 
Implications, cit. at 1, spec. 43 ss. 
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the sovereign debt crisis5, and to assess how such a model accords 
with the principles of democracy recognised by the Treaty of 
Lisbon6. 
 
 
2. Rescue measures for struggling States 
In October 2009 the Greek government's announcement 
that its budget deficit was 12.5% of GDP rather than the 3.7% 
announced by the previous government sparked off an immediate 
reaction in financial markets resulting in a substantial drop in the 
value of Greek bonds. The crisis, exacerbated by speculation, soon 
made it plain that Greece was unable to issue new bonds at an 
acceptable interest rate.  
In the face of such a situation, calls for Greece to be left to 
its own devices came from several quarters. This would have 
meant default for Greece, departure from the euro and a return to 
a national currency, with the option in the future to use inflation 
to balance public spending and support exports7. Such a solution, 
however, would have entailed substantial losses for the banks 
(above all German and French) who had subscribed to Greek 
government bonds, with inevitable repercussions also on the 
stronger economies. Furthermore, Greece's departure would have 
endangered the whole euro system.  
Hence the decision by the Heads of State and of 
Government of the EU Member States to intervene to help 
Greece8. To this end, a package of intergovernmental measures 
was assembled, outside the Treaty framework, including a loan 
facility agreement between Greece and the other euro area States 
                                                           
5 On the “governance” in the European Union cfr. P. Bilancia, The Dynamiscs of 
the EU Integration and the Impact on the National Constitutional Law, 2012, 57 ss., 61 
ss. 
6 For an analysis of the “Provisions regarding democratic principles” which the 
Lisbon Treaty introduced in Title II of the TEU, and for referenced doctrine and 
case-law see. F. Donati, Commento all’art. 9 TUE, Commento all’art. 10 Teu and 
Commento all’art 11 TUE, in A. Tizzano (ed.), Commento al Trattato di Lisbona, 
(2013). 
7 G.L. Tosato, L’integrazione europea ai tempi della crisi dell’euro, cit. at 1, 683. 
8 See A. Viterbo – R. Cisotta, La crisi della Grecia, l’attacco speculativo all’euro e le 
risposte dell’Unione europea, in Dir. dell’Un. eur., 2010, 961 ss. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW – VOL. 5  ISSUE 2/2013 
 
133 
 
extending a credit line to Greece in the form of bilateral loans9, 
and an intercreditor agreement between creditor States. A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Greece and the 
Commission as representative of the euro area countries also 
forms part of the package and sets out the obligations to be met 
for the loan to be granted. The MoU not only requires cuts in 
public spending in order to contain the deficit to GDP ratio but 
actually also sets down the cuts that should be implemented. 
There is, moreover, an undertaking by Greece to carry out certain 
structural reforms, in the health sector and the labour market, for 
instance. The strict conditionality of financial assistance to specific 
economic and social reforms, will be confirmed in all subsequent 
rescue measures. 
In the meantime the crisis worsened, and spread to other 
countries (Portugal and Ireland). The EMU system introduced by 
the Maastricht Treaty, however, includes a number of prohibitions 
and restrictions limiting the possibility of financial support by the 
Union and Member States to those Member States facing severe 
difficulties.  
The system aims to guarantee price stability, which is the 
main objective of Union monetary policy10 and it was precisely 
with this aim in mind, laid down by Germany as a condition of 
entry into the single currency, that a number of rules have been 
introduced in order to guarantee fiscal discipline by Member 
States. In particular, Art. 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) prohibits the Union and Member 
States from sharing liability for, or assuming the obligations of, 
another Member State (no bail-out clause). The provision aims to 
ensure that Member States remain subject to market rules when 
raising debt. In this way States would be encouraged to follow 
sound budget policies, being unable to count on aid from the 
                                                           
9 The package provided for a total 110 billion euro of financial assistance, 30 of 
which contributed by the IMF and 80 by the States of the euro area. Each State 
has undertaken to share in the loan according to its capital contribution in the 
ECB. This intervention proved insufficient so much so that in July 2011 a 
restructuring programme for the Greek debt was drawn up, based on an 
exchange of government debt bonds in the hands of banks and insurance 
companies with other instruments at lower rates and longer due dates. This 
restructuring signified a loss for institutional investors on Greek public debt of 
around 50%.  
10 See Arts. 119(2) TFEU and 127(1) TFEU. 
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Union or other member States to bail them out of an insolvent 
position11.  
Art. 123 TFEU prohibits the ECB and other national central 
banks from granting overdrafts or any other form of credit facility 
to Union or Member State authorities and bodies governed by 
public law, and from buying up their own debt instruments from 
these bodies. Art. 124 TFEU also prohibits any measure which 
offers the Union or Member States privileged access to financial 
institutions. 
The only form of financial aid provided for by Union 
legislation is that under Art. 122(2) TFEU, which allows the 
Council, following a proposal by the Commission, to grant, 
“under certain conditions” financial assistance to a Member State 
who should be “in difficulties or [..] seriously threatened with 
severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control”.  
Under this provision, the Regulation establishing a 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) was adopted 
in May 201012. The creation of the EFSM made it possible for the 
Council, following a proposal by the Commission, to decide by 
qualified majority to grant financial assistance to Member States in 
the form of credit lines and conditional to the undertaking by the 
beneficiary State to re-establish a sound economic or financial 
situation. However, such financial assistance as was available to 
the EFSM for this purpose was limited to available Union budget 
funds, which at the time were around 60 billion. This sum might 
seem enormous in absolute terms but was actually totally 
inadequate considering the size of the financial crisis then 
obtaining. 
The inadequacy of the resources available in Union budget 
funds persuaded the Heads of State or of Government that in 
                                                           
11 Findings of the Court of Justice, Plenary Session, 27 November 2012, in case 
C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney 
General para. 136. On the prohibition concerned, see M.L. Tufano, Il principio del 
no bail-out nel diritto comunitario, in Dir. dell’Un. eur., 2002, 505 ss.; J.V. Louis, 
The No-Bail Out Clause and Rescue Packages, in CMLR, 2010, 971 ss. 
12 Regulation (UE) n. 407/2010 by the Council of 11 May 2010, which sets up a 
European mechanism for financial stabilisation. Regarding the legitimacy of 
recourse to Art. 122 TFEU as the legal basis for setting up the EFSM, see the 
comments of K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and 
Implications, cit. at 1, 25 ss. 
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order to face the crisis it would be necessary to operate outside the 
Union's legal framework. Recourse to international law, 
furthermore, would make it possible to overcome the resistance of 
some States, in particular the United Kingdom, who were not in 
favour of using Union resources to help euro area countries in 
difficulty. 
Thus, together with the establishment of the EFSM, 
government representatives of the 17 euro area countries reached 
an agreement under which the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) was created: a company set up under Luxembourg 
law in which the euro area States hold an interest and which 
finances itself on the international markets through bond issues 
backed by each Member State up to the sum of its capital 
contribution to the EFSF. The agreement was an international 
agreement sui generis for it allowed the EFSF to begin to operate 
without the agreement being first ratified by the national 
Parliaments of the signatory States13. A subsequent agreement 
under international law between the EFSF and the 17 euro area 
States set out the terms and conditions for financial assistance of 
up to a total 780 billion Euro. Assistance granted by the EFSF also 
is strictly conditional: the Commission, representing the 
Eurogroup countries, and the beneficiary Member are required to 
sign an MoU which details the spending cuts and structural 
reforms conditioning the financial assistance package. The EFSF is 
a temporary measure, running to 30 June 201314. 
The EFSM and the EFSF were however perceived by the 
markets as falling short of a definitive solution to the problems 
arising from the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, doubts were 
voiced about the compatibility of such instruments with the 
prohibition set out under Art. 125 TFEU concerning financial 
assistance. It was also argued that the sovereign debt crisis, having 
been caused by mistaken economic and fiscal policies on the part 
of some governments, could not be held to fall under those 
                                                           
13 Regarding the reasons which motivated the Heads of State or of Government 
to use instruments outside the Union framework to deal with the sovereign 
debt crisis see B. De Witte, Treaty Games – Law as Instrument and as Constraint in 
the Euro Crisis Policy, in Governance for the Eurozone. Integration or Disintegration?, 
2012, 139 ss.. 
14To date beneficiaries of financial assistance granted by the EFSF have been 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece. 
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“exceptional occurrences” beyond the control of a Member State 
which justify recourse to the measures under Art. 122 (2) TFEU. 
In the European Council meeting of 28 and 29 October 2010, 
the Heads of State or of Government consequently agreed on the 
need to introduce a permanent crisis resolution mechanism and 
agreed to move to a revision of the Treaties in that sense. With 
Decision 2011/199 of 25 March 2011, the European Council made 
use of the possibility under Art. 48(6) TUE to amend the TFEU by 
means of a simplified revision procedure15. By effect of such 
revision, a third paragraph was added to Art. 136 TFEU which 
expressly permits Member States whose currency is the euro, to 
“establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole” provided that 
“the granting of any required financial assistance under the 
mechanism [...] be made subject to strict conditionality”16. 
Subsequently, on 2 February 2012, the 17 States of the euro 
area signed the treaty creating the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), a permanent mechanism of financial support to safeguard 
the financial stability of the euro area as a whole17, and which 
would replace the EFSM and the EFSF18.  
                                                           
15 On this point, see B. De Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation 
of a Financial Stability Mechanism, in European Policy Analysis, 2011, in 
www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-Institutions/Documents/ SIEPS20116epa.pdf.  
16 Regarding the legitimacy of the simplified procedure used for the 
amendment of Art. 136 TFEU, see Court of Justice, Plenary Session, 27 
November 2012, in case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, 
Ireland, The Attorney General, cit. at 11. 
17 The purpose of the ESM is set out under Art. 3 of the Treaty establishing the 
Mechanism and reads: “The purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilise funding 
and provide stability support under strict conditionality, appropriate to the 
financial assistance instrument chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which 
are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, if 
indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and 
of its Member States. For this purpose, the ESM shall be entitled to raise funds 
by issuing financial instruments or by entering into financial or other 
agreements or arrangements with ESM Members, financial institutions or other 
third parties.” 
18 On institutional and operational aspects of the ESM, see, among others, G. 
Napolitano, Il Meccanismo europeo di stabilità e la nuova frontiera costituzionale 
dell'Unione, in Giorn.dir.amm., 2012, 461 ss. 
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The ESM is an international organization under 
international public law19, participated by euro area States, having 
a capital stock of approximately 700bn euro20.  Liability of each 
ESM Member State is limited to the amount of capital it has 
subscribed to. ESM assistance, granted on the basis of strict 
conditionality, is reserved to the States who have signed the Fiscal 
Compact (see para. 6 below), and therefore accepted fiscal 
discipline and strict supervision by the Commission. Similarly to 
the EFSF, financial assistance granted by the ESM can take 
different forms, such as loans21, purchase of bonds on the primary 
or secondary market22, and loans for the recapitalisation of the 
member's national banks or financial institutions23. 
The ESM is governed by the Board of Governors, composed 
of the finance ministers of the euro area States, with the 
participation – as observers – of the President of the ECB and the 
Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs. The Council 
has wide powers regarding, among other things, setting up the 
facility and the choice of financial instrument to assist the States in 
difficulty24, adopting changes to the share capital and issuing new 
shares 25. The Board of Governors also appoints the Board of 
Directors and the Managing Director.  
Decisions in matters of financial assistance must be taken 
“by mutual agreement” of the Board of Governors26, except for 
emergency cases in which resolutions may be passed by a majority 
of 85%. Control, then, of the ESM remains firmly in the hands of 
national governments. It will be up to each State, therefore, to 
guarantee that its representative on the Board of Governors shall 
operate according to the constituting principles.  
There has been much discussion regarding the 
compatibility of financial assistance measures adopted during the 
crisis (the aid package for Greece, the EFSM, the EFSF and the 
                                                           
19 For this definition, see the conclusions of the European Council of 24 March 
2011. 
20 Capital is subscribed for 80 billion; the rest of the sum can be called up as 
necessary (see Art. 8 of the ESM Treaty). 
21 Art. 16 ESM Treaty. 
22 Arts. 17 and 18 ESM Treaty. 
23 Art. 15 ESM Treaty. 
24 Art. 19 of the ESM Treaty. 
25 Arts. 8 and 10 of the ESM Treaty. 
26 Art. 5(6) ESM Treaty. 
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ESM27) with the provisions of the Treaties and in particular with 
the no bail-out clause in Art. 125 TFEU28. It has been argued 
convincingly that such provision was made to avoid “moral 
hazard”, that may occur if a State would be allowed to rely on 
recue measures by the Union or other Member States in case of 
debt crisis. The principle behind Art. 125 of the TFEU is, then, to 
avoid unsound fiscal policies by Member States and thus to 
guarantee the stability of the euro area as a whole. A similar scope 
governs the prohibition of central bank financing (Art. 123 TFEU), 
privileged access by the public sector to financial institutions (Art. 
124 TFEU) and excessive government deficits (Art. 126 TFEU). It 
may, therefore, be argued that any assistance granted based on a 
strict conditionality criterion, imposing upon the beneficiary the 
adoption of a rigorous plan for cuts to public spending and 
structural reform to reduce deficit and public debt, not only does 
not contrast with the prohibition under Art. 125 TFEU, but rather 
contributes to attaining the object of Articles 123-126 TFEU29. 
This conclusion has been confirmed by the Court of Justice 
in the Pringle case30, where it has been clarified that EU law does 
not preclude the conclusion and ratification of the EMS. The 
Court’s decision did not, however, address the issue concerning 
democratic legitimacy of decisions taken in the EMS framework31. 
                                                           
27 For an analysis of the various mechanisms of financial assistance aiming to 
contrast the effects of the sovereign debt crisis, see A. De Gregorio Merino, Legal 
Developments in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The 
Mechanism of Financial Assistance, cit. at 1, 1616 ss. 
28 In the sense that steps taken to deal with the sovereign debt crisis violate 
some of the provisions under the TFEU, and in particular the prohibition on 
financial rescue under Art. 125 TFEU, see M. Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis 
and European Union Law, cit. at 1, 1785 ss. And, in reply, see R. Smits, The 
European Debt crisis and European Union Law: Comments and Call for Action, in 
CMLR, 2012, 827 ss.  
29 See, amongst others, K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional 
Aspects and Implications, cit. at 1, 24; A. De Gregorio Merino, Legal Developments 
in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanism of 
Financial Assistance cit. at 1, 1627. 
30 Court of Justice, Plenary Session, 27 November 2012, C-370/12, Pringle v. 
Irlande, cit. at 11. 
31 In the sense that the Pringle decision has not resolved doubts regarding 
compatibility of ESM with democratic principles, see, for example, J. Tomkin, 
Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption 
of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy, in German L. J., Vol. 14, 
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As a matter of fact, the adoption of an inter-governmental 
approach normally affects democracy, and especially in 
exceptional circumstances requiring emergency action, 
parliamentary chambers at national level may only ratify choices 
already substantially decided elsewhere32.The debate, as we know, 
was particularly heated in Germany, in view of the fact that the 
German Constitutional Court has always held that the principle of 
democracy enshrined by fundamental law sets out that 
fundamental choices in fiscal matters should remain under the 
control of the people's representative body33. The Constitutional 
Court, however, held that the ESM, involving limited financial 
liability for Germany to the sum of its subscribed share, freely-
approved by the Bundestag, is compatible with the principle of 
democracy guaranteed by the fundamental Law34.  
 
 
3. European Central Bank interventions  
In view of the seriousness of the sovereign debt crisis, the 
ECB also has played an important role in supporting those States 
most seriously hit by the crisis by buying public debt bonds on the 
secondary market. 
Once the extent and seriousness of the crisis had emerged, 
the ECB Governing Council in its meeting of 14 May 2010 
approved the Securities Market Program (SMP), a program for the 
purchase on secondary markets of euro area government bonds. 
                                                                                                                                              
2012, 185 ss.; P. Augustijn Van Malleghem, Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the 
European Union’s Monetary Constitution, in German L. J., Vol. 14, 2012, 164-165. 
See also V. Borger, The ESM and the European Court’s Predicament in Pringle, in 
German L. J., 2013, 113 ss.; 
32 See Editorial, Debt and Democracy: “United States then, Europe now”?, cit. at 1, 
1837. 
33  See the decision of 7 September regarding aid to Greece. 
34 See BVergG, decision of 12 September 2012, cit. On the decision, see, among 
others, F. Pedrini, Le “cautele” di Karlsruhe in ordine al Fondo “salva Stati” 
(commento alla sentenza del Tribunale costituzionale del 12 settembre 2012), in Quad. 
cost., 2012, 894 ss.; G. Grasso, Il costituzionalismo della crisi. Uno studio sui limiti 
del potere e sulla sua legittimazione al tempo della globalizzazione, cit. at 1, 124 ss. 
(and other citations therein); K. Schneider , Yes, But ... One More Thing: 
Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the European Stability Mechanism, in German L. J., 2013, 53 
ss.; M. Wendel, Judicial Restraint and the Return to Openness: The Decision of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 
September 2012, in German L. J., 2013, 21 ss. 
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As a result of this decision, the ECB purchased bonds of troubled 
States of the euro area on the secondary markets for a sum of 
around 210 billion euro. 
According to the ECB, these operations do not violate the 
prohibition of central bank financing of public expenditures under 
Art. 123 of the TFEU, which bans only operations on the primary 
market. The purchase of debt instruments bonds targeted by 
speculators, from this view, would be carried out to “safeguard an 
appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of 
the monetary policy”, which might be hindered by an excessive 
disequilibrium in interest rates among Member States. However, it 
appear obvious that the main objectives of this kind of measures is 
to assist crisis states and to promote stability in the euro area35. 
In the meeting on 6 September 2012, the ECB Governing 
Council decided nonetheless to replace the SMP with Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT), a mechanism which allows an 
unlimited purchase on the secondary market of sovereign debt 
instruments of euro area States. The ECB has underlined that the 
OMT will make it possible to “address severe distortions in 
government bond markets which originate from, in particular, 
unfounded fears on the part of investors about the reversibility of 
the euro” and specified that as such operations aim to counter 
“risks to price stability over the medium term” they are “strictly 
within [the ECB's primary] mandate”36.  
Activating OMT is subordinate to the Member State 
adhering to an EFSF/ESM programme as well as committing to 
structural reforms to restore financial stability. By this means a 
strong link is formed between ESM interventions, aimed at 
guaranteeing assistance to States in difficulties and those of the 
ECB aimed at guaranteeing appropriate monetary policy 
transmission. 
The ECB's intervention looks hardly compatible with the 
model drawn at Maastricht which guarantees that the ECB (and 
                                                           
35 Scholars have expressed doubts concerning the compatibility of this type of 
intervention by the ECB with Union law, and in particular with prohibitions set 
out under Arts. 123 and 125 of the TFEU. See considerations by Ruffert, The 
European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, cit. at 1, 1787-8. See, also, K. Tuori, 
The European Financial Crisis - Constitutional Aspects and Implications, cit. at 1, 28-
29. 
36 See BCE, Bollettino Settembre 2012, 5, 11. 
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national central banks) have a completely independent position. In 
this model, monetary policy not only requires no democratic 
legitimacy but, rather, must be entrusted to an independent 
technical body abstracted from the pressures and conditionings of 
representative bodies.  
The crisis situation casts doubts on this model. With the 
SMP and ODT, in actual fact, the border line between operations 
of purely monetary policy aiming to guarantee price stability and 
measures of financial assistance has become rather hazy. The crisis 
situation, it has been noted, reflects a trend towards the 
“politicisation” of monetary policy37, as confirmed by the 
circumstance that the ECB, together with the IMF, has been 
actively involved, albeit in a consulting capacity, in the drawing 
up of all the rescue plans for States in critical situations (the aid 
package for Greece, and the EFSM, EFSF and ESM). At present 
under discussion is a proposal for regulation attributing to the 
ECB powers of vigilance over the banking system. Heads of State 
or of Government agreed at the euro summit of 29 June 2012 that, 
once the central regulatory mechanism of banks is put into place, 
the ESM would be able to directly recapitalise banks. This further 
confirms the complementary nature of actions by the ESM and the 
ECB. 
The powers of the ECB have, therefore, undergone a 
significant transformation, allowing it in actual fact to operate as 
lender of last resort also for Member States38 in order to contribute 
to their rescue and maintain the stability of the euro area as a 
whole39. It would appear difficult, therefore, to justify the 
subtraction of this type of action by the ECB from any form of 
democratic control40. 
 
 
                                                           
37 See K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis - Constitutional Aspects and 
Implications, cit. at 1, 38. 
38 See P. De Grauwe The European Central Bank: Lender of Last Resort in the 
Government Bond Markets?, in Governance of the Eurozone. Integration or 
Disintegration? (2012) 17 ss. 
39 See K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis - Constitutional Aspects and 
Implications, cit. at 1, 17. 
40 See Editorial, Debt and Democracy: “United States then, Europe now”?, cit. at 1, 
1837 ss.  
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4. The Eurobond Debate  
The financial support measures granted to crisis States has 
not removed the difficulty encountered by some States to find 
funding at reasonable rates in the financial markets. The persistent 
difference between national bond interest rates clearly creates 
competitive disadvantages for the weaker States who are forced to 
bear greater financing burdens just when they are committed to 
harsh austerity policies to balance their budgets. From here 
springs the debate over the feasibility of introducing “Eurobonds” 
or, as the Commission calls them in its Green Paper, “Stability 
Bonds”41. 
Issuing common European national debt bonds, considered 
“at par in importance with the introduction of the single 
currency”42, would enable Member States to obtain financing at a 
uniform rate. The elimination of spreads in sovereign debt 
instrument prices could help reduce economic and competitive 
strains which the weaker countries are forced to face, and would 
substantially reduce the risk of a new European sovereign debt 
crisis. 
The guarantee offered by States pooling their borrowings 
could be without joint liability, in the sense that each State would 
guarantee bond subscribers only for its quota of revenue flows. A 
second option would be to have eurobonds with joint liability, in 
the sense that each EU member would be fully liable for the entire 
issuance independently of its own part of revenues.  
The introduction of the stability bond backed up by 
proportional guarantees would not require an amendment to the 
Treaties. It would in fact be a mechanism under certain aspects 
similar to that already tried and tested with the EFSM and the 
ESM, considered compatible with the no bail-out clause under Art. 
125 TFEU. The advantages of this type of common bond issue 
would however be limited, because the guarantee offered by the 
countries with lower ratings would end up limiting the 
creditworthiness of this type of stability bond, involving therefore 
necessarily higher financing costs for the countries participating in 
the common issuance. 
                                                           
41 Commission Green Paper on the Feasibility of Introducing Stability Bonds, 
Brussels, 23 November 2011, COM(2011) 818. 
42 See European Parliament Resolution of 16 January 2013 on the feasibility of 
introducing Stability Bonds (2012/2028(INI)) 
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Creditworthiness of the stability bond would be greatly 
increased if backed by a joint guarantee on the part of all the States 
taking part in the joint issue. The substitution (in whole or in part) 
of national bond issues with this type of stability bond would thus 
enable all States benefiting from the joint issue to enjoy more 
favourable rates for their debt financing, independently of the 
condition of their respective national finances. However, this 
could trigger a moral hazard, in the sense that crisis countries 
might be induced to rely on the stability bonds and consider not 
necessary to tighten their fiscal policy discipline; to this respect, 
the greater the proportion of national bonds substituted, the 
greater the tendency towards more lenient policies might be.  
In order, then, to introduce stability bonds backed by joint 
guarantees on the part of the issuing States, an amendment to Art. 
125 TFEU would not be enough; at present this Article prohibits 
sharing of liability for government debt by the Union and Member 
States43. The need to prevent or in any case limit the moral hazard, 
in actual fact, would require a further amendment to the treaties to 
allow tighter coordination between economic and fiscal policies of 
euro area States. But a further step towards economic and 
financial integration requires parallel reinforcement of the 
democratic legitimacy of the EMU.  
It must also be remembered that, according to the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, the persisting European Union 
democratic deficit requires that the decisions on revenue and 
expenditure of the public sector remains in the hands of the 
Bundestag. From this springs the prohibition on accepting the 
setting up of a permanent mechanism “which could involve the 
undertaking of commitments arising through the free decisions of 
other Member States, particularly if they present consequences 
whose effects are difficult to calculate”. According to the 
Constitutional Court, as elected representatives of the people, the 
members of the national parliament must remain in control of 
                                                           
43 In the sense that Art. 125 TFEU prohibits issue of eurobonds guaranteed 
jointly by issuing States, see Gregorio Merino, Legal Developments in the Economic 
and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanism of Financial Assistance, 
cit. at 1, 1631. 
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fundamental budget policy decisions, in an intergovernmental 
governance as well44. 
The principles established by the German Constitutional 
Court undoubtedly strictly limit the possibility of introducing 
stability bonds with joint liability, in the absence of a case by case 
prior authorization by the Bundestag. Only a strengthening of the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union could contribute to 
overcoming such limits.  
 
 
5. Coordination of economic and fiscal policies in the EMU model 
prior to the crisis  
The decision to introduce the euro was based on the 
conviction that the co-existence of a plurality of national monetary 
policies hindered the correct functioning of the single market. The 
attempts to introduce exchange-rate stabilisation mechanisms, 
such as, for example, the European Monetary System, had proved 
insufficient to avoid market distortions arising from fluctuations 
in national currency values. Hence the move to monetary union to 
protect the single market from exchange rate variations thereby 
guaranteeing those conditions of stability necessary to encourage 
the circulation of factors of production45. 
The authors of the Maastricht treaty were, however, well 
aware of the fact that while money is a prerogative of a sovereign 
State, Europe is not a federal State and in particular Member 
States would not be willing to cede control of their economic 
policy. Furthermore they well knew that economic policy 
decisions have redistributive consequences and impact on social 
                                                           
44 See the decision by the BVerfG of 7 September 2011 regarding aid to Greece 
and the decision of 12 September 2012 regarding the ESM. See M. Wendel, 
Judicial Restraint and the Return to Openness: The Decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal treaty of 12 September 2012, cit. at 35, 
21 ss.; S.K. Schmidt, A Sense of Déjà Vu? The FCC’s Preliminary European Stability 
Mechanism Verdict, in German L. J., Vol. 14, 1 ss.; K. Schneider, Yes, But … One 
More Thing: Karisruhe’s Ruling on the European Stability Mechanism, cit. at 35, 53 
ss. 
45 On the issues which led to the introduction of the single currency, see G.L. 
Tosato – R. Basso, L’unione economica e monetaria, 2007, 14 ss. 
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service provision. For this reason they require democratic 
legitimacy which only national parliaments can guarantee46. 
To guarantee that the EMU held together, notwithstanding 
the weaknesses of a model based on the separation of monetary 
and economic policy, rigid criteria of sound public finance and 
price stability were imposed to Member States for admission to 
the euro area.47 Moreover, Member States have been encouraged 
to maintain fiscal discipline.  To this end, together with the 
prohibitions on financial bail-out48, public-spending funding by 
central banks49 and privileged access to financial institutions by 
the public sector50, a general prohibition of excessive deficit was 
laid down, by imposing a limit on government deficit and debt 
with respect to gross domestic product51. 
The Treaties furthermore impose on the Member States the 
obligation to coordinate their respective economic policies and 
entrust to the Union the task of promoting this coordination52. The 
EMU system drawn up at Maastricht introduced a procedure in 
this regard requiring the adoption by the Council, on the basis of 
conclusions by the European Council, of a recommendation which 
sets out broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member 
States and the Union. The recommendation is not legally binding, 
essentially representing a soft law instrument targeted at 
encouraging Member States to follow a sound and prudent 
budgetary policy. The Council is required to inform the European 
Parliament regarding the recommendation53. 
Preventive measures were also introduced to supervise the 
development of the economic policies of the Member States and 
                                                           
46 See the comments by K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis - Constitutional 
Aspects and Implications, cit. at 1, 9. 
47 See Art. 140 TFEU, which requires a series of parameters to be met regarding 
price stability, public finance sustainability, limited fluctuation of exchange 
rates and long-term interest-rate levels, detailed in an appropriate Protocol 
annexed to the Treaties. 
48 Art. 125 TFEU. 
49 Art. 123(1) TFEU. 
50 Art. 124 TFEU. 
51Art. 126(1) and (2) TFEU. Protocol on the procedure for excessive deficit 
indicates that government deficit and debt cannot exceed, respectively, 3% and 
60% of gross domestic product. 
52 See Arts. 2(3) and 5(1) TFEU. 
53 See Art. 121(2) TFEU. 
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also adjustment measures in the event that a Member State should 
find itself with an excessive public deficit. 
In the first of these categories is the “multilateral 
surveillance” provided for under Art. 121 TFEU. In this regard, 
the Commission and the Council may issue warnings or 
recommendations (not legally binding) to the Member States 
whose economic policies are not in line with the broad guidelines 
set by the Council or which risk jeopardising the proper 
functioning of the EMU54. The European Parliament is simply 
informed of the results of this multilateral surveillance55. The 
Stability and Growth Pact56 has tried to strengthen this preventive 
control procedure. Here, Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 laid down 
the obligation of the States to deliver to the Council and the 
Commission medium-term programmes for meeting deficit and 
public debt criteria set under European Union law. The Council 
may recommend that the State concerned modify such 
programmes where they are deemed inadequate, and in any case 
it monitors activation, assisted by the Commission and the Social 
and Economic Committee. In those cases where the programme is 
found to be inadequately implemented, the Council may issue a 
recommendation (again, not legally binding) to the State 
concerned inviting it to adopt adequate adjustment measures. 
Should the preventive arm not reach the hoped-for results, 
the corrective measures set out under Art. 126 TFUE are supposed 
to take over. The Council, following a proposal by the 
Commission and considering submissions by the State concerned, 
may establish that there is an excessive deficit and, again upon 
proposal by the Commission, adopt a recommendation addressed 
to the State that they bring an end to the situation within a certain 
time period. Should this recommendation produce no effect, the 
                                                           
54 See Art. 121(3) and (4) TFEU. 
55 See Art. 121(5) TFEU. 
56 The SGP consisted initially of Council Resolution of 17 June 1997, and of two 
Council Regulations of 7 July 1997: Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies, and Council Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure. As is known, the SGP was reformed in 2005 allowing for 
greater tolerance for countries going over the 3% threshold ratio of debt to GDP 
(France and Germany at that time) but who had put into place public spending 
restructuring.  
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Council may adopt the measures deemed necessary for reducing 
the deficit and, in the event, also adopt further measures among 
which specific sanctions, including a non-interest bearing deposit 
until the deficit should be adjusted, or appropriate fines. The 
European Parliament is not involved in this procedure, being 
merely informed of the Council decisions57. Regulation (EC) No. 
1467/97, adopted as part of the stability and growth pact, later 
introduced a series of measures to speed up and clarify the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. In concrete 
terms, however, the excessive deficit procedure has actually been 
started up several times, addressed at one time or another to most 
of the Member States, but it has never closed with the application 
of sanctions. 
The principles of economic constitution defined in the 
Maastricht Treaty, then, retain Member State’s sovereignty in 
economic and fiscal policy, with a duty of coordination in the 
framework of a mutual surveillance procedure and subject to 
corrective measures that can be imposed within the excessive 
deficit procedure. This model has not been modified by successive 
amendments to the Treaties. The Lisbon Treaty limited itself to 
introducing an article dedicated to the countries of the euro area 
which allows the Council to adopt specific measures to strengthen 
coordination and surveillance of budget discipline and to set out 
appropriate guidelines for economic policy58, and also to formalise 
the constitution of the Eurogroup, that is, only members of the 
Council representing States whose currency is the euro59. 
In the absence of an effective power of European economic 
governance, no major issue of democratic legitimacy arises: 
choices of economic policy lie in the hands of the Member States 
and are legitimised by their respective national parliaments. In 
this prospect, the absence of effective role by the European 
Parliament in the definition of the economic policy guidelines for 
Member States triggers no major democratic problem either. Nor 
does the failure to have the European Parliament take a part in the 
excessive deficit procedure appear to harm democratic principles, 
                                                           
57 Art. 126(7) TFEU. 
58 Art. 136 TFEU. 
59 Art. 138 TFUE. 
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as it is a procedure which aims essentially to guarantee fulfilment 
of obligations already provided for by Treaties. 
It is nonetheless clear that a transformation of this model 
which would grant to Union bodies effective guideline and 
coordinating powers, such as would void or in any case drastically 
limit the choices of national parliaments in deciding their own 
economic policy would require that action by the bodies of the 
European Union be supported by a strong democratic legitimacy 
base, which the Treaties have not yet guaranteed. 
 
 
6. The strengthening of the economic governance of the European 
Union  
The sovereign debt crisis has revealed the weaknesses of 
the EMU model defined in the Maastricht Treaty as reinforced 
with the Stability and Growth Pact. In fact, the guideline, 
coordinating and surveillance instruments provided for have 
proved too weak and have not prevented unsound budgetary 
policies by certain Member States, threatening the entire euro 
system. Alongside interventions of financial assistance, aimed at 
dealing with the sovereign debt crisis in the immediate term, 
provision was made for a strengthening of the powers of the 
Union in matters of coordination of economic and fiscal policy of 
Member States, to avoid in the future sovereign debt crisis in the 
euro area. Similarly to what happened for financial assistance 
measures, Member States have made use of both European Union 
law and of agreements under public international law. 
In the first category is the “six pack”, a package of five 
regulations and one directive aimed at improving coordination of 
Member States' economic policies and tightening the excessive 
deficit procedures60. The main objective of the six pack is to 
                                                           
60 Six pack includes: Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement and 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area; Regulation (EU) no. 1174/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area; 
Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) no. 1466/97 on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies; Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
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strengthen “multilateral surveillance” and the procedure for 
excessive deficit provided for under Arts. 121 and126 TFEU and 
finalised with the Stability and Growth Pact. In particular, the 
reform reinforced the conditions which would trigger the 
excessive deficit procedure61, reduced the time periods for the 
procedure and toughened the sanctions. In addition, the reform 
reduced the risk that sanctions could be blocked by a Council 
decision62, through the introduction of a “reverse qualified 
majority” voting procedure: if previously sanctions were decided 
by the Council by qualified majority, it is now up to the 
Commission to set the sanctions which the Council can block only 
by a qualified majority vote. Furthermore, Regulation (EU) No. 
1174/2011 introduced a new procedure for the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances, understood as the 
negative trends of the economy of a single State which could risk 
spreading to the whole EMU. Such a procedure is based on a 
preventive-corrective set of measures where the Commission and 
the Council work together to issue recommendations and 
adjustment plans to the Member State concerned with the 
possibility of applying financial sanctions up to 0.1% of GDP. 
Finally, Directive 2011/85/UE introduced further limitations to 
the fiscal independence of a Member State, in order to guarantee 
that parameters and objectives set under European Union law will 
be met. 
The reinforcement of European economic governance 
clearly poses a question of democratic legitimacy63. In this regard, 
Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011, which modifies Council 
Regulation no. 1444/97/CE on the strengthening of the 
                                                                                                                                              
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances; Council Regulation 
(EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) no. 
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure; Council Directive 2011/85/UE of 8 November 2011 on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. 
61 Following the reform, in fact, for the procedure under ex Art. 126 TFEU to be 
triggered it is now enough to have excessive public debt, even if the budget is 
within the parameters. 
62 As happened, for example, under the procedure for excessive deficit 
commenced in 2002 and 2003 against Germany and France. 
63 Point 9 of the preamble to Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011, acknowledges that 
“strengthening economic governance should include a closer and more timely 
involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments.” 
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surveillance of budgetary positions and coordination of economic 
policies, introduced what it termed an “Economic Dialogue”. By 
this procedure, the competent parliamentary committee may 
invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where 
appropriate, the President of the European Council or the 
President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to 
discuss the measures adopted for the coordination of the Member 
States' economic policies. The participation of the European 
Parliament in the choices of economic governance offered by the 
“economic dialogue” would, therefore, still seem to be 
insufficient64. 
Finally, in November 2011, the Commission put forward 
the proposal for the so-called “two pack”, a new package made up 
of two regulations aimed at further reinforcing the tools of 
economic and budgetary surveillance and adjustment of excessive 
deficits for the euro area countries65. The proposal, still to be 
approved, obliges the euro area States to submit to the 
Commission and to the Council by 15 October each year, the 
budget proposal for the following year. The Commission assesses 
the budget proposal against the obligations deriving from 
European Union law and the recommendations of the Council. 
The Member States in serious financial difficulties will be 
subjected to a tougher monitoring than that provided for under 
Art. 126 TFEU in the framework of excessive deficit procedure. 
Both the “Euro Pact Plus”66 and the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
                                                           
64 See C. Fasone, The Struggle of the European Parliament to Participate in the New 
Economic Governance, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2012/45, 11 ss. 
65 See COM(2011)819 final, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area” and 
COM(2011) 821 final, on “common provisions for monitoring and assessing 
draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area.” 
66 The euro plus pact, an agreement of a political nature without any immediate 
legal effect, was signed by the euro area States along with Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. The pact is open for participation by 
other Member States as stated in the annex to the European Council 
Conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2011 (EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1).  
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Union, commonly known as “Fiscal Compact”,67 are agreements 
under international public law.  
The Fiscal Compact, signed on 2nd March 2012 by 25 out of 
27 Member States68, largely confirms the rules laid down in the six 
pack69. It aims to strengthen financial stability in the euro area 
through greater coordination of the economic and fiscal policies of 
the Member States70 and is closely linked to the ESM in the sense 
that only those States who have underwritten the Fiscal Compact 
can benefit from the assistance thereunder. 
Although the Fiscal Compact is an inter-governmental 
agreement outside the EU legal framework, the contracting parties 
agreed that the substance of the Fiscal Compact should be 
incorporated in the legal framework of the European Union 
within five years at most. In any case the Fiscal Compact must be 
interpreted and applied in conformity with European Union law 
                                                           
67 On the Fiscal Compact, see, among others, R. Baratta, Legal Issue of the Fiscal 
Compact – Searching for a mature democratic governance of the euro, cit. at 1, 647 ss.; 
L.S. Rossi, Fiscal Compact e Trattato sul meccanismo di stabilità: aspetti istituzionali e 
conseguenze dell’integrazione differenziata nell’UE, cit. at 1, 293 ss.; L. Besselink, The 
Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: Europe Speaking German, cit. at 1, 1 
ss. 
68 On the events which led the Heads of State or of Government to proceed with 
an international treaty rather than via an amendment to the primary law of the 
European Union, see editorial Some thoughts concerning the Draft Treaty on a 
Reinforced Economic Union, in CMLR, 2012, 1 ss., which shows how the decision 
to go ahead with the Fiscal Compact was in great measure due to the need to 
get over the UK veto on strengthening budgetary discipline in the Member 
States through amendment of the Treaties. Regarding the content of the Fiscal 
Compact see contributions in G. Bonvicini – F. Brugnoli (ed,), Il Fiscal Compact, 
(2012). 
69 According to S. Peers, The Stability Treaty: Permanent Austerity or Gesture 
Politics?, in Eur. Const. L. Rev., 2012, 404 ss., none of the provisions of the Fiscal 
Compact would be necessary from a legal point of view insofar as they are 
already provided for in European Union Law (in particular, the “six pack”) or 
could easily be provided for by acts of European Union Law. Rather, according 
to this author, the Fiscal Compact is of import politically, easing for those States 
participating in the EMS and the EFSF approval from their respective 
Parliaments. Scholars have raised several doubts regarding the legitimacy of the 
Fiscal Compact (see for all P. Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance 
Treaty: Principles, Politics and Pragmatism, ELR, 2012, 231 ss.) settled however by 
the Court of Justice in the above-referenced Pringle decision. 
70 See Art.1 of the Fiscal Compact. 
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and does not limit the competency of the Union in questions of 
economic and monetary policy71.  
The most significant aspect of the Fiscal Compact is the 
“balanced budgetary position” rule72, which the contracting 
parties are obliged to enter into national law preferably at a 
constitutional level73. This rule imposes certain limits to the annual 
structural balance of general government and to the debt/GDP 
ratio. Should these limits be exceeded, provision is made for an 
automatically triggered correction mechanism to come into effect 
which includes the obligation of the party concerned to implement 
the necessary measures to correct the deviations. The Fiscal 
Compact sets out that such a mechanism shall “fully respect the 
prerogatives of national Parliaments”. Notwithstanding this 
(somewhat vague) provision, the fact is that it is the Commission 
who defines the principles regarding the nature, size and time-
                                                           
71 See Art. 2 of the Fiscal Compact. 
72 See Art. 3 of the Fiscal Compact. For an analysis of the institutional aspects 
deriving from the balanced budget rule as governed by the Fiscal Compact, see 
F. Fabbrini, The Fiscal Compact, the 'Golden Rule' and the Paradox of European 
Federalism (May 1, 2012), in http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2096227. The 
author shows how the obligation on Member States to adopt such a rule entails 
a strong centralisation in the make-up of European economic governance, far 
greater than that found in the federal make-up of the US where the federal 
government does not have the power to influence budgetary processes in the 
States. The author highlights the paradox which sees Member States on the one 
hand systematically dismissing an invitation to create a federal structure for the 
EMU, arguing that this would violate their sovereignty in economic and 
budgetary policies, and on the other hand setting up a system of European 
economic governance which impacts on State sovereignty to a far greater extent 
than would be allowed in a federal state. 
73 According to C. Pinelli, La dimensione internazionale della crisi finanziaria, in 
http://www.gruppodipisa.it/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Pinelli.pdf, 7,, “insofar as it 
impacts on the monopoly of the Member States over the power to decide 
constitutional matters on their national territory”, the Fiscal Compact raises 
serious issues of contrast with the respect for Member States' “national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional” 
(Art. 4 (2) TUE). For an analysis of Constitutional Law No. 1 of 2012, which 
introduced the balanced budget into our body of laws and on the compatibility 
of this with the fundamental principles of the Constitution, see M. Luciani, 
Costituzione, bilancio, diritti e doveri dei cittadini, in http://www.astrid-
online.it/rassegna/06-02-2013/Luciani_Varenna-2012.pdf. For a stiff criticism 
of the Fiscal Compact, from the point of view that it would alter the principles 
of equality among Member States, see F. Bilancia, Note critiche sul c.d. “pareggio 
di bilancio”, in Riv. telem. giur. Assoc. it. costit., n. 2/2012, 4. 
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frames of the corrective actions to be adopted without the 
participation of the European Parliament or of the national 
Parliaments74. The role entrusted to the European Parliament is 
therefore marginal.75 Considered from this aspect, the Fiscal 
Compact would appear to accentuate the democratic deficit 
issue.76 
The State which is subject to an excessive deficit procedure 
shall put in place an economic and fiscal partnership programme 
which should include a detailed description of the structural 
reforms to be addressed and implemented for an effective and 
lasting fixing of its excessive deficit. The Fiscal Compact sets out 
that the content and format of such programmes “shall be defined 
in European Union law”77, most likely in a decision by the Council 
as provided under Art. 126(9) TFEU.  
The contracting States have undertaken to work together to 
develop a policy which strengthens the proper functioning of the 
EMU and economic growth through enhanced convergence and 
competitiveness78. Furthermore, the contracting States are 
required to take account of best practices benchmarks when 
planning economic policy reform79. 
Provision is made for Heads of State or of Government to 
meet informally at least twice a year with the President of the 
European Commission. The President of the ECB will also be 
invited to take part (Euro Summit meetings), to discuss matters 
relating to the governance of the euro area and of its rules as well 
as the strategic orientations of economic policy required to 
increase convergence in the euro area80. Whilst the ECB President 
may take part in the Euro Summits, the President of the European 
Parliament can take part only upon invitation. 
                                                           
74 Art. 3(2) of the Fiscal Compact entrusts to the European Commission the 
definition of “common principles […] concerning in particular the nature, size 
and time-frame of the corrective action to be undertaken.” 
75 See L.S. Rossi, Fiscal Compact e Trattato sul meccanismo di stabilità: aspetti 
istituzionali e conseguenze dell’integrazione differenziata nell’UE, cit. at 1, 301. 
76 R. Baratta, Legal Issue of the Fiscal Compact – Searching for a mature democratic 
governance of the euro, cit. at 1, 675. 
77 Art. 5(1) of the Fiscal Compact. 
78 Art. 9 of the Fiscal Compact. 
79 Art. 11 of the Fiscal Compact. 
80 Art. 12 of the Fiscal Compact. 
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National Parliaments and the European Parliament are 
required to define the organisation and promotion of a conference 
of representatives of the relevant committees in order to discuss 
fiscal policies and other matters pertaining to the euro area81. It is 
to be hoped that on such occasion the sensitive issue of democratic 
legitimacy of European economic governance will be addressed. 
Economic and fiscal policy, which determines redistributive 
effects, do in fact require strong democratic legitimacy. If Member 
States retain sovereignty in this area, as provided by the 
Maastricht EMU model, democratic legitimacy can be granted at 
national level. If, on the other hand, this model is superseded by 
means of a progressive reinforcement of European economic 
governance, it must be ensured that this governance itself shall 
have sufficient democratic legitimacy. 
 
 
7. Closing Remarks 
The sovereign debt crisis which recently hit the euro area 
confirms the structural weakness of the EMU model adopted with 
the Treaty of Maastricht. This model is based on the principle of 
Europeanised monetary policy and Member States fiscal 
sovereignty, save (weak) preventive and corrective measures to 
avoid excessive deficit. This model has not prevented sovereign 
debt crisis that have threatened the whole euro system. 
A substantial financial assistance rescue plan composed by 
a number of different instruments (bilateral loan agreements, 
EFSM, EFSF, ESM) has been implemented. This plan, which has 
been cleared by various constitutional courts82 and the European 
Court of Justice83, has prevented the default of those States more 
exposed to financial speculation and so also the collapse of the 
euro area itself. However, democracy principles remain at issue. 
The management of rescue measures, in fact, does not provide for 
enough involvement of the European Parliament or of national 
                                                           
81 Art. 13 of the Fiscal Compact. 
82 See decisions of the Supreme Court of Estonia of 12 July 2010 on the ESM (no. 
3-4-1-6-12), by the Conseil constitutionnel of 9 August 2012 on the Fiscal 
Compact (decision no. 2012-653 DC), by the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 
September 2012 on the ESM and on the Fiscal Compact (BVerfG, 2 BvR 
1390/12). 
83 See Decision in the Pringle case C-370/12, cit. at 11.  
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Parliaments. It is entrusted principally to institutions which 
operate either according to the inter-governmental method such as 
the EMS, or from a position of total independence of 
democratically representative bodies, such as the ECB. The use of 
public funds necessary for this type of intervention and the 
definition of terms and conditions for the financial assistance, 
including structural reforms impacting on social rights84, have 
been agreed substantially in places that lie on the outskirts of 
representative democracy circuits  
Alongside the measures of financial assistance, European 
economic governance has been strengthened by tightening 
preventive and corrective measures aimed at coordinating 
economic and fiscal policy and avoiding excessive deficit in 
Member States. The redistributive effects of economic and fiscal 
policy choices, however, require a democratic legitimacy which 
can no longer be provided by national parliaments, as previously 
occurred in the Maastricht EMU model. 
In its meeting on 13/14 December 2012, the European 
Council agreed on a roadmap for the completion of the EMU85 
based on a deeper integration and reinforced solidarity. The 
conclusions of the European Council indicate that with the 
strengthening of euro area governance the general objective 
remain to ensure democratic legitimacy and accountability at the 
level at which decisions are taken and implemented. But no 
concrete indications were provided as to how to actually ensure 
that the European economic and fiscal governance should be 
exercised with due respect for democratic principles. The problem 
moreover is complicated by a “democratic asymmetry” which 
springs from the fact that there is no exact overlap between the 
people of the euro area and those represented at the European 
Parliament. Democracy on the one hand demands that all those 
concerned be given a chance to participate through their 
                                                           
84 See comments by G. Grasso, Il costituzionalismo della crisi. Uno studio sui limiti 
del potere e sulla sua legittimazione al tempo della globalizzazione, cit. at 1, spec. 145 
ss. 
85 Conclusions of the European Council of 13/14 December 2012, EUCO 205/12, 
which incorporate the proposals contained in the two papers drawn up by the 
President of the European Council, in close cooperation with the Presidents of 
the European Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank, 
presented on 26 June 2012 and 2 October 2012 respectively. 
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representatives and, on the other, hand, requires that those not 
concerned be left without voice86. 
The sovereign debt crisis has clearly indicated the need to 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of European economic 
governance. The democratic issue will therefore remain at the 
centre of the debates on the future of European integration. 
 
                                                           
86 See K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and 
Implications, cit. at 1, 46. 
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Abstract 
The essay investigates the consequences of the current 
economic crisis on the European legal systems. In particular, the 
article suggests that the crisis is not the main cause of the damage 
suffered by constitutional systems. According to the author, the 
reasons of these transformations are deeper and more structural 
than the urgent need to fight against financial crisis. This kind of 
emergency simply introduced a new factor into the complex 
evolution of contemporary legal systems i.e. the crisis of the 
overall legitimacy of public institutions. Therefore, reflections on 
the decrease of trust in political bodies bring to the loss of rigidity 
of national Constitutions, because a reduction in legitimacy has 
repercussions on the legal superiority of constitutional sources. 
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1. The theories 
Many of the theories on the current conditions of national 
constitutional states and of the European Union may be 
summarized thus: the present economic crisis is clearly impairing the 
soundness of the guarantees and limits provided by constitutional law (at 
both national and European levels). 
More specifically, the efforts to remedy the devastating 
effects of the crisis led to the adoption of measures, and the 
creation of institutions (at both national and European levels) 
which – in concrete terms – did not fall within the scope of 
constitutional legitimacy, or at least raised serious doubts on the 
“principle of constitutional rigidity”1. As a consequence, today 
national and European institutions are in fact governed by “rules” 
or subjected to “authorities” that are different from, or external to, 
the very constitutional system that established them. 
This analysis usually yields two possible scenarios. 
The first may be defined the “resilience of constitutional 
structures”. In this case, once the “extra ordinem” stage has ended, 
the powers return within “ordinem”. The priority is to focus on 
solving the crisis by addressing its economic-financial causes, 
seeking to curtail its duration and therefore its distorting effects, 
rather than on issues of constitutionality. 
The second is the scenario of “irreversible deformation”: 
the damage done by the extra ordinem phase is irreversible and 
thus tends to produce stable results. 
In this case, the priority is to focus on legal-institutional 
aspects and to establish “counter-measures” to avert the 
disappearance of both constitutional rigidity and constitutional 
values. 
A sort of “third position”, encompassing elements of both 
scenarios discussed above, was recently proposed: a “ius-stitium” 
(Agamben2, Cartabia), the creation of a “temporary constitutional 
law”, a constitutional amendment that establishes a different 
regime in times of crisis. Guarantees are therefore not entirely 
forgone, but those which are not essential are attenuated; thus, the 
emergency phase which, in the first and second cases above, 
                                                 
1 F. Angelini, M. Benvenuti (eds.), il diritto costituzionale alla prova della crisi 
economica. Atti del convegno di Roma, 26-27 aprile 2012 (2012).  
2 G. Agamben, State of Exception (2005).  
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would simply “non habet legem”, is governed at least to some 
extent. 
 
 
2. My view  
The following observations presume a different starting 
point.  
Indeed, I believe that the current economic crisis is not the 
cause of the damage suffered by constitutional systems. 
I believe that the causes of these transformations or 
deformations predate the 2008 economic crisis, and are due to 
reasons that are much deeper and more structural than the urgent 
need to establish extra-ordinem measures and institutions to fight 
the financial crisis, which by now has also heavily affected 
sovereign debts. 
In my opinion, if the crisis has had a role, it was that of 
“accelerating” this structural decline or of “triggering” latent 
tensions. It acted upon the magnitude of phenomena, therefore, but 
not on their quality. 
However, the crisis did “add” a specific contribution in one 
respect. It introduced a new factor into the complex evolution of 
contemporary (national and European) constitutional systems: the 
crisis of the overall legitimacy of public institutions, of their 
reliability. I will come to this later. 
A non-secondary consequence of my theory is that, while 
making every effort to resolve the financial crisis is clearly 
necessary and unavoidable, the path to be taken is neither that of 
resilience nor that of irreversible deformation. Rather, efforts must be 
focused on the deep and structural causes of constitutional law’s 
current crisis, to avoid that the corrections – formulated on the 
basis of the emergency – wreak worse damage than the actual 
evils.  
 
 
3. The decline of contemporary European constitutionalism: 
“return to the Statuto”? 
If we wish to strike at the real core of the crisis of 
contemporary constitutionalism, in my view the phenomenon that 
we are witnessing may be defined as a progressive flexibilisation of 
existing constitutions. 
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I will not use the term “deconstitutionalisation” (although it 
may perhaps be more appropriate), because in many cases there is 
no express or implied repeal. Constitutional texts remain in force – 
indeed, they proliferate; and what disappears is the “normative 
added value” that characterizes constitutions, or at least 
contemporary “rigid” constitutions. 
To reprise an expression from Italian history, it may be said 
that we are witnessing a sort of “return to the Statuto”3, i.e. the loss 
of the distinctive trait of post-totalitarian, post-WWII constitutions 
as against liberal constitutionalism: their superiority to the law 
and to the acts undertaken by public powers. 
Post-totalitarian constitutionalism is based on the notion 
that there is a superior law (a higher law) to ordinary laws and 
administrative acts4. Therefore, liberal rule of law was not only 
enriched with an additional hierarchical rank, but rather with a 
new dimension, different and superior to legality: constitutionality. 
All public powers, including the Parliament, must observe this 
insurmountable “measure”. 
I believe that these qualities, that have characterized post-
WWII national constitutions over recent decades, have been 
showing increasing signs of failure; there has been a growing 
adjustability of constitutional norms as against other (not 
necessarily only public) sources of law. 
This process has multiple causes, which are not always of 
equal significance. In any case, all predated the 2008 financial 
crisis and are therefore logically independent of it. As I have 
already mentioned, in many cases the crisis was an “amplifier”, a 
“trigger”, but since a scientific consideration of the matter should 
strive to identify the root and incidental causes of a given 
                                                 
3 This expression is taken from the title (“Torniamo allo Statuto”) of an article 
published by Sidney Sonnino, a Deputy of Parliament of the Destra Storica 
party, on 1 January 1897 in the publication entitled Nuova Antologia. In that 
article, he expressed the hope of returning to observe the Statuto, the first 
constitution of the Italian Kingdom issued in 1848 and which, unlike the current 
republican Constitution of 1948, is flexible, i.e. is freely amendable by ordinary 
legislation. 
4 Whether, on a Kelsenian perspective, this law is deemed superior in legal 
terms as Grundnorm within a hierarchical legal system, or whether in Schmittian 
terms it is considered a political act of supreme decision on the unity of the 
State, or, finally, whether it is considered the “supreme law of the land”, as per 
the North American legal tradition. 
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phenomenon – and seek to distinguish between the two – I will 
discuss at least some of the structural causes. 
First, I will describe some of the effects of the 
“flexibilisation” of our constitutions, focusing on two areas which 
are used to identify the content of constitutions: the form of 
government and the form of state.  
My analysis will not explicitly extend to the other typical 
area of constitutional law, i.e. the protection of fundamental 
rights. This issue would require a different analysis. However, it 
may be recalled that the protection of fundamental rights depends 
not only on the Charters which expressly enshrine them, but also 
on the constitutional limitation of public powers; in this sense, the 
following observations will also be relevant to rights. 
 
 
4. Impact on parliamentary forms of government 
4.1 Flexibilisation of the system of legal sources 
What constitutionalists mean by form of government is 
surely, by definition, the least rigid part of a constitution. In 
relation to the core of this notion, i.e. the relationship between 
Parliament and Government, jurists concur that the Italian 
“founding fathers” only established a very concise and essential 
statement of some fundamental “boundaries”, leaving ample 
space to conventions, customs and constitutional practice5. 
However, one aspect of the form of government that has 
always been well-defined in the Constitution is the “system of 
legal sources”, i.e. the regulation of the “form” of parliamentary 
laws, of legislative initiative and of the procedure for approving 
legislation, of all other primary legal sources within the system 
(the principle of the “limited number” of primary sources) and, 
finally, of the Government’s power to issue primary and 
secondary legislation. Legal scholarship has always supported this 
observation with the conviction that studying the system of legal 
sources is one of the few indicators that can shed light on the 
actual evolution of a country’s form of government, especially for 
those having parliamentary systems6. 
                                                 
5 L. Elia, Governo (forme di) (1970).  
6 For an account of the influence of the Constitutional Court on the form of 
government by means of its case-law on sources, see A. Simoncini, Corte e 
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As may be known, these “norms on norm-making” are the 
only part that Hans Kelsen deemed worthy of being called a real 
“constitution”, as they concern the procedures and conditions for 
a legislative act to be valid and thus existent, in Kelsenian terms. 
Therefore, especially if a temporal perspective on this part 
of our constitution is adopted, I believe it possible to state that 
much regulation on the system of primary legal sources may now 
be considered “deconstitutionalised”. 
The two clearest examples of this are the decree-law and 
the legislative decree; both of these legislative powers of the 
Government have in practice evolved well beyond the schemes 
establishing them (in Articles 76 and 77 of the Constitution). 
In practice, since 2008, this deviation has not undergone 
any particular qualitative evolution.  
 XIII (from  
9/5/1996 to 
29/5/2001) 
XIV (from  
30/5/2001 to 
27/4/2006) 
XV (from  
28/4/2006 to 
28/4/2008) 
XVI (from 
29/4/2008 to 
13/03/2013) 
 Tot
al 
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average 
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al 
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average 
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al 
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Laws 
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112 
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384 
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6,23 
 
288 
 
4,89 
 
114 
 
4,74 
 
223 
 
3,94 
 
Decre
e-laws 
 
 
204 
 
3,36 
 
216 
 
3,66 
 
48 
 
2 
 
118 
 
2,09 
Regardless of the reference to the “current exceptional 
situation of international crisis and market instability” made in the 
preamble of the decree-laws adopted during the crisis7, they are 
similar in content to many urgent decrees issued before. 
It is equally certain that on this front, the current 
government has even  managed to give rise to new forms of 
“violation” of the constitutionally-established system of legal 
sources. 
                                                                                                                       
concezione della forma di Governo, in V. Tondi della Mura, M. Carducci, R.G. 
Rodio (eds.), Corte costituzionale e processi di decisione politica (2005).  
7 See for example the Decree-Law 22 June 2012 No. 83 “Urgent measures for the 
Country's growth”. 
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By way of example, I will mention only one significant 
episode. The “salva-Italia” (“Italy-saving”) decree-law imposed an 
extraordinary tax on the financial activities covered by the “scudo 
fiscale” (“tax shield”). The tax had to be paid by 16 February 2012, 
and the payment procedure had to be established by the Italian 
Revenue Agency with an official decision. However, the Agency 
published this procedure only on 14 February 2012, two days 
before the deadline; in light of the (justified) panic of banks, 
intermediaries and other subjects affected by the tax, the Ministry 
of Economy, which in Monti’s technical government coincided 
with the President of the Council of Ministers (until Minister Grilli 
took over), published the following communication on 15 
February:  
“The Ministry of Economy and Finance states that in light 
of the objective operational difficulties expressed by the financial 
intermediaries obliged to pay the tax on the activities covered by 
the tax “shield” […], the established deadline of 16 February will 
be postponed, with the earliest possible legislative provision.  
This provision will state that the payments that are not 
made before the date of the entry into force of the prorogating 
provision will not constitute a payment violation.” (emphasis added). 
Therefore, a press release “having force of law” (one could 
say!), from which two significant pieces of information emerge: 
first, the notion of the legislative amendment being inserted in the 
“earliest possible legislative provision” appears almost to prove 
the absolute interchangeability of all primary normative 
instruments available to the government (which in turn confirms 
the old image of the decree-law as a “speed train” to which an 
indefinite number of wagons may be attached). The second is the 
pledge to “disapply” the fiscal penalties for failure to pay taxes; a 
pledge which the government took by means of a press release. 
The crisis is hardly relevant here; the notion that the 
Government is the “lord of the sources” (to recall the image 
portrayed by Marta Cartabia at a recent convention)8, a notion that 
is increasingly gaining strength, responds to an evolutionary trend 
present in many European forms of parliamentary government, 
                                                 
8 M. Cartabia, Il governo signore delle fonti? Introduzione, in M. Cartabia, E. 
Lamarque, P. Tanzarella (eds.), Gli atti normativi del governo tra Corte 
costituzionale e giudici (2011). 
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with an increasingly pre-eminent role of the executive over the 
legislative. This may not be so in the United Kingdom, where it 
has indeed always been true, but rather in other parliamentary or, 
to an even greater extent, semi-presidential governments. 
The trend is to reverse the fundamental assumption of 
parliamentary regimes that the Parliament is the sole body with 
legislative power, and the Executive may exercise such power 
only in exceptional cases: today, we increasingly see Governments 
that enjoy parliamentary majorities, usually guaranteed by 
strongly majoritarian electoral systems, and wield a sort of 
undifferentiated primary normative power, free from limitations and 
procedures, and which can assume the form most suitable or 
appropriate to individual decisions (decree-law, legislative decree, 
bill, secondary legislation of deregulation). 
What caused this evolution? 
It is impossible to undertake a detailed analysis here; I will 
limit myself to some notes.  
First, it is intrinsically difficult for rigid constitutions to 
ensure the observance of their provisions on issuing laws and acts 
having force of law; we might define this as an inevitable weakness 
of the constitutional review of legislative acts for formal flaws.  
Indeed, unlike substantive flaws, which affect one or more norms, 
formal flaws act like a “cluster bomb”: the parent measure’s 
unconstitutionality is transmitted in a chain reaction to all the 
norms approved on its basis, which are usually copious and 
important (such as the decree-laws on which entire financial 
operations are based9). G. Zagrebelsky realistically observes that 
constitutional judges very often hesitate to annul norms with only 
formal, and not also substantive, flaws; and they only annul 
formally flawed laws if they are also substantively flawed10. 
                                                 
9 On this last point see N. Lupo, L’omogeneità dei decreti-legge (e delle leggi di 
conversione): un nodo difficile, ma ineludibile per limitare le patologie della produzione 
normativa, in G. D’Elia, G Tiberi, M.P. Viviani Sclein (eds.), Scritti in memoria di 
Alessandra Concaro (2012). 
10 In this connection, although considered less effective, see the pre-emptive 
review for constitutionality (such as that operated by the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel), performed prior to the law’s entry into force and appears to be 
more incisive (for an account of the French experience see P. Passaglia, 
L’invalidità procedurale dell’atto legislativo: le esperienze italiana e francese a confronto 
(2002). 
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However, I believe that there are two other, more 
structural, reasons, that explain this flexibilisation. 
First, the growing value of the “time” factor in lawmaking. 
The case of decree-laws in Italy is a clear example: today, 
timeliness in lawmaking is usually more important than its 
content. To reach a late decision is very often tantamount to not 
deciding. 
It is undeniable that many of our parliaments’ procedural 
rules are still fundamentally linked to the model of the principal 
normative act: law enacted by Parliament. This must be approved 
article by article, subjected to a final vote, and examined by a 
commission and then by the entire House. This basic structure, 
inherited from liberal parliaments, was transposed unchanged 
into our Constitution and into Parliament’s internal regulations. 
The structure certainly worked well as long as the function 
of Parliaments was mainly one of discussion (within consociational 
political contexts), but from a certain moment – the great 
geopolitical changes of the early 1990s, and the introduction of 
obligatory policies of economic convergence at European level 
during the same period – that is, since the dialogue function was 
replaced by the notion of a “deciding democracy”11 in which it 
became necessary to ensure efficiency and coherence in 
government directions especially on decisions of an economic 
nature, this structure began to show its limitations. Decree-laws, 
capable of immediately entering into force, became the only 
instrument available for timely decisions. 
It cannot be denied that in recent years, the Constitutional 
Court has shown greater sensitivity to the issue of decree-laws 
and formal reviews for constitutionality; judgments no. 171 of 
2007, 128 of 2008 and especially 22 of 2012 display a significant 
change in approach compared to the acquiescence previously 
shown, especially in relation to the “manifest extraneousness” of 
modifications made by Parliament. However, the difficulty of 
voiding the entire decree-law and delegating legislation for failure 
to fulfil the conditions established in Articles 76 and 77 of the 
Constitution is still well-entrenched. Indeed, the practice of 
                                                 
11 This is the expression used by the then President of the House of 
Representatives Luciano Violante, in the Premise to Modificazioni al Regolamento 
della Camera dei deputati, Camera dei Deputati, Rome, 1998, p. XI. 
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issuing “urgent” decrees, which is now – paradoxically – the 
principal lawmaking procedure in Italy, is not substantially 
affected by these judgments12. 
However, I wish to highlight that the meagre tenure of the 
constitutional system of legal sources is a phenomenon that does 
not concern only national constitutional law; a similar trend is 
taking place on the European level. 
It is indeed clear that some of the most significant recent 
decisions at European level – such as the adoption of the 
European Stability Mechanism and the related European Stability 
Facility – were taken by means of international treaties between 
some of the EU members, rather than through usual sources of 
European law such as regulations and directives. 
As highlighted by Bruno De Witte13 with reference to a 
recent important case, during an Ecofin meeting, following the 
approval of a European regulation to create the European 
Financial Stabilisation mechanism, the European Council of 
Ministers of Economy and Finance “changed register” and the 17 
Eurozone countries adopted a decision obligating those very 
states to create a European Financial Stability Facility. This 
decision was entirely foreign to European law and taken on the 
basis of a measure of international law, and was then named 
Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro 
Area Member States Meeting within the Council of the European 
Union. 
As may be known, pursuant to this measure, other EU 
Member States adopted, approved and ratified additional 
international treaties, always beyond the scope of European law 
(although their application and their observance was ensured by 
EU bodies such as the Commission and the Court of Justice): the 
ESM Treaty (comprising 17 upon 27 Member States) and the Fiscal 
Compact (25 out of 27 Member States). 
                                                 
12 A. Sperti, Il decreto-legge tra Corte costituzionale e Presidente della Repubblica dopo 
la seconda svolta, in M. Cartabia, E. Lamarque, P. Tanzarella (eds.), Gli atti 
normativi del governo tra Corte costituzionale e giudici (2011) . 
13 B. De Witte, The use of International Law in the framework of the Economic Union: 
Reasons and Consequences, to be published on this Journal. 
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As De Witte recalled, this tendency too, of failing to observe 
the system of sources established by the EU treaties, is not a recent 
occurrence that can be ascribed to the crisis. 
For example, one may consider the Schengen Treaty of 1985 
and 1990, or the Social Policy Agreement, concluded as a treaty 
alongside the Maastricht reform. Both of these measures excluded 
the United Kingdom. 
The entire so-called – before the Amsterdam and Lisbon 
Treaties – Third Pillar constituted an area of essentially 
international/European law existing alongside European law. 
In this case too, the crisis cannot be considered a specific 
cause, but rather only an intensification of a phenomenon that was 
already unfolding: the low tenure of the system of European 
sources. 
What are the reasons for this? A great deal of space would 
be required for an exhaustive answer. However, there are 
surprising analogies with the reasons found within the Italian 
constitutional system. 
First, at the European constitutional level too – a level at 
which, as may be known, supranational and intergovernmental 
“characters” have always had to confront each other – once the 
supranational nature had reached its highest fulfilment with the 
creation of the Euro and the enlargement to 27 Member States, a 
powerful intergovernmental counter-force emerged. Indeed, 
executive power in Member States are regaining a great deal of 
strength despite efforts to counter this force with a more thorough 
realization of the principle of subsidiarity. 
But there is a further issue – again, raised by De Witte – that 
is naturally continuous with the causes of the great proliferation of 
urgent decree-making in Italy: why did the Eurozone states, on 
the same day that the EU Council adopted a regulation on the 
European Stability Mechanism, adopt the European Financial 
Stability Facility with an act of international law? 
As may be known, the latter is an executive agreement, i.e. 
an immediately enforceable international agreement that enters 
into force when signed by governments, without need for 
ratification on part of national parliaments; with this type of 
agreement, a private company under Luxembourgish law was 
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created14, the 17 Member States of the Eurozone being its 
shareholders. Immediately after, the same states adopted a series 
of agreements to establish their voting rights within the company. 
What was the purpose?  
To effectively guarantee payment of the Eurozone states’ 
debts, it would have been necessary to amend the Lisbon Treaty 
(to overcome the ban established in the European treaties on 
European institutions guaranteeing for or taking on the debts of 
Member States); therefore, it would have been necessary to launch 
a long and complex Treaty amendment process, according to a 
timeframe that the financial markets would never have observed. 
Yet, it was necessary to provide an immediate response to the 
markets’ requirements; hence the need for a legal act that could 
immediately enter into force, and to create a “private” entity – 
belonging to the states – that could operate from the very next 
day. As may be known, it was only after this immediate act that 
the abovementioned amendment to the Lisbon Treaty was 
adopted; and, later, that the treaty on the European Stability 
Mechanism, which stabilized and inherited the European 
Financial Stability Facility, was created. 
As further confirmation of the convergence of European 
and national constitutional law in terms of the “flexibilisation” of 
systems of legal sources, the recent European Court of Justice 
judgment in Pringle (Case C-370/12) must be mentioned. In that 
case, the Luxembourg court had to ascertain the compatibility of 
Decision 2011/199/EU of the European Council of 25 March 2011 
with the Treaty system. The Decision amended Article 136 TFEU 
to enable adoption of the ESM15 following a simplified procedure. 
The Court rejected the questions raised by the Irish 
Supreme Court and held that the Decision was legitimate. In light 
of the extraordinary emergency faced by Europe and of the need 
for interventions such as the Fiscal Compact and the ESM, there 
could be no doubt as to the outcome of the case. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
14 http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_articles_of_incorporation_en   
15 Article 1 of Decision 2011/199 states the following: “The following paragraph 
shall be added to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union: ‘3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of 
the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance 
under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.’.” 
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many of the issues highlighted by the Irish Court raise significant 
perplexities.16 
 
 
4.2 Flexibilisation of the regulation of economic policy 
Another aspect of the constitutionally-established form of 
government which has apparently become “flexible” is that of 
decisions on economic and monetary policy. 
I do not think that there is much need for examples in this 
regard; since the very beginning of the European single market, 
the ownership of decisions on matters of economic and monetary 
policy has been less and less national. 
In this case too, the early 1990s are the crucial moment. The 
Maastricht Treaty and the decision to create the single currency, 
the European System of Central Banks and the genesis of the 
European Central Bank are the steps of a substantive 
“Europeanisation” of political decisions on economic and 
monetary matters. 
Moreover, in this context too, it can be said that the 
“rigidity” of constitutions in granting power to national states’ 
various organs has gradually “faded” as economies have become 
globalised; the urgent need for coordination and for supranational 
direction of economic policies is not, therefore, a phenomenon that 
can be ascribed to the 2008 crisis. 
First with the Maastricht Treaty and its famous parameters, 
then with the single currency, Member States – especially Italy – 
began to understand that the means through which they usually 
financed their internal economies (debt and devaluations) were no 
longer available. 
                                                 
16 Indeed, the possibility of modifying the TFEU by means of the simplified 
form of “decision” adopted by the Council is relevant only to modifications that 
do not regard Part I of the Treaty, while the provision that Eurozone Member 
States may introduce a “stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the Euro area as a whole” is, frankly, difficult to bring 
under Part II of the Treaty. Likewise, I find it difficult to refrain from 
acknowledging that this provision ends up extending the EU’s competences 
(another condition which is excluded if the simplified procedure is to apply). 
Finally, I consider significant the objection that in monetary issues, the Union 
has exclusive competence. This excludes, therefore, Member States from 
concluding international treaties, while both the ESM and the Fiscal Compact 
are, as we know, precisely that. 
SIMONCINI –IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
170 
 
 
Some may argue that this does not actually amount to 
“flexibilising” the Constitution, as it was already a consequence of 
Italian membership of the European Union. The situation would 
thus fall squarely within a normal relationship between European 
and internal law. 
However, in this field, the economic crisis itself led to a 
conspicuous leap in the quality of the “supranationalisation” of 
economic policies. 
Indeed, here too, the most significant measures adopted at 
the European level are not measures of European law, but rather 
international treaties. I shall not examine the Treaty on the ESM, 
but rather the other convention, between 25 of the 27 Member 
States of the EU, adopted to complement it – the Fiscal Compact. 
In this connection, two important elements must be 
highlighted. 
First, as we have already mentioned, after Maastricht and 
the single currency, debt and the monetary lever had already been 
conclusively attracted into the sphere of European governance; 
only the fiscal lever remained in the hands of Member States. With 
the Fiscal Compact Treaty, fiscal policy too is subject to 
supranational coordination. The “Europeanisation” of economic 
policy is therefore complete. 
Second, with a decidedly problematic provision in terms of 
legal sources, the Treaty establishes that: 
“[t]he rules set out in paragraph 1 shall take effect in the 
national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest one year after 
the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding 
force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or 
otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to 
throughout the national budgetary processes” (emphasis added). 
But to fully comprehend the legal and institutional 
dynamics surrounding the implementation of this Treaty, its 
history must be examined. 
The Fiscal Compact was adopted on 2 March 2012 and 
entered into force on 1 January 2013; it was ratified in Italy with 
Law No. 114 of 23 July 2012. The balanced-budget constitutional 
amendments required by the Treaty were introduced by means of 
Constitutional Law No. 1 of 20 April 2012 (entitled Introduction of 
the balanced-budget principle into the Constitution); given that 
the procedure for enacting a constitutional law in Italy is 
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decidedly complex17, one may ask how was it possible to approve 
a constitutional law only one month after the Treaty was signed 
and (even!) before it was ratified and entered into force.  
The answer lies not in a European or international 
legislative act, but rather in a simple letter, sent privately on 5 
August 2011from the then President of the European Central Bank 
Jean Claude Trichet and the Governor of the Bank of Italy Mario 
Draghi (who later succeeded the former in chairing the ECB) to 
the President of the Council of Ministers Silvio Berlusconi18. In this 
letter, they asked Italy to “urgently strengthen the reputation of its 
sovereign signature” and to this end required the adoption of 
certain measures deemed to be absolutely undelayable 
(liberalisation of local public services and professional services, 
review of the collective bargaining system and of the labour 
market, anticipation of the balanced budget to 2013 through 
spending cuts, interventions on the pensions system, public 
employment expenditure cuts, a clause for automatic reduction of 
public deficit and monitoring local expenditure). 
The letter continues: 
 “In light of the seriousness of the financial markets’ current 
situation, we deem it crucial that all of the actions listed above […] 
be adopted as soon as possible through decree-law, followed by a 
parliamentary ratification within September 2011. A constitutional 
amendment to make budgetary rules more stringent would also 
be appropriate”, continued Draghi and Trichet. “There is also the 
need for a strong commitment to abolishing or fusing 
intermediate administrative structures (such as the provinces, or 
Province)”. 
Thus, it is to “implement” – to use an euphemism – this 
private letter, signed by two central bankers, that Italy 
commenced the constitutional amendment resulting in 
Constitutional Law No. 1 of 2012. 
                                                 
17 Article 138 of the Italian Constitution: “Laws amending the Constitution and 
other constitutional laws shall be adopted by each House after two successive 
debates at intervals of not less than three months, and shall be approved by an 
absolute majority of the members of each House in the second voting.” 
18 For the complete letter, see Corriere.it, Trichet e Draghi: un'azione pressante per 
ristabilire la fiducia degli investitori, 
http://www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_30
4a5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml?fr=correlati, 20 May 2013, 2011. 
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In this case, the flexibilisation of the constitutional system 
reaches a symbolic apex, if it is considered that two entirely 
“technical” organs, that represent the banking system and the 
European institutions, literally “instructed” the government and 
the Parliament on the way forward, even going so far as to specify 
the means (the decree-law and the constitutional amendment) and 
the timeframe within which to act. 
It cannot be doubted that the amendment of Article 81 of 
the Constitution and related Law No. 243 of 2012 implementing 
the balanced budget are one of the economic crisis’ most recent 
and significant effects on the constitutional system of powers and 
competences.  
I do not wish to undertake here a detailed examination of 
this reform and its differences (however important) from the 
parallel amendment of the Spanish Constitution. 
I will simply note that the reform confirms the trend of, on 
one hand, the definite strengthening of the role of the Executive in 
economic-financial decisions (although the creation of the 
Independent Budget Office in Parliament may be an interesting 
innovation) and, on the other, the consolidation of the increasingly 
unavoidable link with European institutions on these issues. 
 
 
4.3 Flexibilisation of the role of the President of the Republic 
The last part of the form of government affected by 
flexibilisation that I wish to discuss is the President of the 
Republic’s role. Much has been said in recent months about the 
President. Some commentators used the events of the last two 
years of Napolitano’s presidency to state that in fact, we have 
shifted towards a “quasi semi-presidential” system; see the 
famous “King Giorgio” headline in the New York Times19. 
Now, those who are familiar with the position of the 
President of the Republic within the Italian Constitution know 
that it is much less clearly defined than it may seem.  
In particular, the constitutional space occupied by the role 
of the President is of “variable geometry”: in “ordinary” times, 
when political life carries on without particular turbulence, the 
                                                 
19 See R. Donadio, From Ceremonial Figure to Italy’s Quiet Power Broker, New York 
Times, 20 May 2013. 
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President tends to fade into an almost “symbolic” figure, but in 
times of crisis, the President recovers all his powers which, it must 
be recalled, have their roots in royal powers. 
For this reason, rather than only “one” President of the 
Republic, our constitutional system has had several different 
Presidents, each of whom interpreted his role in different ways. 
Still, it cannot be doubted that in the five years between 
2008 and 2013, Giorgio Napolitano’s approach brought the 
constitutional role of the President well beyond the positions 
gained even by the most active and expansive presidencies. 
I refer in particular to the appointment of Senator for life 
Mario Monti as head of the current Government, and to the 
evolution of what is traditionally defined as the presidential 
power to express views. 
In creating the Monti government, President Napolitano 
appeared to appoint a veritable “President’s government”, setting 
the topics, the agenda and – it may legitimately be inferred – the 
composition of the Cabinet. 
The crisis of the government that led to the premature end 
of the 16th Legislature began with the Chamber of Deputies’s vote 
of 11 October 2011 to reject Article 1 of the General National 
Financial Report. The next day, President Napolitano declared 
that “the undeniable manifestation of severe tensions within the 
government and the coalition, with the consequent uncertainties 
on the adoption of the required or announced decisions” raised 
“questions and concerns having indubitable institutional 
impact20”.  
The political situation that had emerged was completely 
unsustainable, in terms of international credibility; for this reason, 
Italy experienced what I consider to be a unique event, regardless 
of its inventive history of government crises: the resignation of the 
government, subject to a “condition precedent”. On 8 November 
2011, after a meeting with President Napolitano, the President of 
the Council of Ministers Berlusconi announced that he would 
resign as soon as the law on financial stability was approved. 
However, the credibility of the President of the Council was 
already too damaged; for this reason, the next day, the President 
                                                 
20 Press release of the President of the Republic, 12 October 2011. 
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of the Republic, “acting as Head of State”, released a 
communication which is worth quoting: 
 “In light of the pressure on Italian government bonds on the 
financial markets, which today reached alarming levels, as Head of State 
I deem it necessary to clarify the following, so as to clear any ambiguity 
or misunderstanding:  
1) There is no uncertainty concerning the choice of the President 
of the Council Berlusconi to resign from the Government which he 
currently leads. This decision will be effective as soon as the law on 
financial stability for 2012 has been approved. 
 2) On the basis of agreements between the Presidents of the 
Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies and the majority and opposition 
parliamentary groups, the law on financial stability will be approved in a 
few days.  
3) Consultations will then be held immediately by the President of 
the Republic to solve the government crisis.  
4) Therefore, shortly, either a new government will be formed, 
and will be capable of taking all further decisions required with the 
confidence of the Parliament, or Parliament will be dissolved so as to 
immediately commence the electoral campaign, which will take place in a 
brief time frame.” 
This is a veritable power of “government” wielded in times 
of crisis. In my opinion, this is unprecedented, even in light of the 
varied practices hitherto followed by Italian Presidents. 
The other area in which I believe that a clear 
“demarginalisation” of the constitutional role of the President of 
the Republic has taken place is his power of “free” communication 
(i.e. communications not made through formal expressions of 
opinion to the Chambers of Parliament as per Article 66 of the 
Constitution). In recent years, the number of official 
communications issued by the Quirinal has grown 
exponentially21. These include not only communications on 
strictly institutional issues – such as the abuse of emergency 
decrees22, but also more general ones, on political-economic 
                                                 
21 Between April 2012 and March 2013, over 680 official press releases were 
published on the Quirinal’s website. 
22 One of the most important cases is surely the press release of 23 February 
2012 which summarizes the problems relating to the conversion of decree-laws 
into laws by including parliamentary modifications which are inconsistent with 
the individual decree-law’s content. The press release was “inspired” by the 
abovementioned Judgment No. 22 of 2012 of the Constitutional Court, which, 
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matters. While the power of communication is a clear sign of the 
President’s “diffuse” political responsibility23, as opposed to his 
lack of political responsibility narrowly construed – I believe that 
recent practice shows an increasingly active President, fully within 
the circuit of political decisionmaking24, and who is capable of 
tangibly influencing and directing the choices made by the 
Government and the Parliament25. It is not a coincidence that – for 
the first time in the history of the Republic – the possibility of 
Napolitano’s re-election has surfaced in these very days. 
 
 
5. Effects on regionalism  
5.1 Flexibilisation of the constitutional division of powers between 
central state and regions 
As mentioned above, in times of economic crisis, an evident 
process of flexibilisation has affected not only the form of 
government, but also the form of state (the relationship between 
the central state and local autonomies). 
I believe that this context too supports my view that the 
causes of the current phenomena are not to be found in the crisis, 
but rather that the crisis led to the “explosion” of dynamics that 
have actually been unfolding for a long time. 
The economic crisis is surely making the constitutional 
norms on the division of powers between the central state and the 
regions more flexible; and, in particular, making the boundary 
between state and regional powers extremely transient, if not 
outright uncertain, in favour of the state. 
A paradigmatic example is the “social card”, upon which 
the Constitutional Court decided in Judgment No. 10 of 2010. Due 
to the serious economic crisis, the state issued a measure – the 
social card – to grant a “purchasing card” to citizens in extremely 
                                                                                                                       
for the first time, voided provisions inserted in a decree-law by the Parliament 
during its examination of the related conversion bill. 
23 On this issue, see, in general, the studies of M.C. Grisolia, Potere di messaggio 
ed esternazioni presidenziali (1986). 
24 T. Groppi, A. Simoncini, Introduzione allo studio del diritto pubblico ed alle sue 
fonti (2012).  
25 O. Chessa, Il Presidente della Repubblica parlamentare: un'interpretazione della 
forma di governo italiana (2010).  
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difficult economic conditions so that they could meet at least their 
basic food needs. 
The regions challenged the decree on the grounds that it 
infringed their exclusive powers in matters of social services and 
their financial autonomy; the latter was threatened by the fact that 
a restricted fund had been created for a subject that fell within the 
regions’ competences. 
The significance of this decision – and of later related ones – 
is that the Court explicitly acknowledged that the case concerned 
social assistance, and displayed awareness of how this provision 
contrasted with its settled case-law against the use of restricted 
funds for social policies managed by the central government (e.g. 
nurseries). However, the Court’s reasoning was equally explicit in 
stating that the current situation is exceptional, extraordinary and 
urgent “due to the situation of international economic and 
financial crisis that in 2008 and 2009 also affected our Country”; a 
crisis that thrust a part of the population in a condition of 
“extreme need”. The circumstances are such that the state’s 
exclusive competence enshrined in Article 117(2)(m) of the 
Constitution (on guaranteeing basic levels of social and civil 
rights), which is usually fulfilled by establishing “minimum 
standards and levels”, may be expanded and thus provide the 
basis for a detailed intervention26. 
When “primary rights” are involved, the state may 
intervene by directly granting “specific aid”, and go beyond 
simply setting structural levels “if it is unavoidable, as in the case 
before us, due to peculiar circumstances and situations such as an 
exceptionally adverse economic situation” (emphasis added). 
Thus, at a first glance, it may seem that the economic crisis 
is to blame for the flexibility of the state’s legislative power 
established in Article  117(2)(m). In both its literal and logical-
systematic formulation (especially in light of the power of 
substitution enshrined in Article 120 of the Constitution), this 
competence certainly does not mean that the state is granted a 
“passepartout”, a power to intervene in all regional competences – 
a situation often confirmed by the very Court. 
But can we really be sure of this? 
                                                 
26 E. Longo, I diritti sociali al tempo della crisi. La Consulta salva la social card e ne 
ricava un nuovo titolo di competenza statale, 1 Giur. cost. 164 (2010).  
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Or has the flexibility introduced by the 2001 reform been a 
“structural” element of the state/region division of powers from 
the very beginning? 
By way of example, I will limit myself to mentioning 
“cross-cutting” issues (such as the environment, competition, 
basic levels of assistance, etc.), in relation to which the Court has 
always acknowledged the state’s power to “intervene” in regional 
matters, albeit only on certain aspects. 
The issue of the so-called “chiamata in sussidiarietà”, or 
flexible subsidiarity, through which great elasticity in the division 
of powers is recognized. 
The alternating processes of “dematerialisation” and 
“rematerialisation” in allocating powers, that inevitably led to an 
expansion of the competences of the central state as against the 
periphery27. 
And we cannot fail to mention the case-law of European 
derivation that, since Judgment No. 126 of 1996, has constantly 
affirmed that “in derogation from what has been said on the 
observance of the internal constitutional framework of powers, 
European law may, for reasons related to the European Union’s 
organization, legitimately establish its own implementing forms. 
Therefore, national law that derogates from the framework of the 
usual constitutional distribution of internal powers, with the 
exception that fundamental and mandatory constitutional 
principles must be observed”. 
 
Therefore, also in respect of the social card, the crisis may 
have exacerbated the symptoms of the ongoing disease, but the 
cause of the pathology is to be found elsewhere. Where? Again, the 
issue appears very complex; I believe that mainly two factors are 
decisive. 
The first factor is of a technical-formal nature; the very 
technique of dividing powers “by subject” (exclusively and 
concurrently) has shown an intrinsic flexibility, due to its 
inevitable “jurisdictionalisation”. When the spheres of power are 
distinguished by means of lists of objects, values, functions, 
subjects, these are affected by the inevitable semantic “flexibility” 
                                                 
27 R. Bin, F. Benelli, Prevalenza e “rimaterializzazione delle materie”: scacco matto alle 
Regioni, 6 Reg. 1185 (2009). 
SIMONCINI –IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
178 
 
 
of any legislative provision and, ultimately, shift the real 
definitional power to the final judge of competences, the 
Constitutional Court28. A recent interesting example is that of the 
cuts on expenditure for the regional political system, imposed by 
the “local authority-saving” decree-law (decreto “salva-enti”)29. A 
judgment issued by the Constitutional Court held that all regions 
must observe the decree30. 
The second factor is political: to be able to function, a 
composite state – whether federal or regional – presupposes a real 
“physiological” difference between local and national levels of 
political direction. 
By “physiological” distinction, I mean that in a composite 
state, differentiating between the centre and the periphery yields 
positive results when the differences between localising and 
centralising pressures are related to actual political-cultural 
differences and a general shared constitutional framework; thus, 
when political-institutional, and not only judicial, tools exist for 
the resolution of any conflicts that may arise. 
This position was expressed in the famous Federalist Paper 
No. 10, in which James Madison himself warned against 
factionism as a fatal flaw of democracy, and stated that a large 
federal republic would be the antidote to this very risk31. 
Without one of these two elements (difference or unity), the 
system cannot find a balance between centrifugal and centripetal 
forces; the history of all composite state systems shows that the 
centralistic force ultimately prevails, to the detriment of local 
autonomies. 
The case of Italy is paradigmatic. We experienced a first 
period (1970s-1990s) in which regionalism was dominated by 
national parties and was substantially the same as the selection 
process used by the national political classes. Regions were not the 
                                                 
28 As noted by S. Calzolaio, Il cammino delle materie nello stato regionale (2012): 
“paradoxically, the reaction to the fragmentation of competences has led to a 
situation in which the State has been granted more competence, in some sectors, 
than it actually wishes to exercise: thus, a dissociation takes place – for example 
on the subject of the environment – between substantially absolute entitlement 
to the subject and “discretionary” attribution of the legislative competence to 
regions”. 
29 Decree-law of 10 October 2012, No. 174. 
30 Judgment No. 198 of 2012. 
31 On this point, A.J. Bellia, Federalism (2011).  
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“gymnasiums” for the creation of a new and different political 
class, as had been envisaged by the constituent fathers; rather, 
they were local “segments” of a unitary political career, which 
was ultimately managed by the strength and centrality of national 
parties. This phase was followed by another, starting from the 
1990s, in which national parties suffered a crisis and “hyper-
autonomist” forces emerged to question the basic constitutional 
framework within which regionalism had developed (the 
contemporary idea of the confederation between the four northern 
regions is but the most recent step in this direction). 
What do these two stages have in common? It is the push to 
strengthen the “centre”: in the first stage, this occurred due to the 
absence of differentiation; in the second, to an “excess” of the 
same. The economic crisis has thus filtered into the crisis of 
regionalism, which has deep roots, further “exacerbating” 
tensions especially by placing the financial crisis of the social state 
at the centre of debate. 
Indeed, we should not forget that state finances’ risk of 
default is having a dramatic effect especially on the cuts to public 
health expenditure, which, as may be known, constitute a very 
significant proportion of regional budgets. 
 
 
6. The economic crisis and democracy 
6.1 Loss of trust in democratic institutions 
Above, I have argued that the most evident elements of 
crisis in our constitutional system of powers are to be ascribed to a 
structural decline and not to the economic emergency.  
In this second part, I wish to highlight some factors of the 
crisis which I believe are to be attributed specifically to the 
economic-financial crisis that has been affecting the world, and 
therefore Europe, since 2008. 
My argument can be summarized thus: since 2008, citizens 
have been progressively and inexorably losing faith in the capacity of 
democratic institutions to represent and defend the collective interests for 
which they were created. 
In other words, we are witnessing a real collapse in the 
“reliability” of public powers, despite the fact that these are 
subject to constitutional discipline and are democratically 
legitimated. 
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It is almost as if constitutional representative democracy, 
the political form created after the totalitarian experiences of the 
last century, can no longer ensure a true correspondence between 
“governors and governed”. 
To illustrate my theory, I will examine some empirical data 
gathered by Eurobarometer in July 201232. 
Figure 1 shows the trend in the opinion of the national 
economic system: a heavily negative opinion as from the economic 
crisis of 2008 is evident, and, I would say, predictable. 
 
  
Figure 1 (Source: Eurobarometer) 
 
However, I believe that the judgment on the current 
situation divided by countries, shown in Figure 2, is much more 
surprising and significant.  
                                                 
32 Http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_en.htm  
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Figure 2 (Source: Eurobarometer) 
The current differences between the Member States of the 
European Union in evaluating the economic situation are startling. 
In Sweden, Luxembourg and Germany, over two thirds of 
the population believe that the situation is excellent. In any case, 
in Finland, Austria and Denmark over half the population believes 
that the situation is entirely good. 
But this happens only in 6 states out of 27; in the remaining 
21 upon 27, the exact opposite is true. 
And if we consider the negative part of the graph, in 17 out 
of 21 states, over two thirds of the population believe the opposite; 
that is, that the situation is entirely negative. 
We are thus before a divided and unbalanced Europe on 
the issue of the economic-financial crisis; a Europe in which the 
general aggregate negative opinion (71% “total bad”) derives from 
the arithmetic average between three states with an enthusiastic 
opinion and nine states in which discontent exceeds 89%! 
Therefore, a first conclusion that can be drawn from these 
examinations is that the crisis definitely does have an impact, 
which however is not the same for everyone. 
The immediate consequence of this opinion is the decrease 
in trust in national and European institutions. 
Figure 3 shows the aggregate trend from 2004 to today. 
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Figure 3 (Source: Eurobarometer) 
 
As may be seen, trust in European institutions has always 
been higher than trust in national parliaments and governments, 
peaking in spring 2007 (when the Union enlarged to 27 Member 
States), while from the beginning of the economic crisis, in 2008, a 
slow decline began, until 2011 (in five years, seven points were 
lost), to collapse between 2011 and spring 2012 (in just over a year, 
ten percentage points were lost). There was a substantial 
convergence with the levels of trust (or rather, mistrust) in national 
institutions. 
In other words, today, two-thirds of European citizens lack 
trust in European and national institutions. 
If we consider some individual country data, the results are 
alarming: 
For example, Italy:  
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Italia 
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79% of interviewees does not trust the Government, 84% 
does not trust the Parliament; but the news that 62% does not trust 
European institutions is truly surprising, in light of the fact that in 
2004 trust in European institutions exceeded 70%. 
But let us examine the data on other European countries: 
Greece, Spain, Germany, Luxembourg, and Finland. 
Grecia - 
 
!  
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Spagna 
 
!  
 
 
Germania 
!  
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Lussemburgo 
!  
 
 
 
Finlandia 
!  
 
Two key observations may be drawn. 
First, in the opinion of citizens, all public institutions have 
lost reliability. 
However, whereas this observation may be considered 
structural in relation to national institutions before the crisis, I 
believe that it is possible to state that the “disaffection” for 
European institutions is an entirely new phenomenon. The 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty certainly revealed difficulties 
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and differences within the European Union on fundamental 
questions such as its overall structure and nature. But at least on 
the technical level, European institutions had always enjoyed a 
relatively grater positive opinion than that on national 
institutions. Today, this is no longer the case; European 
institutions, accustomed to the technical strength of their 
decisions, must face the problem of regaining credibility and 
reliability, just like national institutions. 
The second observation appears to be a paradox. 
In the countries where the economic situation is considered 
better (Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg), citizens trust their own 
government and parliament more than they do European 
institutions; this means that the positive conditions of their 
economy are mainly attributed to national, and not to European, 
institutions. 
Instead, in those countries where the economic situation is 
considered bad, citizens have very little trust in institutions in 
general, but they have more trust in European institutions than in 
their own governments and parliaments. 
Therefore, Euroscepticism as a general attitude is growing, 
but, paradoxically, it grows more where the situation 
(economically at least) is better; this confirms that in these cases, 
there is greater trust of national institutions rather than European 
ones. 
This data surely cannot be a source of comfort for Brussels 
institutions. 
 
 
7. Conclusion: the current crisis as an opportunity to rethink the 
foundations of legal-constitutional systems? 
It could be said that this article has painted too pessimistic a 
picture of the tenure of constitutional democracies, due to its 
emphasis on structural factors of crisis that were exacerbated by 
new shocks due to the economic-financial crisis. It could also be 
stated that the present age, if no longer the age of constitutions – 
destined to be obsolete – is however the great age of constitutional 
judges, of constitutional (especially supranational) courts, which 
remain the bulwark that defends the law against public power, 
which has always sought to reject all fetters. 
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There is no doubt that the judicial source of constitutional 
law is increasingly substituting itself to political sources, but it 
would be a serious mistake to think that the concrete 
implementation of constitutional law is of concern to judicial 
power alone.  
Indeed, while in the context of the protection of subjective 
constitutional rights (Modugno) it is certain that judges have 
significant power and are usually more effective than the “rights 
policies” that have often been invoked (Weiler), in the context of 
the limitation of powers vis à vis  fundamental freedoms, or in of 
the definition of powers, the role of judges is extremely weak. It is 
sufficient to examine how the Italian Constitutional Court “was 
subjected to” the constitutional reform of 2001 – on the powers of 
the state and regions – and unwillingly found itself in the position 
of supplementing the absence of implementing legislation with its 
own case-law, which was often perceived as oscillating and 
debatable. 
Reflecting on the crisis of trust in European- and national-
level political institutions brings us back to the first part of our 
analysis. Indeed, there is a commonality between the loss of 
“rigidity” of national and European constitutions and the low 
trust in the circuit of political decision-making overseen by those 
Constitutions.  
In this connection, it is necessary to recall what Alessandro 
Pizzorusso effectively clarified33: the “legal superiority”, in 
hierarchical terms, of post-WWII rigid constitutions has always 
been in “the expression of a more intense political will contained in 
these documents, as against ordinary legislation”(emphasis 
added); that is, constitutions have always enjoyed a sort of 
political added value because they express choices, values and a 
common good upon which social coexistence may be constructed.  
Therefore, a crisis in “trust” cannot avoid having 
repercussions, sooner or later, on the legal “superiority” of 
constitutional sources. 
                                                 
33 A. Pizzorusso, Delle fonti del diritto, in A. Scialoja, G. Branca (eds.), 
Commentario al codice civile (1977). 
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MECHANISM: COMMENT ON THE PRINGLE CASE 
 
(Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and 
The Attorney General, [2012] not yet reported) 
 
Gianni Lo Schiavo* 
 
Abstract 
Since the beginning of the crisis, many responses have been 
taken to stabilise the European markets. Pringle is the awaited 
judicial response of the European Court of Justice on the creation 
of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a crisis-related 
intergovernmental international institution which provides 
financial assistance to Member States in distress in the Eurozone. 
The judgment adopts a welcome and satisfactory approach on the 
establishment of the ESM. This article examines the feasibility of 
the ESM under the Treaty rules and in light of the Pringle 
judgment. For the first time, the Court was called to appraise the 
use of the simplified revision procedure under Article 48 TEU 
with the introduction of a new paragraph to Article 136 TFEU as 
well as to interpret the no bail out clause under Article 125 TFEU. 
The final result is rather welcome as the Court endorses the 
establishment of a stability mechanism of the ESM-kind beyond a 
strict reading of the Treaty rules. Pringle is the first landmark ECJ 
decision in which the Court has endorsed the use of new and 
flexible measures to guarantee financial assistance between 
Member States. This judgment could act as a springboard for more 
economic, financial and, possibly, political interconnections 
between Member States in the Euro area. 
 
                                                           
* PhD researcher at King's College, London; Research Fellow at University of 
Florence, Florence. The author wishes to thank Prof. Edoardo Chiti, Lorenzo 
Gatti and Prof. Alexander Türk for comments and discussions on earlier drafts. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent sovereign crisis in Europe has had important 
consequences for the established rules of the Economic and 
Monetary Union ('EMU'). The creation of financial assistance 
arrangements to Member States in distress is a critical 
phenomenon in this sense. The need for a new permanent stability 
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mechanism in Europe has acted as an essential step for the 
credibility of the EMU and for the sustainability of Euro area 
public finances.  
At a political level, the creation of a new stability 
mechanism would assure that Member States in the euro area had 
a credible financial backstop to counteract credit crisis. At an 
institutional level, financial assistance to euro area Member States 
in distress and the creation of a permanent stability mechanism 
required a new institutional arrangement for crisis management 
beyond the limitations of the European Union budget and the 
existing Treaty rules. These political and institutional challenges 
led to the creation of the European Stability Mechanism ('ESM').  
Against this background, the Pringle1 case is a seminal 
judgment of the European Court of Justice (hereafter the ‘ECJ’ or 
the ‘Court’) on one of the most remarkable crisis-related reforms, 
the establishment of the ESM.2 The judgment is twofold. The first 
part delves into the constitutional feasibility of the simplified 
Treaty revision procedure to create the ESM, namely the insertion 
of a new paragraph 3 to Article 136 TFEU through the European 
Council Decision 2011/199. The second part deals with the 
possibility for the Eurozone Member States to conclude and ratify 
an international agreement such as the ESM by way of 
interpretation of the Treaty rules and the general principles of 
European Union law. The questions posed to the Court are new in 
the post-Lisbon environment and raise a number of interesting 
legal issues, such as the constitutional impact of the ESM Treaty 
(hereafter the ‘ESMT’) on the EMU and, more generally, on  the 
European constitutional system.  
Before the delivery of the judgment, the adoption of the 
ESMT by Eurozone Member States had provoked a number of 
constitutional challenges in Member States. In particular, the 
Estonian Supreme Court was asked whether the ESMT was 
compatible with the Estonian Constitution. The answer of the 
                                                           
1 Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney 
General, [2012] not yet reported. 
2 For a more general appraisal of the origins of the ESM see A. de Gregorio 
Merino, Legal developments in the Economic and Monetary Union during the debt 
crisis: The mechanisms of financial assistance, 49 Com. Mkt L. Rev. (2012), 1613-
1646. 
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Estonian Court was positive.3 Furthermore, the German 
Constitutional Court, in a much-awaited judgment, was invited to 
assess the compatibility of the ESMT with the German Grundgesetz 
Norm. The Karlsruhe judgment on 12 September 2012 paved the 
way for the entry into force of the ESMT.4  
In Pringle, the ECJ endorses the Council Decision to amend 
the Treaty and declares the compatibility of the ESMT with the 
European rules brought to its attention by the referring Court. 
Most importantly, the value of the Pringle judgment lies in the 
interpretation, for the first time, of a number of core EMU 
provisions such as the no bail out clause under Article 125 TFEU. 
Moreover, Pringle has the clear merits of endorsing the Treaty 
amendment of Article 136 TFEU and of clarifying the relationship 
between the ESMT and the TFEU.  
Before commenting upon the most interesting issues raised 
by the judgment, the legal background and the content of the 
ruling will be recalled. 
 
 
2. The legal and factual background 
Pringle should be seen in the wider context of the EMU. As 
is well known, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced a title on 
Economic and Monetary Policy. This framework has been defined 
as “asymmetric”5. This is because the monetary ‘pillar’ is far more 
advanced than the economic ‘pillar’. On the one hand, since 1999, 
monetary policy competences have been transferred to the 
European System of Central Banks (ECBS) where the European 
                                                           
3 See the English translation to the Estonian’s Supreme Court judgment of 12 
July 2012 available at http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=1347.  
4 BverfG, BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 
1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12, 12 September 2012 available in English at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20120912_2bvr139
012en.html).  
There was also another judgment decided by the German Constitutional Court 
on 19 June 2012, 2 BvE 4/11, concerning the German Bundestag’s rights to be 
informed by the Federal Government (press release available in English at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg12-042en.html).  
5 See F. Amtenbrink & J. de Haan, Economic governance in the European Union: 
fiscal policy discipline versus flexibility, 40 Common Market Law Review 1078 
(2003); J.-V. Louis, The Economic and Monetary Union: law and institutions, 41 
Common Market Law Review 575 (2004).  
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Central Bank (‘ECB’) is the principal institution for monetary 
policy in the Eurozone together with national central banks. On 
the other hand, economic policy is still dominated by Member 
States’ competences.  
As to monetary policy, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU states that the 
Union has an exclusive competence. As to economic policy, the 
wording of Article 5(1) TFEU affirms that “the Member States 
shall coordinate their economic policies within the Union (...)”. 
Economic policy is still retained by Member States and the EU has 
not been conferred any specific competence except from a role of 
coordination. Member States’ competences in the economic policy 
framework are still ‘considerable’.6    
The imbalance between monetary and economic policy has 
been stigmatized by the outbreak of the financial crisis. The 
limited competences of the Union to control and supervise 
Member States’ budgets have had a clear impact on the EMU 
framework. Member States have been obliged to resort to special 
arrangements to assure fast liquidity to weaker Member States. In 
the early phases of the crisis, these measures have taken the form 
of bilateral loans to Greece7 as well as pan-Euro area loan facilities 
to Member States in economic distress. The European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) were established for these purposes.8  
                                                           
6 R. Palmstorfer, To bail or not to bail out? The current framework if financial 
assistance for euro area Member States measured against the requirements of EU 
primary law, 32 European Law Review 773 (2012). 
7 On 25 March 2010 Euro-area Member States decided to establish an ad hoc 
intervention as part of a joint Eurozone-IMF financing package via the 
conclusion of "coordinate bilateral loans" that would complement the assistance 
provided by the IMF. See the text of the two agreements at 
www.minfin.gr/content- 
api/f/binaryChannel/minfin/datastore/30/2d/05/302d058d2ca156bc35b0e26
8f9446a71c92782b9/application/pdf/sn_kyrwtikoimf_2010_06_04_A.pdf  
8 The EFSM, adopted with Council Regulation 407/2010 establishing a 
European financial stabilization mechanism, OJ 2010, L 118/1, had a lending 
capacity of € 60 billion, whereas the EFSF was set up by the Eurozone Member 
States as a temporary intergovernmental lending facility which had a lending 
capacity of € 440 billion. See more extensively, A. de Gregorio Merino, Legal 
developments in the Economic and Monetary Union during the debt crisis: The 
mechanisms of financial assistance, cit. at 2, 1615-1621. See, further, P. Craig, The 
Lisbon Treaty, Revised Edition: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform 466-468 (2013). 
LO SCHIAVO – THE JUDICIAL BAIL OUT OF THE ESM 
 
193 
 
In order to ensure balance and sustainable growth, during 
the European Council meeting of 28 and 29 October 2010, the 
Heads of State and of Government convened on the need for the 
Member States to create a permanent crisis mechanism in order to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area. The President of 
the European Council agreed to undertake consultations for an 
amendment of the Treaty required to that effect. Heads of State 
and Government agreed that, as this permanent mechanism 
would be designed to safeguard the financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole, Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU would no longer be 
needed. Hence, on 16 December 2010 the Belgian Government 
submitted a proposal for the review of Article 136 TFEU, pursuant 
to Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU, with a view to add a paragraph 3 
to that article. Decision 2011/199 was adopted on 25 March 2011.9  
This European Council decision adds a new paragraph to 
Article 136 TFEU according to which:  
“The Member States whose currency is the euro may 
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of 
any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be 
made subject to strict conditionality”.  
Pursuant to Article 2 of the decision, Member States 
proceeded with the completion of procedures for the approval of 
the decision in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. The amendment entered into force on 1 January 
2013.  
At the same time, Member States whose currency is the 
euro concluded the ESMT with a view to assume the tasks of the 
EFSF and the EFSM. The ESM has been conceived as a 
Luxembourg-based international organisation composed of a 
Board of Governors, a Board of Directors and a Managing 
Director. The ESM provides, where needed and subject to 
conditionality, financial assistance to euro area Member States in 
financial difficulties.10 Following the adoption of the ESMT, all the 
                                                           
9 2011/199/EU: European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 
136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a 
stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro,  [2011] OJ L 
91 
10 A. de Gregorio Merino, Legal developments in the Economic and Monetary Union 
during the debt crisis: The mechanisms of financial assistance, cit. at 2, 1621 et seq.. 
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euro area Member States have proceeded with the ratification of 
the ESMT according to their constitutional requirements and have 
paved the way for the entry into force of the agreement before the 
actual entry into force of the Treaty amendment. 
When a Eurozone Member State in distress needs financial 
assistance, the parties involved would prepare and sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding ("MoU") which shall reflect the 
severity of the weaknesses to be addressed in order to receive 
assistance.11  
The ESMT provides for a number of programmes to assist 
the Eurozone Member States. Financial assistance might be used 
to recapitalize the financial institutions of a specific Member 
State.12 The ESM can provide precautionary financial assistance 
when the economic condition of a Member State is sound enough 
to retain access to the market, but financial aid is necessary in 
order to avoid a crisis.13 Further, the ESM can grant loans to 
Eurozone Member States who have lost access to financial markets 
either through excessive costs or lack of lenders. The Primary 
Market Support Facility (PMSF) allows the ESM to buy bonds in 
the primary bond market of the Eurozone Member State either to 
facilitate that it returns to the financial markets or to increase the 
efficiency of other ESM financial aid.14 Intervention in the 
secondary bond markets is designed to reduce interest rates in the 
secondary market and to help Eurozone Members struggling with 
the refinancing of their banking systems.15  
Spain has been the first Eurozone Member State to make 
use of the ESM funds. It has been granted financial assistance to 
recapitalize the country’s banking sector.16 More recently, Cyprus 
has been granted financial assistance through the ESM in the 
aftermath of its banking crisis in early 2013.17 
                                                           
11 ESMT, Article 13(3). 
12 Ibidem, Article 15. 
13 Ibidem, Article 14. 
14 Ibidem, Article 17. 
15 Ibidem, Article 18. 
16 Relevant information on the Spanish financial assistance programme can be 
found at http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/assistance/spain/index.htm  
17 Relevant information on the very recent Cypriot financial assistance 
programme can be found at 
http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/assistance/cyprus/index.htm  
LO SCHIAVO – THE JUDICIAL BAIL OUT OF THE ESM 
 
195 
 
The ESM entrusts the EU institutions with crucial tasks in 
granting and supervising financial assistance. The European 
Commission and the ECB assess the needed financial needs18 as 
well as the sustainability of the Member State’s public debt and 
the corresponding risk of financial stability to the Eurozone as a 
whole.19 Following the decision to grant aid and in liaison with the 
ECB, the Commission negotiates the MoU with the concerned 
Member State.20 Thereafter, the Commission signs the MoU on 
behalf of the ESM.21 In the implementing phase, the ESM and the 
ECB monitor compliance with the conditionality laid down in the 
MoU.22 The ECJ is entrusted with the task of adjudicating disputes 
between the ESM and a Member State or among several Member 
States relating to the interpretation and application of the ESMT 
when an ESM decision on the matter is contested.23 
During the process of ratification of the ESMT Mr. Pringle 
brought an action before the High Court of Ireland. In turn, he 
contested the lawful adoption of the Decision 2011/199 because, in 
amending the Treaty, it entailed an alteration of the competences 
of the EU and it was inconsistent with EU rules on economic and 
monetary policy and with general principles of EU law. Further, 
the claimant asserted that the entry into force of the ESM would 
create obligations to Ireland which, among others, would be in 
contravention with the Treaty rules on economic and monetary 
policy and would encroach with the exclusive competence of the 
Union in relation to monetary policy. Then, he criticized that the 
creation of an autonomous and permanent international 
institution would circumvent the rules contained in the Treaty as 
regards economy and monetary policy. 
Following the claims brought forward by Mr. Pringle, the 
Irish High Court dismissed his action in its entirety. Mr. Pringle 
appealed before the Supreme Court of Ireland which decided to 
refer a number of questions to the Court of Justice for preliminary 
                                                           
18 ESMT, Article 13. 
19 Id.. 
20 Ibidem, Article 13.3. 
21 Ibidem, Article 13.4. 
22 Ibidem, Article 13.7. 
23 Ibidem, Article 37.3. 
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ruling.24 Given the urgency of the subject, the ECJ applied the 
accelerated procedure. The case was assigned to the full Court.     
 
 
3. The judgment  
Following the Advocate General ("A.G.") Kokott ‘views’ on 
26 October 2012,25 the Court delivered its judgment on 27 
November 2012. The Court’s judgment comprises three questions. 
 
 
3.1 The question concerning the validity of Decision 199/2011 
The first question referred to the Court concerns the 
validity of the Treaty amendment of Article 136 TFEU and the use 
of the simplified revision procedure under Article 48 paragraph 6 
TEU.  
After having established that the Court has jurisdiction and 
that the question is admissible,26 the Court scrutinises the impact 
of the amendment to the TFEU and ascertains whether the effects 
of such amendment concern solely provisions of Part Three of that 
Treaty and whether such amendment increases the competences 
attributed on the Union in the Treaties.  
The ECJ reaches the conclusion that the ESM pursues the 
objective of maintaining the stability of the euro area as a whole 
whereas the Eurosystem pursues the objective of price stability. 
The Court observes that it is clear that the establishment of the 
ESM does not encroach on the monetary policy as the ESM’s 
objective “to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, 
that is clearly distinct from the objective of maintaining price 
stability, which is the primary objective of the Union’s monetary 
policy. Even though the stability of the euro area may have 
repercussions on the stability of the currency used within that 
area, an economic policy measure cannot be treated as equivalent 
to a monetary policy measure for the sole reason that it may have 
indirect effects on the stability of the euro".27 Further, it specifies that 
                                                           
24 See Pringle v. Ireland, [2012] IESC 47, para.5 (S. C.) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.courts.ie/__80256F2B00356A6B.nsf/0/E7504392B159245080257A4
C00517D6A?Open&Highlight=0,Pringle,~language_en     
25 A. G. Kokott View on Pringle delivered on 26 October 2012. 
26 Pringle judgment, paras 30-44. 
27 Ibidem, para. 56 (emphasis added). 
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the ESM has the primary objective of managing financial crises 
which might arise and does complement the new regulatory 
framework for strengthened economic governance of the Union as 
envisaged in a number of new measures.28  
It follows that the establishment of that mechanism does 
not encroach upon the exclusive competence of monetary policy 
held by the Union and does not affect the restricted role of the 
Union in the area of economic policy.29 The Court concludes that 
Decision 199/2011 satisfies the conditions established under 
Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU by means of a simplified revision 
procedure. 
The Court concludes that Decision 199/2011 does not 
establish any new competence on the Union as the Treaty 
amendment does not create any legal basis for the Union and is 
silent as to any possible role for the Union’s institutions in the 
field.30  
 
 
3.2 The right to conclude and ratify the ESM Treaty and EU law 
The Court subsequently focuses on the question whether 
the power to conclude and ratify an agreement such as the ESMT 
is compatible with some European Treaty articles.  
On substance, the Court analyses the provisions relating to 
the exclusive competence of the Union in the monetary policy and 
the power to conclude international agreements.  
With regard to the monetary policy competence, the ECJ 
denies that the role and the tasks of the ESM would fall within the 
monetary policy under the TFEU. According to Articles 3 and 
12(1) of the ESMT, the ESM is not entitled to set the key interest 
rates for the euro area or to issue euro currency, but it seeks to 
provide financial assistance entirely granted by the ESM from 
paid-in capital or by the issue of financial instruments.31 
Furthermore, the Court recalls that even if the activities of the 
ESM might have an influence on the rate of inflation, such 
                                                           
28 Ibidem, paras 58 and 59. 
29 Ibidem, paras 63 and 64. 
30 Ibidem, paras 73-75. 
31 Ibidem, para. 96. 
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influence would constitute “only indirect consequence of the 
economic policy measures adopted”.32  
As to Article 3 paragraph 2 TFEU on the exclusive power to 
conclude international agreements, the Court states that the ESM 
does not affect common rules or alter their scope.33  
Further, the Court conducts an extensive analysis on the 
interpretation of the ESM with the economic coordination 
provisions under Articles 2(3) TFEU, 119 TFEU to 121 TFEU and 
126 TFEU. 
The judgment states that “the ESM is not concerned with 
the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States, 
but rather constitutes a financing mechanism”.34 Even though the 
Court distinguishes between the ESM’s conditionality and 
economic policy coordination, it emphasises that the ESM comes 
within the economic policy element of the EMU as the 
conditionality attached to the ESM stability support shall be 
compatible with the TFEU-based coordination of economic 
policies.35 Similarly, the Court excludes that the ESM affects the 
excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 as the ESMT, 
provides “that the conditions imposed on ESM Members who 
receive financial assistance must be consistent with any 
recommendation which the Council might issue under [the 
excessive deficit procedure]”.36 The ECJ holds that the nature of 
the ESM is “to mobilise funding and to provide financial stability 
support to ESM Members who are experienced, or threatened by 
severe financial problems”.37  
Then, the Court interprets the ESM in light of Articles 123 
and 125 TFEU. First, the Court specifies that Article 123 TFEU is 
addressed specifically to the ECB and to the central banks of the 
Member States, and not to Member States as a whole, which are 
entitled to create mechanisms of financial stability. Member States 
are not covered by that provision.38  
                                                           
32 Ibidem, para. 97. 
33 Ibidem, para. 107. 
34 Ibidem, para. 110. 
35 Ibidem, paras 111-112. 
36 Ibidem, para. 113. 
37 Ibidem, para. 110. 
38 Ibidem, para. 125. 
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Second, the Court examines more in details the spirit of the 
provision of Article 125 TFEU. Even if not in such a detailed way 
as the A.G. did,39 the Court stresses that “the ESM will not act as 
guarantor of the debts of the recipient Member State by referring 
to the spirit of the article inserted by the Treaty of Maastricht. In 
fact, the latter will remain responsible to its creditors for its 
financial commitments”.40 The nature of that rule, as it can be seen 
in the preparatory work relating to the Treaty of Maastricht, lies in 
the aim of the article itself which is to ensure that the Member 
States follow a sound budgetary policy by assuring that they are 
subject to the logics of the market when they enter into debt. 
Hence, the ECJ concludes that the no bail out clause is not 
infringed by “the granting of financial assistance by one or more 
Member States to a Member State which remains responsible for 
its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions 
attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member 
State to implement a sound budgetary policy”.41   
Further, the judgment is devoted to the interpretation of 
Article 13 TEU which provides that each institution shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Treaty. First, 
the Court examines the role allocated to the Commission and to 
the ECB. It recalls that, in cases of non-exclusive competences of 
the Union, Member States can confer powers to the Union 
institutions, on condition that the Member States do not alter the 
essential character of the powers conferred on those institutions 
by the Treaties. Moreover, the Court states that the provisions of 
the Treaty do not establish a specific competence to establish a 
permanent stability mechanism. Article 20 TEU on enhanced 
cooperation does not preclude a role for the Commission and the 
ECB in the ESM.42   
As to the role allocated to the Court, the judgment confirms 
that Article 273 TFEU does not preclude the possibility to confer a 
judicial role to the Court in cases of international agreement 
outside the Union framework. On the contrary, the conditions laid 
                                                           
39 A.G. Kokott View, paras 100-166.  
40 Pringle judgment, para. 138. 
41 Ibidem, para. 137. 
42 Ibidem, paras 168-169. 
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out in the ESMT under Article 37 appear consistent with the 
provision under Article 273 TFEU.43    
 
 
3.3 The question concerning the ratification of the ESM Treaty 
Finally, the Court assesses whether the Member States can 
conclude and ratify the ESM Treaty before the entry into force of 
Decision 199/2011. Very briefly, the Court states that that decision 
does not confer any new power to the Member States and, thus, 
concludes that the ESM Treaty is not subject to the entry into force 
of Decision 2011/199.44  
 
 
4. Commentary 
The ruling in the Pringle case is a seminal ECJ judgment.45 
The Court endorses the amendment of Article 136 TFEU and 
concludes that the ESMT is compatible with the rules of the 
Treaty. It was a rather awaited judgment, especially because of the 
incumbent entry into operation of the ESMT and the need to 
provide rapidly a safety net for Member States in distress. Along 
the lines of this contribution, the full Court ECJ ruling constitutes 
the ECJ “bail out” of the ESM. This is for two reasons. 
First, by clarifying the extent of powers to exercise the 
Treaty amendment powers under Article 48 TEU, the Court allows 
the revision of Article 136 TFEU.  
Second, the judgment, for the first time since the adoption 
of the Maastricht Treaty, analyses core provisions in the economic 
and monetary policy title (in particular Articles 122 and 125 TFEU) 
and it clarifies the extent of power to provide financial assistance 
between Member States. In sum, the judgment legitimizes the 
possibility to use an international instrument between Member 
                                                           
43 Ibidem, paras 171-177. 
44 Ibidem, paras 184-185. 
45 At the time of writing some commentaries on Pringle have been published: V. 
Borger, The ESM and the European Court’s Predicament in Pringle, 14 German Law 
Journal (2013) 113-140; P. Van Malleghem, Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the 
European Union’s Monetary Constitution, 14 German Law Journal 141-168 (2013); 
P. Craig, Guest Editorial Article, 20 Maastricht Journal on Comparative and 
European Law,  3-11 (2013); B. de Witte & T. Beukers, The Court of Justice 
approves the creation of the European Stability Mechanism outside the EU legal order: 
Pringle, 50 Common Market Law Review 805-848 (2013). 
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States to reinforce financial assistance in the Eurozone. Such 
solution appears sensible and the judgment itself stands out as a 
significant precedent with a view to take further action to reduce 
the impact of the financial crisis.  
After having briefly mentioned some aspects on 
admissibility and jurisdiction, the commentary will address the 
extent of powers to conclude an international agreement as it 
happened for the ESM. Then, it will concentrate on the extent of 
revision powers in the Treaties in the context of economic and 
monetary policy. Finally, it will assess the judicial interpretation of 
the Treaty rules on economic and monetary policy with particular 
emphasis on the no bail out clause under Article 125 TFEU. 
 
 
4.1 Admissibility and Jurisdiction  
4.1.1 Jurisdiction 
The new Lisbon framework did not pose particular 
problems to the Court to exercise its jurisdiction on the case. The 
Court affirms that it has jurisdiction under the Treaty to establish 
the feasibility on the use of the simplified revision procedure 
under Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU.  
Competences and powers of the EU have been substantially 
increased and it is no surprise that Decision 199/2011 can be 
subject to the Court jurisdiction. This is because the European 
Council has become a stand-alone EU institution with the power 
to adopt decisions which can, in principle, be subject to the Court 
jurisdiction.46  
This is the first time that the Court pronounces itself on the 
new simplified revision procedure introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty. The position of the Court is quite clear in affirming its 
jurisdiction as Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU does not specify which 
institution has jurisdiction on the revision procedure. De Witte 
held that the Court would be involved on disputes about the 
scope of Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU.47 This has been precisely the 
case. 
 
                                                           
46 Article 13 TEU and Article 267 TFEU. 
47 Bruno De Witte, The reform of the revision rules by the Lisbon Treaty, in P. 
Eeckhout, A. Biondi & S. Ripley (ed.), EU law after Lisbon 124 (2012). 
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4.1.2 Admissibility 
As to the first question, the Court reaffirms the TWD 
doctrine and excludes that Mr. Pringle had standing before the 
Court for a direct challenge to the European Council decision.  
Under Article 263 paragraph 4 TFEU “[a]ny natural or legal 
person may (...) institute proceedings against an act addressed to 
that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them 
(...)”. In other words, any natural or legal person shall 
demonstrate that the Union act is addressed to him or that it is of 
direct and individual concern to him in order to have standing 
before the ECJ. 48  
Differently, an indirect challenge to a Union act – in casu the 
decision of the European Council - can be made through the 
preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 TFEU without any 
specific condition on the standing.  
As it is well established in the Court case law, the TWD 
doctrine maintains that if an individual has locus standi for 
bringing an annulment action before the European judicature – id 
est the Union act is of direct and individual concern to the 
applicant - and such action is not exercised in due time, a 
preliminary ruling on the same matter is inadmissible.49  
Mr. Pringle had not, beyond any doubt, direct and 
individual concern to bring action against Decision 2011/199. This 
is because the challenged decision is an act of general application 
and does not directly and individually concern Mr Pringle. It 
flows from the content of the Decision itself that it did not apply 
as such to a limited category of individuals among which Mr. 
                                                           
48 Note, however, that the Lisbon Treaty added a new indent to article 263 
paragraph 4 TFEU according to which “any natural or legal person (...) may 
institute proceedings (...) against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to 
them and does not entail implementing measures” (emphasis added).    
49 Case C-188/92, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, ECR [1994] I-00833, paras 23-24. The TWD Textilewerke Deggendorf 
case concerned the reimbursement of an unlawfully granted aid. The German 
Government informed the company, and told it also to the Commission’s 
decision could be challenged under Article 263 TFEU. The company did not 
challenge the Commission’s decision, but instead sought to raise the legality of 
the Commission’s decision via the national courts. See also case C-550/09, E and 
F, [2010] ECR I-6213, paras 45-46. On the TWD doctrine see more extensively 
Roland Schwensfeier, The TWD principle post-Lisbon, 37 European Law Review, 
156–175 (2012). 
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Pringle.50 On the contrary, the European Council decision is of 
general application. This was uncontested and the Court has 
correctly declared the action as admissible.  
As to the second question, it is well established that 
preliminary rulings are an instrument of judicial cooperation that 
allow the Court of Justice to provide “national courts with the 
criteria for the interpretation of European Union law which they 
need to decode the dispute before them”.51  
However, a number of conditions need to be respected for 
the preliminary ruling order. As to the one contested in the Pringle 
case, the order of reference should give sufficient information on 
the Treaty rules invoked. Accordingly, both the Court and the 
A.G. contended that some provisions indicated in the order of 
reference did not come into question for the outcome of the 
dispute. In particular, the Court stresses that Articles 2 and 3 TEU 
do not come within the scope of the second question. This position 
reinforces the duty on the part of the referring court to specify the 
EU provisions that the referring court should or shall ask for 
reference to the benefit of the national proceedings.     
 
 
4.2 Substance  
4.2.1 Judicial endorsement of international agreements outside 
the EU legal framework? 
The Pringle judgment raises three questions on the extent of 
powers to conclude and ratify the ESMT under EU external 
relations law. First, the judgment questions the conclusion of an 
international agreement outside the EU legal framework. Second, 
it affirms the use of the Commission and the ECB institutions in 
cases outside the Union legal framework. Third, it assesses Article 
273 TFEU and the role of the ECJ itself in the framework of the 
ESM. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
50 Pringle judgment, para. 42. 
51 Ibidem, para. 83.  
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4.2.1.1 The ESM and international agreements between Member 
States 
First, it is clear that the ESM Treaty was concluded as an 
inter se international agreement, thus between some Member 
States and outside the Union framework. The European Treaties 
do not contain rules to provide permanent financial assistance to 
Member States in distress.  
Conversely, the Lisbon Treaty introduces rules, codified 
from case law, that give exclusive competences to the Union for 
the conclusion of international agreements with international 
organizations and third countries. In particular, Article 3 
paragraph 2 TFEU affirms that the Union has exclusive 
competence to conclude an international agreement in so far as its 
conclusion would “affect common rules or alter their scope”. 
Correctly, the Court excludes that the ESMT refers to those 
situations.  
However, the ECJ makes two mistakes. First, Article 3 
paragraph 2 TFEU refers to international agreements with third 
countries and not between Member States. It appears that 
reference to such article is wrong as the ESMT is an international 
agreement between Member States and not with third states or 
international organizations. Article 3 paragraph 2 TFEU should 
not have been mentioned in this case.  
Second, the Court holds that the ESMT neither affects 
"common rules nor alters their scope".52 The ESMT shall not be seen 
as an initiative impinging on exclusive or shared competences of 
the Union, in casu monetary policy. This argument serves the 
Court to conclude that the ESM does not affect common rules 
because economic policy is not an area of common rules. However, 
the Court seems to be wrong when it refers to common rules as the 
ESMT shall be considered close to an economic policy 
instrument.53 This area is not - strictly speaking - a common policy 
within the meaning of Article 3 paragraph 2 TFEU.  
On a more positive note, this ECJ assumption entails some 
duties on the part of Member States. To such purpose, the Court 
reaffirms the Gottardo case law according to which, even when 
concluding international agreements outside EU competences, 
                                                           
52 See Ibidem, paras 102-104. Emphasis added by the author. 
53 See, clearly, Pringle judgment, para. 60. 
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Member States need to comply with EU law when exercising their 
competence in their reserved competence area.54 This means that 
the Member States need to respect EU law even when they act 
outside its scope. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 The ESM and the role of the Commission and the ECB 
Second, the judgment gives some interesting indications on 
the use of Union institutions in international agreements.55 Pringle 
gives ground to the Court to assess the use of the Commission, the 
ECB and the Court itself in situations where EU institutions are 
given competences outside the Union framework. Some case law 
already existed and is mentioned by the Court. The Court refers to 
the Bangladesh case56 and to the Lomé case.57  
The Bangladesh case concerned the constitution of a fund of 
aid to Bangladesh as an extra-EU instrument. The European 
Parliament challenged the validity of a collective decision by all 
Member States to grant such aid and to confer power to the 
Commission to manage that aid to be given. In the Lomé case the 
European Parliament contested a decision of the Council to 
establish a system outside the EU budgetary procedure to 
administer Member States’ assistance to some third countries 
within the framework of the Lomé Convention. This reference to 
the previous case law allows the Court to affirm in Pringle that 
additional tasks can be conferred to Union institutions so long as 
                                                           
54 Case C-55/00, Elide Gottardo v. Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS), 
[2002] ECR I-00413, para. 32. This case concerned Mrs Gottardo, an Italian 
citizen who worked as a teacher in Italy, Switzerland and France, and wished to 
obtain an old-age pension in Italy. She would be entitled to an Italian old-age 
pension if account were also taken of her Swiss contributions in the overall 
calculation of her contributions pursuant to the 1962 Italian-Swiss convention 
on social security. 
55 See, more extensively, S. Peers, Towards a new form of EU law? The use of EU 
institutions outside the legal framework, 9 European Constitutional Law Review, 
37-72, in particular at 46-55 and 61-65 (2013); and P. Craig, Pringle and Use of EU 
Institutions outside the EU Legal Framework, 9 European Constitutional Law 
Review, 263-284 (2013). 
56 Cases C-181 and 248/91, Parliament v. Council and Commission (Bangladesh 
aid), [1993] ECR I-3865, para. 20. 
57 Case C-316/91, Parliament v. Council [1994] ECR I-625. 
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they “do not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on 
those institutions by the EU and FEU Treaties.”58  
Paragraph 158 confirms that the Bangladesh and Lomé case 
law is still good law and that Member States can confer additional 
tasks to the Union institutions also when they use the 
intergovernmental means or they act outside the Union 
framework. However, one may argue whether the doctrine 
according to which it is possible by international agreements to 
confer additional functions to EU institutions, so long as the basic 
competences of the EU are not affected, has not been stretched too 
much. In other words, to what extent may EU institutions be 
“borrowed” for international arrangements between Member 
States? Some conditions need to be respected: the Union shall not 
have exclusive competence; the tasks conferred to EU institutions 
shall not entail any power to make decision of their own; and the 
additional tasks shall not alter the essential character of the 
powers conferred to them by the Treaties. Unfortunately, the 
Court does not go more into the details of each condition and 
bases its reasoning on previous case law rather than proposing 
some new grounds to assess these conditions.  
In other words, It is submitted that the judgment should 
have clarified better the degree of involvement of the EU 
institutions in the ESM decision-making process. It is true that the 
ESMT indicates that the Board of Governors plays a central role in 
the ESM. It acts as the main body to take decisions to grant 
financial assistance to Member States in difficulty. The 
Commission and the ECB should only play a role of assistance. 
However, the ESMT suggests that both the Commission and the 
ECB may exert some quasi-decisional powers. A strict reading of 
the ESMT would suggest that these powers would run counter to 
the second condition mentioned by the Court. Some more 
indications from the Court could have been considered.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the use of Union 
institutions and the enhanced cooperation under Article 20 TEU 
needed further clarifications. According to this article Member 
States may make use of enhanced cooperation between themselves 
within the framework of the Union's non-exclusive competences 
by making use of Union institutions. The applicant argued that 
                                                           
58 Pringle judgment, para. 158 (emphasis added). 
LO SCHIAVO – THE JUDICIAL BAIL OUT OF THE ESM 
 
207 
 
Article 20 TEU on enhanced cooperation should be used. This 
argument is correctly rejected by the Court as Article 20 TEU 
refers only to cases where the Union has competences to establish 
a permanent mechanism and this was not the case.59 However, the 
Court fails to give more indications on how to use the procedure 
under Article 20 TEU. How would the enhanced cooperation 
procedure under Article 20 TEU be used in areas covered by 
Union policies?60 
 
 
4.2.1.3 The ESM and the role of the ECJ 
Third, Pringle sheds some light on the interpretation of 
Article 273 TFEU. This provision affirms that the Court “shall 
have jurisdiction in any dispute between Member States which 
relates to the subject matter of the Treaties if the dispute is 
submitted to it under a special agreement between the parties”. It 
serves to avoid a divergent interpretation of EU law by other 
jurisdictions and to assure unity in the interpretation of EU law.61 
Accordingly, the ESMT states that if decisions of the Board of 
Governors are contested, the dispute is submitted to the Court of 
Justice.62  
The Court’s reading of Article 273 TFEU is quite broad. 
First, the Court recognizes that Article 273 TFEU may be invoked 
also ex ante causa. It means that it is not necessary that the actual 
dispute has arisen.63 Second, the expression "subject matter" can 
concern the Treaties, and a fortiori EU law, as the ESMT requires 
that the stability support be fully consistent with EU law.64 
However, one may question the fact that the Court affirms that the 
                                                           
59 Ibidem, paras 168-169. 
60 However, on the interpretation of the provisions on enhanced cooperation in 
the context of the unitary patent system see the recent joined cases C-274/11 
and C-295/11, Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v Council of the European 
Union, nyr, commented in F. Fabbrini, Enhanced Cooperation under Scrutiny: 
Revisiting the Law and Practice of Multi-Speed Integration in Light of the First 
Involvement of the EU Judiciary, 40 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 197–224 
(2013). 
61 See more extensively K. Lenaerts, D. Arts & I. Maselis, Procedural law of the 
European Union, 502 et seq. (2006),  
62 ESMT, article 37. 
63 Pringle judgment, para. 172. 
64 Ibidem, para. 174. 
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dispute will be likely to concern the interpretation or application of 
EU law. Does this mean that in some cases the Court’s jurisdiction 
will not be in place as regards some ESM Treaty disputes on 
unrelated EU law subjects? The Court does not give hints on this. 
Finally, the Court includes under Article 273 TFEU also disputes 
where international organisations are party to.65  
Overall, the Court’s reading on Article 273 TFEU is a 
welcome development. It is submitted that the Court adopts an 
extensive and open interpretation on the possibility to conclude 
international agreements outside the Union framework and to 
make use of EU institutions to that effect. This might reinforce 
Member States to rely on international agreements concluded 
between each other in order to tackle the debt crisis in future.  
 
 
4.2.2 The extent of simplified revision powers and the ESM: 
between policies and competences 
The third question before the ECJ explicitly affirms that 
“Decision 2011/199 confirms the existence of a power possessed by 
the Member States”.66 It is clear that the entry into force of the 
Treaty amendment did not affect the power to adopt the ESMT 
alone. This conclusion questions whether the Treaty amendment is 
really necessary to adopt international agreements between 
Member States to establish permanent financial assistance 
facilities. Does Article 136 paragraph 3 TFEU really add a new 
legal dimension to international agreements between Member 
States or is the amendment only the result of a political 
compromise between Member States and the EU institutions? It 
appears that the revision of Article 136 paragraph 3 TFEU is not a 
necessary element to the entry into force of the ESMT from a legal 
point of view.  
Having said that, it is important to appraise the simplified 
revision procedure as Pringle gives significant indications on the 
relationship between the simplified revision procedure under 
Article 48 TEU and the nature of the EMU. 
Revision procedures are contained in Article 48 TEU. The 
Treaty provides for an ordinary and a simplified revision 
                                                           
65 Ibidem, para. 175. 
66 Ibidem, para. 184 (emphasis added). 
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procedure. As underlined above,67 the first question concerned the 
possibility to amend the Treaty through the simplified revision 
procedure of Article 48 TEU paragraph 6 TEU by inserting a third 
indent to Article 136 TFEU.  
The functionality of the simplified revision procedure is to 
avoid recourse to the ordinary revision procedure where a 
Convention composed of the representatives of the Member 
States’ governments is necessary. According to the simplified 
revision procedure, the proposed amendment will be adopted 
directly by the European Council acting by unanimity of its 
members without a Convention. However, two essential 
conditions are necessary to make use of Article 48 paragraph 6 
TEU: first, the amendment shall concern solely the provisions of 
Part Three of the TFEU on Union internal policies and actions 
(Articles 26-197 TFEU); second, the revision shall not increase 
competences conferred on the Union by the Treaties.68 The Court 
assesses these conditions in turn and comes to the conclusion that 
the amendment is compatible with the procedure under Article 48 
paragraph 6 TEU.  
In general terms, it is the first time that the Court interprets 
Article 48 TEU and the conditions therein. This allows us to make 
three critical remarks on this contentious part of the judgment.  
First, it is important to note that the content of the article 
amendment refers to the possibility to allow the conclusion of an 
international treaty, such as the ESM and not a Union 
arrangement. This shows that the simplified amendment 
procedure can also be used to insert provisions that do not 
necessarily concern EU law.  
Second, and more interestingly, the essential question that 
the Court addresses is whether the new amendment impinges on 
monetary and economic policy. It is well known that the EMU is 
composed of two “pillars”: monetary policy and economic 
policy.69 The former is an exclusive competence; the latter is a 
                                                           
67 See supra Section 3.1. 
68 More generally on the simplified revision procedure see S. Peers, The future of 
EU Treaty Amendments, in T. Tridimas & P. Eeckhout (eds.), Oxford Yearbook of 
European law 31-42 (2012).  
69 See supra Section 2.  
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW - VOL. 5   ISSUE 2/2013 
210 
 
“peculiar” competence reserved to Member States through a 
system of coordination of economic policies.70  
The Court has the opportunity to interpret the concept of 
“economic” and “monetary” policies as contained in the Treaty. 
However, the Court appears to limit its interpretation by stating 
that the EU’s economic policy competence has merely a 
coordinating nature. In such way, the Court does not recognize 
that the Union competence in this field can go beyond the simple 
coordination and, at the same time, it does not exclude that it can 
include also ad hoc financial assistance under Article 122 
paragraph 1 TFEU.71  
The Court’s conclusion on the Treaty amendment is clear: 
the amendment of Article 136 TFEU concern solely economic 
policy and not monetary policy which therefore is not altered by 
the new provision.72 This reasoning is remarkable as it allows for 
future use of the simplified revision procedure in the EMU Title 
whenever the envisaged revision does not impinge on monetary 
policy stricto sensu. Even if financial assistance measures “may 
have indirect effects on the stability of the euro” (emphasis added), 
it can be argued that paragraph 56 gives ground to reform 
economic policy measures through the simplified revision 
procedure. In other words, the simplified revision procedure can 
be used even if the amendment has direct effects on the stability of 
the euro, but only indirectly on price stability, and thus on 
monetary policy.  
An example could be the use of the simplified revision 
procedure to put forward amendments to create the Banking 
Union as long as the proposed amendment does not directly 
impinge on monetary policy. However, it is difficult to believe 
that the procedure under Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU may be used 
to reform the Treaty on prudential supervision of credit 
institutions. Article 127 paragraph 5 TFEU, which refers to the role 
of the ESCB to “contribute to the smooth conduct of policies 
pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential 
                                                           
70 R. Palmstorfer, To bail or not to bail out? The current framework if financial 
assistance for euro area Member States measured against the requirements of EU 
primary law, cit. at 6, 773. 
71
 On article 122 TFEU see below Section 4.2.3.1. 
72 Pringle judgment, para. 56. 
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supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial 
system”, is a provision contained in the monetary policy chapter.  
A restrictive reading of the Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU 
conditions would exclude the use of the simplified amendment 
provision to change the Treaty on the role of the ESCB in banking 
supervision.  
However, one might argue whether Article 127 paragraph 5 
TFEU refers to the core of monetary policy or rather to the 
“indirect” tasks of the ESCB’s activities on monetary policy. If we 
follow the second interpretation, it is submitted that Article 48 
paragraph 6 TEU could be used to such purposes. However, one 
might still argue what content the new provision should have. If 
the amendment increases new competences to the Union, it would 
still infringe one of the conditions on the simplified amendment 
procedure. On the contrary, if it relates to institutional issues, 
which are also mentioned in Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU itself – 
“institutional changes in the monetary area” –, a simplified 
amendment would still be possible. This, for instance, would 
allow Member States to insert a new provision on an institution or 
an authority for the resolution of credit institutions in the euro 
area under the simplified revision procedure. 
Arguably, the simplified procedure could also be used to 
revise some more problematic Treaty provisions such as Articles 
123 or 125 TFEU by providing exceptions to the strict prohibitions 
contained therein.73 However, the reasoning of the Court appears 
too cautious and Pringle does not explain better what the 
threshold for “indirect effects” is.   
Third, paragraph 56 contains also an interesting “policy” 
development as compared to previous jurisprudence. It is the first 
time that the Court interprets the concept of “stability of the euro 
area as a whole” as the main objective of the ESM. This is “clearly 
distinct from the objective of maintaining price stability”,74 the 
main objective of the monetary policy. The expression “stability of 
the euro area as a whole” is contained in the first sentence of 
Article 3 of the ESMT as well as in the new indent of Article 136 
TFEU. The Court’s interpretation seems to suggest that the Euro 
                                                           
73 On articles 123 and 125 TFEU see infra 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2. 
74 Pringle judgment, para. 56. 
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area pursues a new objective which could pave the way to a future 
refocusing of the EMU.  
However, the judgment fails to give more clarifications of 
it. This lack of reasoning opens a number of questions. Is “the 
stability of the euro area as a whole” something more or less than 
price stability? What is the relationship between the "stability of 
the euro as a whole" and price stability? Is it an objective 
pertaining only and exclusively to the economic policy? The Court 
affirms that the ESM can have some indirect effects for the 
monetary policy. However, it does not specify what these effects 
are. Further, what is the relationship between “coordination and 
economic policy” and “economic policy”? It is submitted that the 
Court interprets the ESM as an instrument within the “economic 
policy”,75 but it does not give enough indications on how the ESM 
relates to the Union framework. Unfortunately, Pringle does not 
give answers to these questions. However, the interpretation of 
the expression “stability of the euro area as a whole” results in a 
very innovate assertion by the Court that needs to be clarified in 
future case law especially now that it is contained in a specific 
Treaty provision.  
Finally, it should be noted that the answer of the Court is, 
arguably, far less reasoned and motivated as to whether the 
revision procedure increases the competences conferred on the 
Union in the Treaties, namely the second condition for a 
simplified revision procedure. Conferring new competences can 
be made by express Treaty provisions that establish legal basis for 
the Union to take action or through implied powers. The solution 
of the Court appears very cautious. The judgment limits to say 
that the simplified amendment does not confer any new 
competence on the Union. The amendment does not add any new 
Union legal basis nor extend the role of the Union’s institutions.76 
As such, the Court does not take a purposive or extensive 
interpretation of the conditions for a simplified revision, but keeps 
a prudent, even a status quo, interpretation on the possibility to 
integrate the ESM into the Union in future. The very careful 
approach of the Court might be explained by the political pressure 
put by the case at issue. A more open reading would have been to 
                                                           
75 Ibidem, para. 60. 
76 Ibidem, paras 73-74. 
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argue that the Treaty amendment acts as a first step, in emergency 
situations and under “strict conditionality”, to allow further 
Treaty amendments without infringing Article 48 paragraph 6 
TEU.  
Overall, the judgment sheds important lights on use of the 
simplified revision procedure under Article 48 paragraph 6 TEU 
in future. To some extent, the Court has opted for an extensive 
reading of this Article that could allow for future simplified 
revisions of the EMU provisions so long as the Treaty revision 
does not touch the core of monetary policy and does not add new 
legal basis.    
 
 
4.2.3 Articles 122, 123 and 125 TFEU: real limits to the 
establishment of permanent assistance mechanisms between Member 
States? 
As recalled before, the ESM has been established outside 
the Union legal framework. This is because the Union framework 
does not contain any specific provision that allowed the 
establishment of permanent financial assistance mechanisms 
between Eurozone Member States. To that extent, Articles 122, 123 
and 125 TFEU come into question. These will be analysed in turn. 
 
 
4.2.3.1 The ESM Treaty and Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU 
Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU provides that “where a 
Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with 
severe difficulties (...), the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial 
assistance to the Member State concerned. (...)”. The use of this 
provision is limited to natural disasters or similar occurrences. A 
strict reading of this provision would run counter its use in other 
circumstances. However, the crisis has made reference to this 
provision in a wider sense to provide ad hoc financial assistance to 
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Member States in distress.77 In particular, it was used to establish 
the EFSM.78  
Article 122 paragraph 2 allows for the use of special “Union 
financial assistance” to the benefit of a Member State “in 
difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties”. The 
special nature of the provision cannot act as a carte blanche to 
provide any kind of financial support, given the special conditions 
set out in that article. As such, it could not be stretched as much as 
to establish the ESM. This would clearly run counter the scope of 
the provision especially because of the permanent nature of the 
ESM. 
Pringle examines whether Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU 
would run counter the establishment of the ESMT. The Court 
adopts a strict reading on the limits of Article 122 TFEU which 
follows the strict views of the Heads of State and Government on 
the future use of Article 122 TFEU. The Commission’ position was 
divergent. This discrepancy can be implicitly seen from the 
Conclusions of the meeting of 16 and 17 December 2010 where 
only the Heads of State and Government are mentioned and not 
the European Council comprising also the President of the 
Commission.79  
The Court follows the strict line of the Heads of State and 
Government by excluding that “article 122 (2) TFEU (...) constitute 
an appropriate legal basis for the establishment of a stability 
mechanism of the kind envisaged in [Decision 199/2011].”80 In 
other words, the judgment does not recognize that that article 
might be used, more generally, as the legal basis to provide 
permanent - and not temporary - financial assistance to Member 
States in serious difficulty in the Eurozone.  
                                                           
77 See among others J.-V. Louis, Editorial Guest Article, Common Market Law 
Review, 984 (2010); and R. Palmstorfer, To bail or not to bail out? The current 
framework if financial assistance for euro area Member States measured against the 
requirements of EU primary law, cit. at 6, 779. 
78 Council Regulation 407/2010, Preamble. 
79  European Council conclusions, 16-17.12.2010, 1:  “As [the ESM] is designed to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, the European 
Council agreed that Article 122(2) TFEU will no longer be needed for such 
purposes. Heads of State or Government therefore agreed that it should not be 
used for such purposes” (emphasis added). 
80 Pringle judgment, para. 65. 
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Some authors have expressed the same concern on the use 
of Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU.81 Before the judgment they 
argued that Article 122 TFEU has a limited scope and cannot give 
ground to the establishment of permanent mechanisms of the kind 
envisaged.82  
The Court’s approach distances the ESM, a permanent 
financial assistance mechanism, from any possible encroachment 
with Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU. The reference to Article 122 
paragraph 2 should be made only when support is provided to a 
Member State in temporary financial difficulties and not to create 
a permanent facility to assist Member States in distress.  
However, one might question whether Article 122 
paragraph 2 TFEU is really useful to provide an ESM-kind new 
financial assistance arrangement. The system of own resources in 
the EU budget is not sufficient to safeguard government debts of 
big Member States. The EU budget does not have sufficient funds 
to provide the required financial assistance to big economies in the 
Eurozone.83 Member States needed to establish an international 
organisation to provide robust assistance going beyond “the 
margin available under the own resources ceiling for payment 
appropriations” of the EFSM.84 This shows that stability 
mechanisms for robust assistance to Member States require funds 
that are not currently available under the EU budget and thus 
would not come within the scope of application of Article 122 
paragraph 2 TFEU.  
Overall, Pringle confirms that Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU 
is a very special provision. To some extent, this is a regrettable 
step as the Court could have avoided such a firm view on this 
article. In this way, the Court excludes that Article 122 paragraph 
2 TFEU would come into play as a legal basis to create other forms 
of financial assistance under European Union law in future. It is 
                                                           
81 J.-V. Louis, Editorial Guest Article, cit. at 77, 986. 
82 A. de Gregorio Merino, Legal developments in the Economic and Monetary Union 
during the debt crisis: The mechanisms of financial assistance cit. at 2, 1632. 
83 According to the latest data, the draft EU budget for 2014 would amount to 
€142.01 billion in commitment appropriations and to €135.9 billion in payment 
appropriations. The latter sum is clearly insufficient to cover financial assistance 
to big Member States such as Spain or Italy. See further 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/index_en.cfm  
84 Council Regulation 407/2010, Article 2 paragraph 2. 
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true that the introduction of Article 136 paragraph 3 TFEU allows 
for the use of permanent financial assistance mechanisms between 
Member States outside the Union framework. However, the 
Court’s approach on the use of Article 122 paragraph 2 TFUE 
appears too severe. It is submitted that the Court should not have 
been so clear-cut to limit the use of Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU.   
 
 
4.2.3.2 The ESM Treaty and Article 123 TFEU 
Article 123 TFEU prohibits “[o]verdraft facilities or any 
other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or 
with the central banks of the Member States (...) in favour of (...) 
Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly 
from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks 
of debt instruments”.  
Pringle makes a reference also to Article 123 TFEU.85 
However, both the A.G.'s View and the judgment fail to provide 
legal certainty on the terms contained in this article. The Court 
simply excludes that financial assistance between Member States 
of the ESM is covered by that provision. The choice of the Court is 
cautious as it prefers to assess only forms of financial assistance 
between Member States. The judgment neither gives indications 
on the terms used in Article 123 TFEU nor specifies what limits 
this article entails. Thus, it still cannot be inferred from Pringle 
whether some forms of ECB credit facilities would be compatible 
with Article 123 TFEU.  
At the time of writing, there are at least two measures that 
need some scrutiny under this article. First, on 2 August 2012 the 
ECB announced that it would undertake the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMTs) programme86 as a purchase of government-
issued bonds maturing in 1 to 3 years in the secondary market. 
The ECB can exercise OMTs once the Eurozone Member State asks 
for financial assistance. This announcement followed Draghi’s 
public speech where he declared that “[w]ithin our mandate, the 
                                                           
85 Ibidem, paras 125-128.  
86 The OMTs are outright transactions in secondary, sovereign bond markets, 
aimed "at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the 
singleness of the monetary policy." See the ECB press release on OMTs 
available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html  
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ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”.87 So far 
the OMT programme has only been announced and has not yet 
been exercised. It has been demonstrated that the effects of the 
announcement has been beneficial to stabilize the markets, but it is 
still questionable whether the OMT programme is compatible 
under Article 123 TFEU.88 It is submitted that the OMT 
programme is feasible as it acts only as a purchase in the 
secondary market and is a crisis-tailored instrument for 
intervention. The German Constitutional Court will decide on the 
compatibility of the OMTs programme with the 
Grundgesetznorm.89 There may be the possibility that the German 
Constitutional Court refers, for the first time, to the ECJ the case as 
it lacks the powers to assess the legality of the ECB mandate under 
article 123 TFEU. In such case, the ECJ may be called to rule on the 
OMT and the ECB mandate. The Karlsruhe decision would 
probably indicate some guidelines on the feasibility of the OMTs. 
However, it is submitted that only the ECJ has the competence 
and the power to provide the interpretation on the feasibility of 
OMTs under Article 123 TFEU.90  
Second, the ESMT envisages the possibility of borrowing 
capital “from banks, financial institutions or other persons or 
institutions for the performance of its purpose”.91 The ESMT 
provision does not set any limits as to the threshold to borrow 
                                                           
87 Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at the 
Global Investment Conference in London 26 July 2012 available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html 
88 On the OMT programme see, further,  T. Petch, The compatibility of Outright 
Monetary Transactions with EU law, 2013 Law and Financial Markets Review, pp. 
13-21. 
89 ECB warns against opening debate on its mandate, Financial Times, 12.06.2013, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8e6e2600-d366-11e2-b3ff-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2dNfDhgW9  
90
 This is precisely what happened in the German Constitutional Court case 
where, for the first time in German constitutional law, the Karlsruhe Court 
makes a reference to the ECJ. The decision of the German Constitutional Court 
in English is available at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20140114_2bvr2728
13en.html . See "German court refers ECB bond-buying programme to 
European justice", Financial Times, 07 February 2014, available at  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3feab440-8fd5-11e3-aee9- 
00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl  
91 See the ESMT, Article 21.  
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capital. It is submitted that the ECB comes within the term 
“banks” and that the ECB could be used as the lending institution 
for additional capital to the ESM. In other words, the ECB could 
become the lender of additional capitals to the ESM, especially in 
cases of systemic crisis or of a defaulting big euro area Member 
State. However, so far some Member States, most notably 
Germany, have opposed the power to grant this unlimited 
banking license to the ESM.92 The use of the ECB capital to the 
benefit of the ESM would certainly question the compatibility of 
such measure under Article 123 TFEU. However, it is not excluded 
that, in the long term, the ECB via the ESM could acquire the role 
the pan-Euro area financial backstop institution for the safeguard 
of Member States’ public finances. Neither the AG’s view nor the 
ECJ judgment give indications on the possible links between the 
ECB and the ESM. Ton conclude, it is clear that the creation of an 
unlimited or a wide ECB banking license to the ESM would 
require a Treaty change as Article 123 TFEU would not allow this 
operation. However, there is ground to argue that some credit 
links between the ESM and the ECB could put “real teeth” to 
create a strong financial backstop in the Euro area.  
 
 
4.2.3.3 The ESM Treaty and Article 125 TFEU 
More importantly, the Pringle case assesses, for the first 
time, the no bail out clause under Article 125 TFEU. Before 
commenting on the judgment, we will first recall the provision 
and the doctrinal debate on it.  
Article 125 TFEU contains the ban to the assumption of 
commitments by Member States between each other. It states that 
the “Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments (...) 
of any Member State, (...). A Member State shall not be liable for or 
assume the commitments (...) of another Member State, (...)”. This 
                                                           
92 “Angela Merkel stands firm in resisting ESM bank licence”, The Telegraph, 29 
August 2012, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9506882/Angela-Merkel-
stands-firm-in-resisting-ESM-bank-licence.html  
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provision was inserted in the Treaty of Maastricht to ensure that 
the Member States follow a sound budgetary discipline.93  
So far, Article 125 TFEU has proven to be the real “evil” for 
any possible mutualisation of public debt. Doctrinal positions so 
far on it have been divergent. Shortly after the entry into force of 
this provision, Smits argued that the no bail out clause is an 
essential element of the budgetary code if the Union and, thus, 
Member States, are “on their own” as to their budgetary 
commitments. He underlined that “the rationale for the 
prohibition is (...) the application of full market rigour to the 
activities of Governments”.94  
More recently, in the context of the current financial crisis, 
different positions have arisen on the recent crisis measures taken 
in Europe. Rüffert argued that the bilateral loans to Greece in 2010 
and the establishment of the EFSF were in breach of EU law 
because they would run counter Article 125 TFEU.95 More 
correctly, Smits suggested that the markets have yet not been a 
reliable instruments to discipline financial assistance to Member 
States in difficulties and that, given the changed circumstances, a 
different view o the EMU rules is needed.96  
Some others have tried to give a narrower interpretation of 
the no bail out provision as “it aims to force Member States to 
comply with their budgetary discipline following the logics of the 
markets when incurring public debts”.97 Louis sustained that 
under exceptional circumstances the no bail out can be potentially 
overturned “if the situation (...) degenerates into an asymmetric 
shock or a shock common to a number of Member States”.98 
Nonetheless, as affirmed by the more cautious position of 
Palmstorfer, the wording and the systematic reading of the 
provision “covers and bans all forms of financial assistance given 
by the European Union or through a Member State to another”. 
                                                           
93 Ibidem para. 135 where the Court mentions the Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Supplement 2/91, 24 and 54, to retrace the origin of the no bail 
out rule. 
94 R. Smits, The European Central Bank, 76-77 (1997). 
95 M. Rüffert, The European debt crisis and European Union law, 48 Com. Mkt L. 
Rev., 1777-1805, at 1785 (2011). 
96 R. Smits, Correspondence, 49 Com. Mkt L. Rev., 827-832, 827 (2012). 
97 De Gregorio Merino, Legal developments in the Economic and Monetary Union 
during the debt crisis: The mechanisms of financial assistance, cit. at 2, 1625. 
98 J.-V. Louis, Editorial Guest Article, cit. at 77, 984. 
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Thus, the Greek loan facility, the EFSF and the ESM would run 
counter Article 125 TFEU.99  
Overall, the doctrinal positions appear divergent as to the 
possible implications of Article 125 TFEU on financial assistance 
mechanisms. 
Pringle has offered the Court the chance to express itself for 
the first time on Article 125 TFEU and, in particular, to interpret 
the ESM in light of Article 125 TFEU. The Court considers that 
Article 125 TFEU does not preclude the adoption and ratification 
of the ESMT. This conclusion is made through a certain number of 
arguments that need a careful assessment. 
First, the Court conducts a literal interpretation of Article 
125 TFUE and concludes that Member States are not prohibited 
from granting any form of financial assistance whatever to another 
Member State.100 This result is achieved through a combined 
reading of Article 125 TFEU together with Article 122 paragraph 2 
TFEU and Article 123 TFEU. Correctly, the Court shows that 
financial assistance between Member States is allowed by some 
Treaty provisions even if Article 125 TFEU provides for the no bail 
out clause. It is an important point as the Court considers that, 
notwithstanding the no bail out clause, financial assistance 
between Member States is possible.  
Second, the Court examines the objective of Article 125 
TFEU. Paragraph 135 affirms that Article 125 FEU serves to ensure 
that Member States maintain budgetary discipline. This equals to 
say that Article 125 TFEU serves as a provision to guarantee the 
budgetary discipline of the Member States and not, strictly 
speaking, to ban financial assistance between them. However, this 
is not an absolute "invitation" to provide financial assistance 
instruments. In fact, the Court requires that such intervention is 
indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole and that it is subject to strict conditionality.101 
The arguments of the Court are based on the different provisions 
contained in the ESMT according to which financial assistance is 
given only if special conditions are respected. This is not to say 
                                                           
99 R. Palmstorfer, To bail or not to bail out? The current framework if financial 
assistance for euro area Member States measured against the requirements of EU 
primary law,  cit. at 6, 784. 
100 Pringle judgment, para. 130. 
101 Ibidem, para. 136. 
LO SCHIAVO – THE JUDICIAL BAIL OUT OF THE ESM 
 
221 
 
that Member States cannot provide assistance between each other. 
Indeed, one might take two different views on this issue. 
 On the one hand, it can be argued that the Court has 
clearly set the maximum limits on the possible exceptions to 
Article 125 TFEU. Member States cannot be liable for debts of 
other Member States, but they can only provide loans or similar 
means on condition that the beneficiary rests fully liable with its 
commitments.  
On the other hand, provided that assistance is given to the 
benefit of the “financial stability of the euro as a whole” and that 
strict conditionality is respected, Member State can voluntarily 
make use of financial assistance instruments without infringing 
Article 125 TFEU and to the extent that they prefer.  
Correctly, De Witte and Beukers argue that the 
interpretation of Article 125 TFEU in Pringle is based both on the 
requirement of indispensability and conditionality of 
intervention.102 However, I would put more emphasis on the 
actual limits on Member States’ commitments which flow from 
Article 125 TFEU. It is submitted that the Court legitimizes 
Member States’ money transfers to bail out other Member States in 
distress without infringing EU law.103  
It is true that the recipient Member State remains fully 
responsible to its creditors for any financial commitments104. 
Financial assistance amounts to the creation of a new debt to the 
ESM and not to the establishment of debt liabilities assumed by 
the assisting Member States. We are still not in a transfer Union 
with a mutualisation of public debts.105 The ESM does not provide 
neither for the joint nor for the joint and several liability of the 
assisting Member States. It is not an international organisation 
which provides for "stability bonds".106 The assisted Member State 
remains fully responsible for its commitments.  
                                                           
102 B. De Witte & T. Beuckers, The Court of Justice approves the creation of the 
European Stability Mechanism outside the EU legal order: Pringle, cit. at 45, 838-839. 
103 See Pringle judgment, para.137.  
104 Ibidem, paras 139, 145. 
105 See more extensively A. de Gregorio Merino, Legal developments in the 
Economic and Monetary Union during the debt crisis: The mechanisms of financial 
assistance cit. at 2, 1630-1632. 
106 European Commission, Green Paper on the feasibility of introducing Stability 
Bonds, 23.11.2011, COM(2011) 818 final. 
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Nonetheless, it can be argued that the Court legitimizes, if 
not even invites, Member States to bail out each other without 
necessarily infringing the Treaty. This is because the purpose of 
Article 125 TFEU is essential to assure that “the incentive of the 
recipient Member State to conduct sound budgetary policy is [not] 
diminished”107 and not to prohibit financial assistance between 
Member States as such.  
If the Court’s judgment is welcome as it held that the ESM 
is compatible with the no bail out clause, regrettably, it does not 
appear as progressive as the reading of the A.G.’s view.  
First, the A.G. stated that Article 125 TFEU would not 
prohibit any form of financial support to a Member State.108 In a 
more appealing way, she argued that the purpose of Article 125 
TFEU is to assure that “the disciplinary effect of interest rate 
spreads on the capital markets according to the individual 
financial positions of Member States”.109 Does this mean that the 
no bail out provision is concerned with market discipline of 
Member States rather than with budgetary discipline?110 It appears 
that Article 125 TFEU runs primarily counter Member State’s 
arrangements which would subvert the credibility of the 
individual financial position of Member States.  
Second, the A. G.’s view argued that an extensive reading 
of the provision would run counter the principles of sovereignty 
and solidarity of the Member States. Such arguments equal to say 
that an extensive reading of the no bail out clause would infringe 
two principles in the EU that, admittedly, “rank as of at least equal 
importance to Article 125 TFEU”.111 Unfortunately, the judgment 
does not mention any principle to counteract the prohibition 
under Article 125 TFEU. This is regrettable as the Court could 
have showed more activism in legitimizing a restrictive reading of 
Article 125 TFEU.  
Conditionality and even more indispensability of financial 
intervention have less relevance than what one could see at first 
look. As to the former, conditions attached to the MoU are 
                                                           
107 A. G. Views Ibidem, para. 136. 
108 Ibidem, para. 134. 
109 Ibidem, para. 132 and 148. 
110 See on that issue V. Borger, The ESM and the European Court’s Predicament in 
Pringle, cit. at 45, 135-137. 
111 Pringle judgment, para.136. 
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essential to granting financial assistance in compliance with EU 
law, but can go further or can be different from what is required 
under the economic policy provisions contained in the Treaty. It is 
true that Article 13 ESMT requires strict conditionality of 
intervention. However, it is argued that conditionality is a flexible 
concept which depends on the nature of each intervention. As to 
the latter, indispensability does not seem so much essential. It is 
true that the ESM was created to guarantee the stability of the 
euro and that Article 136 paragraph 3 TFEU requires that 
intervention can be activated “if indispensable to safeguard the 
stability of the euro area as a whole”. However, the recent Cypriot 
bail out programme did not appear to be such a serious threat to 
the financial stability of the euro as a whole. Even if the 
Eurogroup stated that “financial assistance to Cyprus is warranted 
to safeguard financial stability (...) to the euro area as a whole”112, 
it is submitted that indispensability of intervention was not 
essential to safeguard the currency union as such. As shown by 
the Cypriot bail out, the ESM funds can be used also to allow a 
Member State in difficulty not to exit the Eurozone.113 This 
questions whether indispensability of intervention is essential to 
trigger the ESM funds.   
Overall, the Court’s approach on Article 125 TFEU is 
welcome as it gives some leeway to assure financial assistance 
between Member States beyond a strict reading of Article 125 
TFEU. Despite not being as appealing as the A.G.’s view, the 
Court establishes that Member States can provide financial 
resources to another Member State without breaching the no bail 
out prohibition. This is possible so long as such intervention is in 
line with sound budgetary discipline and with the 
indispensability to safeguard the stability of the euro as a whole. 
However, it has been demonstrated that these two conditions can 
become rather flexible in their application. Thus, the real limit of 
the no bail out clause remains the nature of the liability of the 
financial instrument which, under the ESM, is still separate 
between Member States' finances and ESM finances.  
                                                           
112 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus of 25 March 2013 available at 
http://eurozone.europa.eu/media/404933/EG%20EG%20Statement%20on%20
CY%2025%2003%202013.pdf   
113 See in favour V. Borger, The ESM and the European Court’s Predicament in 
Pringle, cit. at 45, 138. 
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5. Conclusions 
The judicial endorsement of the ESMT by the ECJ was 
highly expected. This contribution has shown that this judgment is 
welcome and satisfactory in light of future developments along 
the financial crisis. Among others, it clarifies four issues in the 
current debt crisis era.  
First, it is the first time that the Court pronounces itself on 
the rules related to the new crisis-related measure in light of the 
economic and monetary provisions contained in the Treaty. The 
Court’s approach is satisfactory as it adopts a lenient judicial 
control over the conclusion and ratification of an international 
Treaty to provide financial assistance to Eurozone Member States. 
An opposite solution would have jeopardized the project of 
monetary union in Europe.  
Second, the judgment sheds some lights on the use of EU 
institutions beyond the EU legal order. It provides some 
indications on the role of the Commission, the ECB and the ECJ in 
dealing with a stability mechanism of the ESM-kind. This is not a 
conferral of a "carte blanche" of delegation as some conditions are 
attached to such exercise. However, this does not exclude that EU 
institutions might be relied on to exercise intergovernmental 
functions in future. In particular, this might be the case for the 
ECB.  
Third, the judgment allows the use of the simplified 
revision procedure pursuant to Article 48 TEU in the context of 
the economic policy. This is a critical point as the Court has 
clarified to what extent the simplified revision procedure might be 
used to change the Treaty. The judgment is an important 
precedent to future simplified revisions of the Treaty provisions 
on the EMU so long as the changes do not affect the core part of 
the monetary policy competence and introduce new legal basis. It 
has been argued that new provisions could be inserted to amend 
the Treaty under the simplified procedure with a view to 
legitimize the Banking Union.   
Fourth and perhaps most importantly, the Pringle case 
illustrates how stability mechanisms to support Member States in 
financial distress can be effective tools to provide liquidity in the 
European markets. By endorsing the ESMT, the ECJ assures that 
Member States can take financial measures to support each other, 
notwithstanding the straightjacket of the no bail out clause. The 
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result is that Member States can establish financial arrangements 
which can be used beyond a strict reading of Article 125 TFEU. In 
essence, the judgment gives some flexibility to Member States to 
provide financial support to each other.  
To conclude, Pringle will be remembered as the first 
landmark decision in which the Court has endorsed financial 
assistance between Member States as a “catalyst” to increase 
further financial, economic and perhaps political interconnection 
between Member States in the euro area.     
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Abstract. 
Assuming that technology represents a development of 
freedoms, the article analyzes how in a constitutional and 
liberal State the Internet and the use of technologies in general 
is employed as a strategic tool to foster and enforce individuals 
freedoms. According to the author, the Internet constitutes an 
important instrument for increasing democracy, because it 
guarantees the transparency of the political acting, ensuring the 
pluralism of information. In this perspective, the legal horizon 
of the Internet includes not only the right to privacy, but it can 
also be extended to the freedom of expression. The informatic 
freedom is qualified as a new right, resulted from the evolution 
of technological society, which shows a new aspect of the well-
established idea of personal liberty. This particular right has 
become a claim of liberty in the active sense, perceived as the 
freedom to make use of computer in order to provide and 
obtain information of any kind or as the right to join the digital 
society and communicate to whoever. Therefore, the author 
amounts to the right to access to the Internet as a social right, or 
better, as an individual claim to a state’s performance (like 
services such as education, health and welfare) and through 
comparative references shows how some countries have 
recognized the access to the Internet as a fundamental right of 
individuals, considered as a universal service that they must 
guarantee to their citizens by investments of public resources 
and social or educational policies. 
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1. Technologies have represented and still represent a 
development of freedoms; more in details, freedoms have 
significantly extended their scope to new frontiers of human 
acting by virtue of the recent technological developments1. Indeed, 
technologies do not only produce freedom: it would be better to 
say that technologies can be employed by good and bad 
individuals, as well as by either an open-minded government or a 
despotic one. In a constitutional and liberal state, however, public 
policy should always be aimed at fostering and extending 
individuals’ freedoms, and the use of technologies must be one of 
the strategic tools to this end. Let’s think about the Internet and its 
typical cross-border nature, which goes across national borders, 
overcomes customs boundaries and removes cultural differences 
between various people2.  
Also, with respect to the Internet, it is still a problem to 
distinguish the different freedoms in order to achieve a holistic 
model of freedom: whoever has access to the Internet, in fact, 
expresses himself/herself, joins communities, communicates, in 
the manners that he/she prefers. Different freedoms are therefore 
enforced by the same medium, i.e. the Internet, at the same time or 
at very closed times. Of course, there is another point in return: 
virtual barriers are raised instead of real barriers. In fact, there are 
some countries (illiberal, of course) that have built electronic 
barriers in order to avoid the access to part of their global 
network, by the removal of words, names, and keywords from 
search engines or by violating personal data of individuals. New 
information barriers have been raised in part of the world, where 
videos or blogs are the samizdat of the present days. These factors, 
however, confirm the liberal spirit of the Internet, and the fear by 
which non-tolerant countries approach technologies, because they 
feel the Internet as a threat to their absolute power. The Internet 
can be – as it was, for example, in the so called “Arab spring” – an 
important tool for increasing democracy, also because it 
guarantees the transparency of the political acting by a pluralism 
of news and information which circulate over the Internet, 
allowing citizens to see-know-share. 
                                                           
1 See T.E. Frosini, Nuevas tecnologias y constitucionalismo, 124 Rev. Est. Pol. 129 
(2004). Recently, P. Costanzo, Il fattore tecnologico e le sue conseguenze, 4 Rass. 
Parl. 232 (2012). 
2 V. Frosini, L’orizzonte giuridico dell’Internet, 2 Dir. inf. 271 (2000). 
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2. It has to be pointed out that the problems brought along 
by technological developments are not limited to the protection of 
the right to privacy anymore, even if this problem has been and 
continues to be analyzed from the constitutional point of view, by 
both scholars and courts (including data protection authorities). 
The “legal horizon of the Internet” includes the right to privacy, of 
course, but such background extends also to the freedom of 
expression, which is a constitutional right to be rethought in light 
of its new implications from a legal point of view. 
In order to examine the most critical issues concerning the 
coming of the Internet and its legal implications, I believe that 
some points have to be made with respect to the “informatic 
freedom”. This theory was developed in 1981 and found its 
grounds in the concept of a new liberal age, characterized by the 
new achievements permitted by the technological “revolution”. 
Such doctrine was based on the rise of a new dimension of the 
personal liberty in the age when computer were used for the first 
time3.  
The informatic freedom is therefore a new right resulted 
from the evolution of technological society, and shows a new 
aspect of the well-established idea of personal liberty and 
constitutes the advancement of a new frontier of human freedom 
to the society of the future to be placed in the construction of the 
contemporary constitutionalism. 
The informatic freedom qualifies as a new form of the 
traditional right of personal liberty, as the right to exercise the 
control over personal information, or a right to “habeas data”. 
Over the time, case law has recognized and affirmed this new 
freedom in terms of preservation of the individual, as a claim 
against the holders of the computer power, by private persons and 
public authorities. By the new legislation on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, 
fostered by a European standard, the notion of the right to 
informatic freedom has been recognized in positive law. The 
freedom to preserve their confidentiality when using computer 
has become also the freedom to communicate to others the 
information transmitted by electronic means to exercise that 
                                                           
3 See V. Frosini, Law and Liberty in the Computer Age (1995). 
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freedom of expression of one's personality making use of new 
communication systems. 
Hence the right to informatic freedom acquires an 
additional significance nowadays as a result of the coming of the 
Internet, and this proves its relevance even today. In fact, in the 
age of the Internet, the right to informatic freedom 'has become a 
claim of freedom in the active sense, not a freedom “from” but 
freedom “of”, which is the freedom to make use of computer to 
provide and obtain information of any kind. 
And it is a right to participate in the virtual society, which 
has been created by the coming of computer in the digital age: it is 
a society characterized by movable parts and dynamic 
relationships, where each participant is sovereign over his/her 
decisions’. 
It is, then, the right to join the digital society that has been 
created. We are approaching, without doubts, a new form of 
freedom, i.e. the right to communicate to whoever, including the 
right to circulate personal opinions, thoughts and materials, as 
well as the right to receive the same. 
Therefore, freedom of communication qualifies as a right to 
circulate and receive. This is not only the individual freedom of 
expression anymore, rather the right to establish relationships, 
circulate and request information, and therefore exercise the new 
power of knowledge based on the information technology: in a 
nutshell, the right to exercise the informatic freedom. Moving 
from the acknowledgement of such a freedom it could be possible 
to establish some grounds for an Internet Bill of Rights. 
 
 
3. Then we come to the right to access to the Internet. It is 
worth quoting Rifkin, first of all: «In a world more and more 
based on economic and social electronic networks, the right not to 
be excluded – the right to access – acquires an increasing 
importance. Concepts like “inclusion” and “access” have today 
replaced those (corresponding) of autonomy and possession, 
which characterized the notion of property in a traditional sense: 
in the new economy, the concept of property does not refer to a 
power of excluding others from enjoying personal goods 
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anymore, rather it qualifies as a right to not be excluded from the 
society’s resources»4. 
The right to access to the Internet has therefore to be 
considered as a social right, or better as an individual claim to a 
state’s performance, like services such as education, health and 
welfare. It is a universal service that state’s bodies must guarantee 
to their citizens by investments of public resources, social and 
educational policies. In fact, more and more the access to the 
Internet and the conduct of business via the Internet constitute the 
means by which individuals enter into relations with state’s 
powers, i.e. exercise their citizenship’s rights5. 
Today, citizenship is a digital concept. It is interesting, in 
this respect, to look at the provisions contained in the Italian Code 
of Digital Administration (CAD) - Legislative Decree No. 82/2005, 
which establishes “a statute of the digital citizen” (including 
natural and legal persons), by requiring public offices, agencies 
and bodies to interact in a digital manner, thus to arrange 
appropriate means from the technical and organizational point of 
view to meet citizens’ requests. It is clear that such a new way of 
qualifying the relationship between individuals and public 
administration in terms of a new digital citizenship demands a 
process of digital literacy, as a social right that the state must 
guarantee, along with the right to education and to the digital 
cultural development, that the Italian Constitutional Court (by 
decision n. 307, 2004) has found to be «corresponding to a general 
interest, specifically the development of culture -by the use of 
digital tools-, that Italy must pursue at any levels (art. 9)». In this 
respect, it is worth mentioning the European Parliament 
resolution of 10 April 2008, requiring Member States to «to 
recognize that the Internet is a vast platform for cultural 
expression, access to knowledge, and democratic participation in 
European creativity, bringing generations together through the 
information society; calls on the Commission and the Member 
States, to avoid adopting measures conflicting with civil liberties 
and human rights and with the principles of proportionality, 
effectiveness and dissuasiveness, such as the interruption of 
                                                           
4 So, J. Rifkin, The Age of Access: The New Culture of Hypercapitalism, Where All of 
Life is Paid-For Experience (2000). 
5 A. Lepage, Libertés et droits fondamentaux à l’épreuve de l’internet (2002). 
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Internet access». Also in the European Parliament 
recommendation of 26 March 2009 to the Council on 
strengthening security and fundamental freedoms on the Internet 
it is stressed that the Internet is «a key instrument at world level 
for exercising freedom of expression» protected under the Charter 
of fundamental rights of the European Union and « can be an 
extraordinary opportunity to enhance active citizenship». 
Yet, in terms of (digital) active citizenship, it is worth 
quoting the Italian Law No. 4/2004 (so called “Stanca Law”), 
establishing provisions for favouring the access of disabled people 
to computer systems. This law recognizes and protects the right of 
any persons to access any sources of information and the related 
services, including those provided by computer systems. In 
particular, art. 1 refers to art. 3 of the Italian Constitution when 
setting the right to access to the Internet, by qualifying such right 
as instrumental for the achievement of equality among citizens. 
Therefore, denying access to the Internet would result in the 
violation of fundamental human rights such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of information, education, development and 
equality6. Then, the right to access to the Internet amounts to a 
fundamental right the exercise of which is instrumental to the 
enjoyment of other constitutional rights and freedoms: not only 
the freedom of expression, protected by art. 21 of the Italian 
Constitution, but also the right to an “appropriate development of 
the human being” and to an “effective participation to the 
political, economic and social life of the State” protected under art. 
3 of the Constitution, as well as the freedom of conduct business 
contained in art. 41. Today, against the background of the 
information society (or the “age of the access”) being deprived of 
access to the Internet results in being prevented from exercising 
large part of the citizenship rights. 
In Finland, a law that came into force on 1st July 2010 has 
defined as “a legal right” the access to the Internet for over five 
millions of citizens. The Finnish Minister of Communication said 
that «a high-quality broadband Internet connection at a reasonable 
price is an essential right». Therefore, all the 26 providers 
operating in Finland, that are qualified as “provider of a universal 
service”, shall be able to connect any facilities with a download 
                                                           
6 See, recently, O.D. Pulvirenti, Derechos Humanos e Internet (2013). 
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speed of 1 megabit per second. Also Switzerland and Spain are 
looking at this initiative, and may act in the next future in order to 
grant access to the Internet as a condition for the enjoyment of 
other rights. 
 
 
4. Some countries have recognized the access to the Internet 
as a fundamental right of individuals in the relevant legal systems, 
even if at different levels: some in the constitutions, like Estonia, 
Greece and Ecuador; some by laws, like Finland and Peru; some 
by the case law of the respective domestic courts, like France, 
Costa Rica and –even before- the United States, where the 
Supreme Court, in a decision delivered in 1997, said that «The 
record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and 
continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional 
tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume 
that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more 
likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to 
encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in 
a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven 
benefit of censorship»7.  
With regard to the decision of the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel (no. 2009-580 DC of 10 June 2009), it has to be 
stressed that the court referred to the access to the Internet in 
terms of a fundamental right. In fact, due to the large-scale 
diffusion of the Internet, the freedom of communication and 
expression necessarily requires a free access to online 
communication services. The Conseil moves from an express 
reference to art. 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen of 1789: «The free communication of ideas and 
opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every 
citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, 
but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be 
defined by law». This definition provides a clear and specific view 
of the freedom of information and still proves to be valid. Then, 
the Conseil, by the application of the proportionality test, found 
that the freedom of communication, including the right to access 
                                                           
7 See, American Civil Liberties Union vs. Reno [E.D. pa 1996]; again, Supreme 
Court 521 US 844 (1997).  
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to communication services, has a valuable importance and 
therefore any restriction of the same imposed by the competent 
authorities must be specifically defined8. 
Also, some international (also non-binding) documents 
concern the right to access to the Internet.  It is worth quoting, for 
example, a May 2011 report issued by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations where it is highlighted that «given that the 
Internet has become an indispensable tool for realizing a range of 
human rights, combating inequality, and accelerating 
development and human progress, ensuring universal access to 
the Internet should be a priority for all States». 
 
 
5. In the 21st Century the «legal horizon of the Internet» is 
clear and visible. And this constitutes also the new horizon of 
contemporary constitutionalism, as the aforesaid important 
decisions of the US Supreme Court first and of the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel then, have proven (without forgetting the 
decisions, already mentioned, of the Sala Constitucional of Costa 
Rica). It is interesting to observe, in two countries where the 
constitutionalism was born, even though by following different 
paths at the very beginning, the interpretation given by courts to 
two dated provisions – the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution and art. 11 of the 1789 Declaration-, provisions which 
were written and adopted more than two centuries ago to protect 
and enforce the freedom of information: that’s the case to say, the 
freedom of yesterday, today and tomorrow. In fact, it is from these 
provisions –defining clear horizons of the constitutionalism- that 
today a legal ground is sought in order to recognize and protect 
the new forms of expressions of electronic communications, with 
respect in particular to the Internet. Thanks to an appropriate 
interpretation and enforcement of the relevant parameters, a very 
constitutional right to access to the Internet is emerging nowadays9. 
And this is because, against the extensive diffusion of the Internet, 
the freedom of communication and expression requires first the 
freedom to access to those online communication services. It is for 
                                                           
8 L. Marino, Le droit d’accès à internet, nouveau droit fondamental, 30 Rec. dal. 2045 
(2009). 
9 See, T.E. Frosini, La lotta per i diritti. Le ragioni del costituzionalismo (2011). 
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states to remove barriers and obstacles that prevent citizens from 
enjoying this universal service that must be guaranteed to all 
citizens by public investments, social and educational policies, by 
public expenses. As pointed out, the right to access to the Internet 
constitutes in fact the way by which individuals approach state’s 
powers. Denying the access to the Internet, or making it costly, 
excluding part of citizens from its enjoyment would make it 
impossible to exercise a large part of the citizenship rights. 
Finally: the constitutional freedom of expression consists of 
what art. 19 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of indicated in the right: «to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers», even when– like in the recent “WikiLeaks” case – the 
information circulating via the Internet may disappoint national 
governments, put at risk diplomatic relationship between states or 
reveal arcana imperii. One could not like it, and also reduce the 
scope of protection and the effects or deny the legal validity, but in 
any cases the act of “seeking, receiving and imparting 
information” demonstrates the crucial role of the right to know 
and the freedom of information, that also show a new model of 
separation of powers in light of a modern constitutional view. 
In the past, it was the government to control citizens by the 
control over information; today, it has become harder and harder 
to control what a citizen reads-sees-hears, seeks-receives-imparts. 
The technology provides thus to individuals the ability to become 
a power that is in the condition to control the other powers: le 
pouvoir arrêt le pouvoir. 
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Abstract 
The article argues that administrative procedures and 
organization can affect the quality of regulation. This premise 
creates the necessity to consider the matter starting from the point 
of view of enforcing regulation. The mentioned approach also 
implies the need for maintenance of rules, with systematic and 
periodic monitoring and evaluation of regulatory provisions, in 
particular in order to ensure the continuous connection between 
the objectives of regulation and the effects which regulation 
produces. Furthermore, procedural steps of a regulatory decision 
are analyzed, as well as the hard question of the relationship 
between politics and administration in procedures and in 
organization. Finally, good organization principles for regulators 
are described, with specific reference to parliament, 
administrations and independent authorities. 
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I. “Good” regulation, procedures and organization  
The aim of this article is to illustrate how procedures and 
organization can affect the problem of quality of regulation, and – 
in so doing – to show that they could be considered as regulatory 
tools. 
If we remember that regulation has its roots in political 
economics1, it is clear that the legal concept of regulation has been 
influenced by the economic one, which requires a strong link 
between rules and their consequences2. From a legal point of view 
regulation is law structurally built to achieve its objectives, to 
solve effectively various kinds of problems3 and to avoid (as far as 
possible) regulatory failures4. 
During the last twenty years, the biggest driver in 
circulating the idea that regulation should be “good” has been the 
OECD which has stated that “better regulation means to adopt 
                                                 
1 See A. Ogus, Regulation. Legal Form and Economic Theory, (2004), 1. 
2 See C. Coglianese and R.A. Kagan (ed. by), Regulation and Regulatory Process 
(2007),  xi. 
3 See S.G. Breyer and R.B. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, 
(1992), 5-6. 
4 See R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation. Theory, 
Strategy and Practice, (2012), 68. On this point see also European Commission, 
Communication “Strenghtening the foundations of Smart regulation – improving 
evaluation”, COM(2013) 686 final, p. 3: “Thorough evaluation also identifies 
unintended and unexpected consequences”. 
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regulations that meet concrete quality standards, avoids 
unnecessary regulatory burdens and effectively meets clear 
objectives”5.  
“Good” regulation has been described several times and in 
several ways, in literature as well as by national, European and 
international organizations. While highlighting each time specific 
aspects, it has been indicated as “better regulation” by the OECD6 
and, more recently, by the EU, as “smart regulation”7 as well as 
regulation “fit for purpose”8.  
Furthermore, institutions and scholars have looked for 
principles and criteria of good regulation. In this way, any 
regulation should be: transparent, accountable, proportionate, 
consistent and targeted only at cases where action is needed”9 and 
needs legislative mandate, accountability, due process, expertise 
and efficiency10. 
Starting from a more general point of view, the problem of 
a “good” regulatory regime11 is often indicated in terms of 
enforcement (and compliance)12, to the extent that “the problem of 
enforcement is an acute one in regulation for reasons that are 
                                                 
5 OECD, Overcoming Barriers to Administrative Simplification Strategies: Guidance 
for Policy Makers, (2009), 44. 
6 OECD, Reccomendation on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation, Paris, 
9 March 1995 and The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform; Synthesis, (1997),  8. 
7 European Commission, Communication “Smart Regulation in the European 
Union”, COM/2010/0543 final, p. 3: Smart Regulation means a regulation “[...] 
about the whole policy cycle – from the design of a piece of legislation to 
implementation, enforcement, evaluation and revision”, a regulation which 
“must remain a shared responsibility of the European institutions and of the 
member States”, a regulation in which “the views of those most affected by 
regulation have a key role to play”. On this point, see R. Baldwin, Is better 
regulation smarter regulation?, in Public Law, 2005, p. 485. 
8 See European Commission, Communication “EU Regulatory fitness”, 
COM(2012) 746 final and European Commission, Communication 
“Strenghtening the foundations of Smart regulation – improving evaluation”, p. 3. 
9 Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act, 2006, art. 21, sec. (2). The principles of 
good regulation have been established by BRTF (Better Regulation Task Force), 
Principles of Good Regulation, 2003. 
10 See Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation. Theory, Strategy and 
Practice, cit. at 4. 26-27. 
11 Ibid., p. 38. 
12 OECD, Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challanges for Regulatory Compliance, 
(2000). See also W. Voermans, Motive-based enforcement, Working Paper Leiden 
University, March 23, 2013. 
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intrinsic to the nature and the task of regulatory control”13. In this 
regard, the quality of legislation has been considered as a problem 
of making legislation clear and accessible but also of making it as 
“easy to comply with as possible”14.  
However, this approach to enforcement reveals an 
administrative stance which prioritizes compliance: “regulatory 
unreasonableness makes regulatory compliance much more 
inefficient and costly than it needs to be”15.  
If enforcement aims “to solve problems”16 and to pursue 
“behaviour modification”17, “good regulation” should even be 
measured as “performance of regulatory improvements tools, 
institutions and policy”18. In this sense, I would argue, it is strictly 
connected to procedures and organization because “the ultimate 
impact of any regulatory policy depends not only on how that 
policy has been drafted and designed, but also on how 
enforcement officials take actions to implement those policies at 
the ‘street level’”19. 
In other words, there is a “symbiotic relationship between 
the formulation of regulatory rules and their application”20. 
Let us look, for example, at (administrative) procedures in 
regulatory processes. Administrative procedures, in fact, have 
been considered “another mechanism for inducing compliance”21. 
                                                 
13 K. Hawkins and J.M. Thomas, Enforcing Regulation, (1984), 7. 
14 European Commission, Communication “EU Regulatory fitness”, p. 9. See also 
OECD, Better Regulation in Europe: Italy 2012 – Revised Edition, June 2013, OECD 
Publishing, p. 101 (Compliance, enforcement and appeals). 
15 E. Bardach and R.A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness, 2010, originally published in 1982 by Temple University Press, 
x. 
16 Ivi,  xxi. 
17 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation, cit. at 4, 227. 
18 Ibid., p. 34. 
19 Coglianese and Kagan (ed. by), Regulation and Regulatory Process, cit. at 2,  xvi. 
The concept of “street-level bureaucracy” is due to M. Lipsky, Street-level 
Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, (2010), original edition 
published in 1980. 
20 Ogus, Regulation. Legal Form and Economic Theory, cit. at 1, 90. See also 
Hawkins and Thomas, Enforcing Regulation, cit. at 13, 173: “Enforcement 
activities are facilitated and constrained by the form, stringency and coverage of 
the law”. 
21 M.D. McCubbins, R.G. Noll and B.R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, in J.L. Econ. & Org., 1987, 244. 
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Their importance is due to “transparency and public participation 
[which] can help produce better, more informed policy 
decisions”22. But the use of economic evaluation techniques, such 
as cost-benefit analysis, has increased and has been itself defined, 
in the context of the so-called “analytic management of 
regulation”, as “a method for taking into account the interests of 
all affected citizens and selecting regulatory measures that will 
enhance societal welfare”23. 
Let us look at (administrative) organizations which are in 
charge of regulatory tasks: “enforcement practice is heavily 
influenced by the role that organizations play in regulation”24. In 
fact, there are important “institutional factors that affect the 
decision of regulatory officers”25. 
“Good” regulation, finally, seems to regard both elements 
of  (what we are going to define) formal quality and substantial 
quality, as we will see later (par. II). In other words, “good” 
regulation depends on (or is strictly connected with): the way in 
which regulation is adopted; the way in which it is enforced; the 
way in which it is evaluated (and, if necessary, revised or 
reformed) in order to ensure the continuous adequacy of 
regulatory provisions. 
We could say that – alongside classic regulatory tools26 – 
there are relevant administrative tools (procedures and 
organization) which can affect regulation as being capable of 
achieving its proper objectives.  
 
 
II. Quality of regulation: formal and substantial aspects 
The problem of the quality of regulation (how to design a 
good regulatory regime) could be usefully analysed as the 
problem of the quality of rules (how to make a good rule)27. In 
                                                 
22 C. Coglianese, H. Kilmartin and E. Mendelson, Transparency and public 
participation in the federal rulemaking process: recommendations for the new 
administration, in Geo. Wash. L. Rev., 2009, vol. 77, 927. 
23 R.B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, in N.Y.U. L. Rev., 
vol. 78, 2003, 445 
24 Hawkins and Thomas, Enforcing Regulation, cit. at 13, 18. 
25 Coglianese and Kagan (ed. by), Regulation and Regulatory Process, cit. at 2, xiii. 
26 See Breyer and Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, cit. at 3, 11. 
27 The relationship between quality of legislation and quality of regulation has 
been analysed by W .Voermans, Concern about the quality of EU legislation: what 
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fact, only legal rules are specifically enforced and only a single 
legal rule imposes consequences on its targets, altering their 
behaviour. The legal rule is, in other words, the basic element in 
the context of wider regulation28. 
The quality of regulation/rules, as we have seen, has been 
considered both from a formal point of view and from a 
substantive one. 
Firstly, the formal quality of the rule is the objective of 
drafting (also called legistique formelle, in French speaking 
countries). To achieve formal quality of rules, rules must be 
consistent, clear and understandable. Therefore, manuals of 
drafting style have been adopted all over the world by several 
legislative assemblies (e.g., by the U.S. House of Representatives), 
by governmental institutions (e.g., in Italy there is a “Guida alla 
redazione degli atti normativi”, adopted in 2001; in Spain there are 
“Directrices de técnica normativa”, adopted in 2005), but also by 
supranational bodies, such as at European level (since 1993, the 
EU institutions has issued a lot of official documents regarding the 
question of quality of drafting)  and at international level (e.g. the 
ILO – International Labour Office Manual for drafting, adopted in 
2006).  
But this concept of formal quality is nowadays more 
extensive. In 2010 the U.S. Office of information and regulatory 
affairs adopted “Disclosure and Simplification as Regulatory 
Tools”, which gives directives to ensure fair communication: not 
only should each rule be consistent, clear and understandable, but 
should also be transmitted “clearly and at the time when it is 
needed”, information must be “salient and easy to find and to 
understand”; “as usable as possible” and accessible in an 
electronic format “that does not require specialized software”. 
Secondly, the substantive quality of the rule refers to the 
effect of the whole regulation and, in this sense, is the object of 
                                                                                                                       
kind of problem, by what kind of standards?, in Erasmus L. Rev., vol. 2, 2009,  59. 
See also H. Xantachi, Quality of legislation: an achievable universal concept or a 
utopian pursuit?, in Quality of legislation. Principles and instruments: Proceedings 
of the Ninth Congress of the International Association of Legislation (IAL), 
(2011), 75. 
28 See M. De Benedetto, M. Martelli and N. Rangone, La qualità delle regole, 
(2011), 12-13, where the problem in general has been developed and where 
wider references are provided. 
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“better” and “smart” regulation policies. In fact, since the 
beginning of the Nineteen Nineties the OECD has given impetus 
to the need to rationalise the regulatory system, with the goal of 
reducing quantitative regulations and improving their quality. 
Furthermore, the question of evaluating the effects of regulations 
has presented itself in an institutional dimension at the EU level29 
and has also become ever more important30 in many national legal 
systems.  
In the life-cycle of regulation rules are considered as being 
capable of producing effects. The horizon is wider than in the 
legislative process, which has the different perspective of the mere 
adoption of the rule/regulation. The life-cycle of regulation 
includes all institutional activities oriented towards monitoring 
and evaluating the effects of rules in order (ultimately) to make 
possible review or regulation reform: this is what I have elsewhere 
defined as “maintenance of rules”31.  
This approach to the problem of quality of regulation has 
important consequences for procedures and organization, as we 
are going to explain specifically. 
 
 
III. Procedures 
 When we adopt the logic of the cycle of regulation many 
things in administrative processes need to be reinterpreted. 
Procedures must be created with a “developing logic” in mind: a 
planning phase comes before a regulatory procedure, which is 
followed by evaluation in a sort of “rolling”32 sequence. 
What kind of rules are to be adopted in order to achieve 
good quality rules? What is the way in which regulation could 
meet its objectives? We can approach these questions in two 
different ways. 
The first way looks at procedures formally, with regard to 
the rules of the procedure. The competition between public and 
                                                 
29 In general, on this point, see L. Mader, Evaluating the effects: a contribution to 
the quality of legislation, in Statute L. Rev., 2001,  119. 
30 See, recently, European Commission, Communication “EU Regulatory fitness”. 
31 See De Benedetto, Martelli and Rangone, La qualità delle regole, cit. at 28,  98. 
32 See European Commission, Communication “Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps”, COM(2013) 685 final, p. 13, where 
REFIT has been defined as “a rolling programme”. 
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private interests is regulated by the procedure itself, because 
participation in procedures “involves competition amongst 
competing ends and values”33. Furthermore, the U.S. 
Administrative Procedure Act and other general regulations of 
rulemaking all over the world, impose procedural obligations, 
such as prior notice to the targets of the rule, participation (or 
consultation), information and transparency. 
The second way looks at procedures substantively, with 
regard to the content of the final decision and to the choices 
during the procedure. The problem is to develop an adequate 
procedure and to control the cost of the whole rulemaking 
process. How deep has a rulemaking process to be in order to 
assure a well-reasoned decision? If we consider the cost of 
gathering information in procedures34, we have to define a 
proportionate level of analysis (as this concept is called in EU 
vocabulary35) for each procedure. But, in order to arrive at an 
appropriate definition of this level, further activities would need 
to be carried out, in other words, to incur further costs. 
It is necessary to accept a suboptimal solution36. The 
procedural choice is, in fact, based on a “bounded rationality”37, a 
rationality which is constrained by limited information, by 
cognitive limitation and by a finite amount of time to make a 
decision. The choice could also be conditioned by the 
requirements which come from the various kinds of regulatory 
                                                 
33 D.J. Galligan, Due process and fair procedures. A study of administrative 
procedures, (1996), 123. 
34 See, in general, on this topic G.J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, in J. Pol. 
Ec., 1961, 69, 3, 213. 
35 The concept of “proportionate level of analysis” has been used in the contex 
of Impact Assessment, see European Commission, “Impact Assessment 
Guidelines”, SEC(2009) 92, p. 13-14, where it is considered that it “relates to the 
appropriate level of detail of analysis which is necessary for the different steps 
of IA”. See also, European Commission, Communication “Strenghtening the 
foundations of Smart regulation – improving evaluation”, p. 7 where a good 
evaluation report is described: “the appropriate level of (proportionate) analysis 
is defined based on the policy importance, the complexity of the EU action and 
its stage in the policy cycle”. 
36 See A. Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft, (1969), Italian edition Per un 
razionalismo critico, (1973), 20. See also N. Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren, 
Italian edition Procedimenti giuridici e legittimazione sociale, (1995), 213.  
37 See H. Simon, Administrative Behaviour, (1947). 
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oversight (judicial review, oversight bodies, and non-
governmental oversight bodies). 
On the basis of this double approach, in several legal 
systems rulemaking is commonly articulated in a “series of 
step”38, a decision route constituted by a “highly complicated set 
of activities”39. 
U.S. Executive Order n. 12866/1993 describes the principles 
of regulation, while the OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory analysis 
(2003), indicates key elements of a regulatory analysis. In Europe 
there has been a strong tradition of adopting check-lists since the 
Nineteen Seventies. This has been accepted by the OECD, which 
adopted the most famous check list in 1995. Also in France, la 
Guide de legistique – reviewed in 2007 – has considered the “trame” 
of the “étude d’impact” to be absolutely necessary, independently 
of the degree of in-depth study of the analysis. In Italy, the content 
of impact regulatory analysis is described as a step of the  
Government rulemaking process. In UK, the Impact Assessment 
Guidance40 has identified stages in the process of impact 
assessment. Finally, at the European level, the European Impact 
Assessment Guidelines have prescribed analytical steps in the 
process and evaluation has, more recently, become crucial in the 
REFIT  Programme41. 
This, of course, leads to the logical conclusion that “an 
assortment of analytical requirements have been imposed on the 
simple rulemaking model” and that “the rulemaking process has 
become increasingly rigid and burdensome”42. This is the 
phenomenon called “ossification” of the rulemaking process. 
 
 
                                                 
38 C.M. Radaelli, What do governments get out of regulatory reform? The case of 
regulatory impact assessment, paper, XV Conference of the Nordic political 
science association, Trømso, Norway, 6-9 agosto 2008, p. 5 
39 J. Wroblewski, The rational law-maker. General theory and socialist experience, in 
L’educazione giuridica, V – Modelli di legislatore e scienza della legislazione, tomo III 
– la discussione contemporanea, ed. by A. Giuliani and N. Picardi, (1987), 59. 
40 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills,  Impact Assessement Guidance. 
When to do an Impact Assessement, August 2011. 
41 In particular, see European Commission, Communication “Strengthening the 
foundations of Smart Regulations – improving evaluation”. See also footnote n. 32. 
42 About the “ossification” of the rulemaking process, see McGarity, T.O., Some 
thoughts on ‘deossifying’ the rulemaking process, in Duke L. J., 1992, vol. 41, p. 1385. 
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a. Regulatory “steps” 
Let us begin with an examination of the possible nine steps 
which must be found in the process and which must be 
transparent, accessible and documented. 
1) Input of regulation. At this step the problem is defined, 
in particular by highlighting the criticisms of the 
regulation in force, often facing the pressure of the users 
and their representative organizations43. Here the need 
for intervention is defined44.  
2) Grounds of regulation. Here the gathering of evidence 
is provided45 as well as the development of a baseline in 
order to measure the benefits and the costs of a rule46. 
3) Purposes. At this step, policy objectives must be 
identified47. They have to be clear and directly related to 
solving the problems48. Furthermore, they have to be 
divided into general, specific and operational objectives. 
Finally, it is necessary to make the objectives of the 
proposed regulation SMART objectives (Specific; 
Measurable; Achievable; Realistic; Time-dependent)49. 
4) Consultations. In order “to be effective” consultations 
must “start as early as possible”50 and must respect 
minimum standards51. Moreover, a specific consultation 
stage allows the regulatory options to be refined, also 
                                                 
43 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Code of practice on Guidance on 
regulation, October 2009, p. 6 
44 European Commission, Impact assessment Guidelines, (2009), p. 21 
45 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Impact Assessment Guidance, p. 
10  
46 Office og Management and Budget, Circular A (Regulatory Analysis), 
September 17, 2003, p. 15 
47 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Impact Assessment Guidance, p. 
10 
48 European Commission, Impact assessment Guidelines, p. 25 
49 Ibid., p. 28 
50 European Commission, Communication”Towards a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties by the Commission”, COM(2002) 704 final, p. 18. 
On this point, Executive Order 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory 
Review, January 18, 2011,  sec.2. 
51 Ibid., p 19. Here minimum standards for consultations have been indicated: 
clear content of the consultation process, consultation target groups, 
publication, time limits for participation, acknowledgement and feedback. 
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with a publication for public consultation and 
comments52. The Minister or other regulator – exercising 
largely discretionary powers - can consult “all relevant 
interests in society”53 as well as the representative 
organizations of interests which are substantially 
affected by the proposed regulation54, or statutory 
bodies, where the proposed regulation relates to its own 
functions. 
5)  Alternatives. At this step regulators “shall identify and 
assess available alternatives to direct regulation”55, 
“including the alternative of not regulating”. In other 
words, it is necessary to define which options are most 
likely to achieve the objectives “in the light of 
constraints such as compliance costs or considerations of 
proportionality”56. 
6) Evaluation. The comparison and the evaluation of the 
options allow the regulator to “focus on costs and 
benefits of preferred option”57.  
7) Justification. As Executive Order n. 12866/1993 
stipulates, cost-benefit analysis and other measuring 
techniques provide a framework for evaluating the 
alternative regulatory choices58 and for showing the 
reasons for choosing one alternative over another. 
8) Enforcement. Also called the implementation step, at 
this stage it is obligatory for implementation to be “‘on 
track’ and the extent to which the policy is achieving its 
objectives”59.  
9) Review stage. After the implementation of the 
regulation, the regulation should be reviewed to 
                                                 
52 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Impact Assessment Guidance, p. 
9 
53 European Commission, Communication “Towards a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties by the Commission”, p. 5. 
54 Art. 13, Legislative and regulatory reform Act, 2006. 
55 Executive Order n. 12866/1993, Regulatory Planning and Review, sec. 1, b, n. 3. 
56 European Commission, Impact assessment Guidelines, p. 28 
57 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Impact Assessment Guidance, p. 
22. 
58 Office of Management and Budget, Circular A (Regulatory Analysis), p. 9. 
59 European Commission, Impact assessment Guidelines, p. 48. 
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confirm the actual costs and benefits and to verify 
whether it is achieving its desired effects60. When 
regulation contains a review clause evaluation is made 
compulsory 61.  
Thanks to the review stage we can talk about a real 
regulatory “chain”, characterized by a systematic and periodic 
evaluation of regulation, according to the regulatory provisions. 
The described nine steps of the regulatory decision route are not 
always compulsory but they should be traceable if we want to 
ensure quality of regulation. If the steps are not traceable, 
regulators can omit consultations or not evaluate the options, 
without fear of consequences even when some form of oversight 
(by a Regulatory Oversight Body or by judicial review) has been 
established. 
Transparency in the process relating to these steps  “means 
that agency decisions are clearly articulated, the rationale for these 
decisions are fully explained and the evidence on which the 
decisions are based is publicly accessible”62. So, by following the 
steps it is possible to achieve two different goals: legitimacy of 
regulatory decisions and good quality regulation. 
Three questions remain to be analysed: political decisions 
and technical (or bureaucratic) decisions; participation; giving 
reasons. 
 
 
b. Political decisions and technical decisions.  
The general problem of the normative criteria for the 
allocation of tasks to bureaucrats or politicians63 aims to find a 
solution also in procedures. Therefore, almost all of the steps 
described above should be performed by technical bodies, by 
bureaucrats, by professionals operating in institutions 
                                                 
60 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Impact Assessment Guidance, p. 
22. 
61 European Commission, Impact assessment Guidelines, p. 50. 
62 Coglianese, Kilmartin and Mendelson, Transparency and public participation in 
the federal rulemaking process: recommendations for the new administration, cit. at 22, 
926. 
63 See on this point, A. Alesina, and G. Tabellini, Bureaucrats or politicians? Part I: 
a single policy task, in Am. Ec. Rev., 2007, 97, p. 169 and Bureaucrats or politicians? 
Part II: multiple policy tasks, in J. publ. ec., 2008, 92, p. 426. 
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characterized by expertise and impartiality, in legislative 
assemblies, in ministries or in independent regulators. The 
administrative stage (in which impact assessment is produced and 
decisions are taken) is “an aid to decision-making, not a substitute, 
for political judgement”64. The reason is that politics and 
administration function in quite different ways, for example, let us 
consider the system of incentives. The administrative decision, on 
one side, should be extended to every step of the process, until the 
formulation of alternatives to regulation and until choosing the 
preferred “proposal”. The political stage of decision, on the other 
side, should be limited to the input of regulation (for example, by 
a regulatory agenda, directives and so on) and to the final 
decision, even if it is different from the preferred “proposal”. If we 
must face facts, very often the decision is adopted in advance, 
without a transparent process and with a “post-hoc 
rationalization”65. 
 
 
c. Participation and transparency.  
We have seen that participation and transparency in 
rulemaking are considered rules of quality. There is a remarkable 
difference between consultation in a regulatory process and 
lobbying. In fact, lobbying (regulated only in some legal systems, 
such as US, Canada, Australia and EU) is a process starting from 
the representatives of interest groups and directed at regulators in 
order to gain favourable rules66, while consultations are 
conditioned by the input of regulators themselves and are directed 
towards achieving the point of view of the targets of the 
regulatory process67. 
                                                 
64 European Commission, Communication  on “Impact assessment”, COM (2002) 
276 final 
65 Coglianese, Kilmartin and Mendelson, Transparency and public participation in 
the federal rulemaking process: recommendations for the new administration, p. 933. 
66 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Working Paper, 
Lobbying in the European Union: current rules and practices, 2003, p. iii, where the 
objective of lobbying is described as “to maintain a favourable regulatory 
environment for their organizations, members or clients”. 
67 See European Commission, Communication “Towards a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties by the Commission”. 
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Not all legal systems regulate participation and 
transparency in rulemaking. The most important regulation is 
without any doubt the US Administrative Procedure Act, adopted 
in 1946, also based on notice and comment procedures. But in 
some legal systems – like in Italy – there are no general provisions 
in order to guarantee participation in rulemaking even though 
specific provisions in regulatory sectors (such as communications 
or financial markets) have started being adopted. 
But, also thanks to the pressure of European regulations – 
informed by the right to be heard and to promote consultations - 
participation in rulemaking processes is destined to become more 
robust, because it “allows agencies to obtain information that 
helps them (1) improve the quality of new regulations, (2) increase 
the probability of compliance, and (3) create a more complete 
record for judicial review”68. 
 
 
d. Giving reasons.  
It was noted that “the standard of fair treatment is […] not 
only that there be good reasons, but also that the reasons be 
given”69. In fact, giving reasons is the formalization of the 
justification process and is also the object of the various kinds of 
review by oversight bodies and by judges. 
The requirement to give reasons is prescribed in several 
legal system, such as in Europe, or in the UK, and in Spain 
(exposiciòn de motivos), but is absent – in the legislative process - in 
Italy and France even if it has here recently been made obligatory 
for legislative initiatives to be accompanied by specific analisi 
d’impatto della regolazione and études d’impact. 
So, we can reasonably expect that in a short time general 
provisions adopted by every kind of regulator will be not only 
justified but also provided with a related explanation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Coglianese, Kilmartin and Mendelson, Transparency and public participation in 
the federal rulemaking process: recommendations for the new administration, cit. at 22, 
946. 
69 Galligan, Due process and fair procedures. A study of administrative procedures, cit. 
at 33, 433. 
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IV. Organization 
In order to improve the quality of regulation it is necessary 
to build efficient institutions, which are coherent with the 
procedural framework70. Furthermore, to make good rules we 
need not only a change in traditional institutions but also the 
creation of new kinds of institutions to be in charge of such 
matters. Regulation is “la forme moderne de l’action administrative”71, 
i.e., it imposes new ways for traditional functions to be performed 
and to carry out new functions. 
This has been confirmed by pressure from the OECD to 
promote simultaneous regulatory reforms and institutional 
reforms. 
On the other hand, the organizational problems of public 
bodies have been studied less, at least in Italy72, even if they are 
priority problems73 and even if they are possible obstacles to 
implementing reforms.  
The relevance of this question concerns institutional design: 
design – as a general process - consists in “inventing physical 
things which display new physical order, organization, form, in 
response to function”74. As a consequence, starting with functions 
good quality regulation imposes new skills, a greater workload 
and an adjustment of the organizational framework in ministerial 
and independent bodies one of whose aims is to reconfigure and 
probably even to reduce the public sphere75. 
                                                 
70 D. Rodrigo, L. Allio and P. Andres-Amo, Multi-level regulatory governance. 
Policy institutions and tools for regulatory quality and policy coherence, OECD 
Working Papers on Public Governance No. 13, 2009, p. 25: “Regulatory 
institutions are fundamental to ensure regulatory implementation and the 
appropriate use of regulatory instruments”. 
71 Y. Gaudemet, Introduction in La concurrence del modes et des niveaux de 
régulation, in Revue francaise d’administration publique, 2004, n. 109, 13.  
72 The question of administrative organization was extensively analyzed by 
M.S. Giannini, Le organizzazioni elementi degli ordinamenti giuridici, in Scritti in 
onore di Pietro Virga, Tomo I, (1994), 929. 
73 M.S. Giannini, La priorità dei problemi di organizzazione, in Il motore immobile. 
Crisi e riforma della pubblica amministrazione, (1980), 45, now in Scritti, vol. VII, 
1977-1983, (2005), 503. 
74 C. Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form, (1964), 1. See also M.S. Giannini, 
In principio sono le funzioni, in Amministrazione civile, 1959,  11, now in Scritti, 
Vol. IV, 1955-1962, cit. at 73, 719. 
75 About the “minimal State”, see R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (1974).  
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But, how must we consider the relationship between 
regulation and organization? How must a good regulator evaluate 
organization? 
A good regulator is, in fact, involved in making a consistent 
procedural and organizational framework with the need for good 
regulation and, in so doing, aims at giving regulation concrete 
opportunities to become effective. 
If we take a look at organization from the point of view of 
the quality of regulation we can observe three ways in which it 
could be relevant. 
Firstly, organization is one of the variables in Impact 
assessment. Organization, indeed, can represent a criticism in 
order to implement a regulation and the impact of each regulatory 
option on administrative institutions has to be individually 
evaluated. 
Secondly, organization is one of the possible objects of 
regulation itself, for example, when institutional reforms are 
carried out. In these cases, organization is analysed from an 
empirical and managerial point of view. 
Thirdly, organization is probably one of the most relevant 
conditions for the success of regulation, because it also consists of 
enforcement and monitoring rules, as we have previously 
affirmed. The organizational dimension of law has been also 
considered the key-variable in order to understand effectiveness 
(efficacy) of legislation. In other words, efficacy problems have to 
be evaluated as organizational problems76. 
In recent years, several countries have been interested by 
institutional reforms, very often related to better regulation 
policies77. A look at the possible kinds of organizational 
interventions reveals six different typologies. 
The first kind is the reduction (or suppression) of public 
bodies. This is the case for Italian “enti pubblici” and the French 
“suppression de services ou organismes”, in the framework of the 
“Révision general des politiques publiques”, started in 2007. 
                                                 
76 See, on this point, Wroblewski, The rational law-maker. General theory and 
socialist experience, cit. at 39,  65. 
77 C. Radaelli, F. De Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe: Concepts, Measures 
and Policy Processes, (2011). 
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The second kind is the reduction in the size of public 
bodies. This is the case for the “reinventing government” 
programs and for the “cutting red tape” programs. 
The third kind is the fusion (or merging) of public bodies. 
This is the case for the UK single regulator of financial markets, 
born in 2000 (Financial Services and Markets Act). 
The fourth kind is the transformation of public bodies. This 
is the case where there is a change in the juridical nature of bodies 
which were in origin public and which were later privatised (such 
as in the privatization of public enterprises). 
The fifth kind is the establishment of independent 
institutions. This is the case, for example, with the antitrust 
authorities in many European countries. 
Finally, there is the reform of public bodies. This is the case 
for real reform, in which the functions are reorganized, like in the 
Italian reform of Government (1999) and in the Belgian reform 
(Plan Copernic), implemented in 2000. 
A good regulator should choose between these different 
kinds of intervention in order to make consistent (as much as 
possible) regulation and organization. The choice depends in part 
on possible regulatory constraints (i.e. EU regulations which 
require independence of regulator, financial constraints, and so 
on) and in part on regulatory contents (i.e. liberalization 
accompanied by a privatization process).  
More importantly, a good regulator should also take into 
account the zero-option also when designing institutions in charge 
of regulatory enforcement. This means that regulators should 
always keep in mind the possibility not to carry out any 
organizational reform. In fact, often (at least in Italy) a public body 
reform could be a pretext for a creative compliance strategy to 
pursue objectives other than good regulation (for example, to 
change completely the managerial positions in a Ministry or to 
serve symbolic politics). Furthermore, every change in 
organization carries costs and creates side-effects which should be 
considered before starting the process: “changes are costly and 
take time to implement – so they need to be justified and greater 
attention need to be paid to looking back before moving 
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forward”78. Even “stakeholders prefer regulatory stability over 
frequent legislative revision”79, so it may sometimes be sufficient 
to look for informal agreement and solutions80.  
Another two questions require our attention.  
Firstly, we have to take into account the general relevance 
of informatization over organizational matters. Informatization, 
indeed, implies a different allocation of the tasks, of the 
relationship between administrations and citizens or users and a 
change in workloads. 
Secondly, we have to take into account the increasing 
relevance of the financial point of view, which seems to be the 
principal criterion of institutional reform “in an age of permanent 
fiscal crisis”81. 
What is needed to qualify the professional role of experts 
regarding the quality of regulation? There is large agreement 
about the idea that a good regulator should have a high level of 
technical expertise and a certain degree of independence. 
In a number of studies and research projects we have seen 
that regulatory functions (and specifically those functions related 
to the use of regulation analysis techniques) have been inserted 
into the organization of institutions all over the world, and have 
also been organized in several ways82. On the other hand, this 
“diffusion” of regulatory functions and the operating capacity are 
“without convergence”83. It is, in fact, possible to find different 
models, different contexts, different flexibility and different 
oversight systems. 
 
                                                 
78 See European Commission, Communication “Strengthening the foundations of 
Smart Regulations – improving evaluation”, p. 5. 
79 See European Commission, Communication “Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps”, p. 9. 
80 See, on this point, J. Black, Talking about Regulation, in “Public Law”, 1998, p. 
77. 
81 On the specific issue of administrative costs, D. Osborne, and P. Hutchinson, 
The Price of Government: Getting the Results We Need in an Age of Permanent Fiscal 
Crisis, (2004). 
82 See A. Kasemets, Impact Assessment of Legislation for Parliament and Civil 
Society: a Comparative Study, in ECPRD Seminar on Legal and Regulatory Impact 
Assessment of Legislation, 2001, Riigikogu, Tallinn. 
83 C.M. Radaelli, Diffusion without convergence: how political context shapes the 
adoption of regulatory impact assessment, in J. Eur. Publ. Pol., 2005, p. 924. 
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a. Principles of Good Organization 
In this non-uniform overview, it is useful to search for 
uniform principles of “good” organization, principles capable of 
giving directives over the allocation of tasks in the matter of good 
quality regulation. 
The first principle concerns the relationship between 
politics and administration. As we have explained in the matter of 
procedures, good quality regulation is placed at the boundary 
between politics and administration84. When regulator designs an 
institutional framework85 it is necessary to distinguish between 
two different regulatory bodies: one is responsible for political 
tasks and placed at the top of the institution; the other is 
responsible for technical tasks and closely linked to the executive 
director of the agency or the permanent/general secretary of the 
Ministry and related to the line structures86. 
The second principle regards transparency and 
responsibility, which are strictly connected. Transparency is the 
key to achieving democratic goals and also to producing “better, 
more informed policy decisions”87. Moreover, all political and 
administrative decision-makers (even if with different methods of 
                                                 
84 On the relationship between political decision and technical decision see the 
already mentioned Alesina, and Tabellini, footnote n. 63. 
85 See, in general, R. E. Goodin (ed. by), The Theory of Institutional Design, (1996), 
in particular p. 32-33. 
86 On this point see J. Chevallier, L’évaluation législative: un enjeu politique, in 
Contrôle parlementaire et évaluation, ed. by A. Delcamp, J.L. Bergel and A. Dupas, 
(1995), 20. See, on this point, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
Impact Assessement Guidance, in particular p. 15, where there is a description of 
the approval necessary to publish an Impact Assessment. This is an interesting 
example which expresses a good distintion between politics and administration 
in IA process: “The minister responsible for the policy (or the Chief Executive 
of non departmental public bodies or other agencies) is required to sign off 
published Impact Assessment [...]”, and specifically he has to declare that he 
has read and he is satisfied about the consultation stage, the final proposal and 
the review stage, while “Chief Economist should sign off Impact Assessment 
for the robusteness and accuracy of the costs, benefits and impact analysis at 
the different stages of policy development”. 
87 Coglianese, Kilmartin and Mendelson, Transparency and public participation in 
the federal rulemaking process: recommendations for the new administration, cit. at 22, 
927. 
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oversight) should be held to absolute standards of individual 
responsibility88. 
The third principle is multicompetence in regulation. 
Regulation presupposes multicompetent expertise, such as 
economic, legal, statistical, political and, ultimately, technical 
skills. Furthermore, regulation needs a specific competence in 
managing multicompetent expertise.  
Finally, we should look for an oversight principle in 
regulation89. Regulatory decisions must be reviewed by an 
oversight body in order to guarantee their adequacy to attain 
regulatory objectives.  The “plethora of oversight mechanisms”90, 
such as parliamentary, governmental or judicial ones, imposes the 
need for models in line with technical reviews of regulatory 
decisions. 
If problems of efficacy are mainly problems of organization 
(as we have seen)91, what is necessary to make a regulator a 
“good” regulator, from an organizational point of view? 
Given that the regulator is part of the traditional 
administration (such as a ministry), it would be necessary for the 
office in charge of regulatory tasks to have a sufficiently high level 
in the organization, in order to coordinate line structures (where 
expertise is found) and to manage external relations with a 
sufficient degree of autonomy. Furthermore it would be well-
resourced92. 
Since the regulator is supposed to be independent (for 
example, when imposed by a European regulation), the various 
measures of independence (appointments, incompatibilities, 
                                                 
88 See H. Jonas, The imperative of responsibility: in Search of an Ethics for the 
Technological Age, (1984), in particular the “responsibility principle”. See also 
F.A. Von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (1960); Italian edition, (1999), 123. 
89 See OECD, Regulatory institutional framework and oversight, in 
“Government at a glance” 2011, p. 158. 
90 M. Seidenfeld, A table of requirements for federal administrative rulemaking, in Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev., 2000, p. 533. 
91 See Wroblewski, The rational law-maker. General theory and socialist experience, 
cit. at 39,  65. 
92 At this regard, see Evia (Evaluated Integrated Impact Assessment), Improving 
the practice of Impact Assessment, in particular p. 10-11, where institutions for 
Impact Assessment are described. 
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powers, autonomy, etc.) should create a coherent and non-
contradictory system93. 
If we are to set up an oversight body, then expertise and 
adequate resources must be accompanied by a placement “at the 
centre of Government”94. 
Some different considerations should be mentioned about the 
different kinds of institution: Parliaments (or legislative 
assemblies); Administrations; Independent Authorities. 
 
 
b. Parliaments (or legislative assemblies).  
Sometimes Parliaments adopt rules which are proposed by 
members of the assembly but more frequently rules are proposed 
by Governments. If we consider that the economic analysis of 
regulation must be used as early as possible in the regulatory 
process, then in reality we can only develop an oversight of the 
proposed legislation at the parliamentary stage. How have 
Parliaments organized offices, teams or professionals in charge of 
regulatory support? Impact assessments, for example, are usually 
performed outside parliament, by governments as well as research 
centres and universities or other private entities95. Nevertheless, 
parliaments have appointed structures to support the legislative 
process and to review the proposed legislation, from the general 
point of view of the quality of regulation. Such structures include: 
the US Congressional Budget Office; the German Büro, which 
supports the Bundestag in matters of technological innovation; the 
Office parlamentaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et 
technologiques, which advises French Parliament about the 
consequences of scientific and technological choices. In Italy there 
are two different organisms, the Commissione parlamentare per la 
semplificazione (which has advisory powers in the process of 
                                                 
93 See Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form, cit. at 74, 15, where – talking 
about “design” in general – he says that “every design problem begins with an 
effort to achieve fitness between two entities: the form in question and its 
context”; see also, p. 17: “the rightness of the form depends […] on the degree to 
which it fits the rest of the ensemble”. 
94 OECD, Oversight bodies for regulatory reform, 2007. 
95 The European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation in 2001 
carried out (and later updated) a comparative study on Impact assessment in 22 
countries, see Kasemets, Impact Assessment of Legislation for Parliament and Civil 
Society: a Comparative Study. 
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cutting legislation) and the Comitato per la legislazione which (in the 
Italian Chamber of Deputies) has advisory powers on the formal 
quality of legislative proposals. Regional assemblies too have 
structures responsible for the quality of legislation, such as in 
Italian regions (inside the Conference of the Presidents of Regional 
Legislative Assemblies) and in the German Länder (inside the 
Conference of the Länder Presidents). 
 
 
c. Administrations.  
In the Ministries (and in regional and local administrations), 
the functions regarding quality of regulation are, normally, 
organized into three different levels, which are (generally) present 
at the same time. 
The first way in which to organize regulatory functions is 
inside each regulator, in order to decentralize (as much as 
possible) the functions96. Different kinds of professionals operate 
here: the US agency regulatory policy officer; the UK impact 
assessment officer; the Australian regulatory impact officer; the 
French fonctionnaires responsables de la qualité de la réglementation; 
the Italian responsabili dell’analisi degli impatti della regolazione. The 
most frequent problems are, at this level, the proper allocation of 
tasks and the clear definition of the functions in the regulatory 
process, in order to correctly distinguish technical evaluation from 
political evaluation. 
The second way to organize regulatory functions is near the 
centre of Government, in order to centralize the functions. The 
central unit can take several forms. For example, there is – in the 
US – the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, inside the 
Office of Management and Budget of the Presidential Executive 
Office; the UK Better Regulation Executive based in the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), which has 
general responsibility over governmental activities; in France 
there is a Direction des études legislatives and an interministerial 
group at the Secrétariat general du gouvernment; in Italy, there is a 
Central Unit for Simplification and for Quality of regulation and 
                                                 
96 We can find ad hoc offices near the permanent/general secretary; offices 
specifically dedicated to the mission of good quality regulation; other 
organisms in the ministry, characterized by a certain degree of autonomy; 
specific units in those offices which are responsible for the normative process. 
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an office in charge of analysis and evaluation of regulatory impact 
inside the Department for Legal and Legislative Affairs (at the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers); in Spain, there is a 
national Agency (Agencia de evaluacìon y calidad) in charge of 
evaluation, inside the Ministry of public administration.  
Three different kinds of tasks are performed: coordination of 
regulatory activities of the Government, in order to pursue what 
the OECD has called the “whole of Government approach”; 
support and advice to ministerial regulators (such as the State of 
New York Governor’s Office of Regulatory reform); regulatory 
oversight, such as for the US Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs.  
The third way in which to organize regulatory functions is to 
create a network of regulators, in order to connect functions. This 
kind of organization allows regulators to create an integrated 
system, between centralized structures and decentralized ones, 
aimed at “network building and administrative cooperation”97.  
 
 
d. Independent authorities.  
Independent authorities are generally not obliged to observe 
the same procedural constraints imposed on the executive 
agencies or Ministries, because they have a direct relation with the 
Parliament/Congress (as is the case of Italy, for example). The 
cost-benefit analysis constraints in the US have been established 
only for the executive agencies, which are subject to review by the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. In the US it has been 
suggested, indeed, that even independent agencies might be 
subject to some of the procedurals constraints of executive 
agencies. Executive Order 13,578 (Regulation and Independent 
Regulatory Agencies, July 11, 2011) has stated that “independent 
regulatory agencies should consider how best to promote 
retrospective analysis of rules” (Sec. 2). Nevertheless, it is clear 
that there are some risks (to their independence) if presidential 
control over independent agencies would become too pervasive. 
 
 
                                                 
97 C.M. Radaelli, The diffusion of regulatory impact analysis. Best practice or lesson-
drawing, in Eur. J. Pol. Res., 2004, p. 739. This is the case, for example, of the 
Standard Cost Model Steering Group, established in 2003. 
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IV. Conclusions 
 Legislative inflation (due to interest groups, symbolic 
politics and to the speed of technological innovation) is an obstacle 
to the certainty and the consistency of regulatory frameworks. It is 
becoming ever more difficult to maintain rules and to 
continuously make rules consistent with their consequences98. The 
need for (legal) certainty is, indeed, indispensable to exercising 
freedom99  and regulators work towards the goal of guaranteeing 
the so-called securité juridique100, which consists both in the quality 
of rules and in their predictability. 
The problem is not limited to the single procedural 
obligation or to a specific regulatory process. It involves the 
normative power itself, which must be controlled101: this is the 
reason why wide programs for controlling regulations are carried 
out in many OECD legal systems.  
 What rules of quality must be adopted in order to ensure 
good regulation? 
The first (and more general) rule of quality is – as we have 
seen – to distinguish between politics and administration both in 
regulatory procedures and in organization102. It is not a simple 
question: the two aspects of institutional decisions (political and 
administrative) have frequently been linked and influence each 
other. 
Furthermore, a powerful tool to achieve better quality 
regulation is transparency, which must be understood as the main 
rule in the life-cycle of regulation. Transparency is required by the 
diverse stakeholders in the regulatory process and implies not 
                                                 
98 See Coglianese and Kagan (ed. by), Regulation and Regulatory Process, cit. at 2, 
xi. 
99 On the need of certainty, see Z. Bauman, Liquid life, (2005); Italian edition Vita 
liquida, (2008), 29. 
100 Conseil d’Etat, Rapport public 2006 – Sécurité juridique et complexité du droit, La 
documentation française, 2006. 
101 Concerning the “control” of normative power, see B. Leoni, Freedom and the 
law, (1961); Italian edition, La libertà e la legge, (2000), 108 ss. and; see also, N. 
MacCormick, Questioning sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth, (1999); Italian edition La sovranità in discussione. Diritto, stato, 
nazione nel <commonwealth> europeo, (2003), 95, and, finally, B. Du Marais, L’Etat 
a l’epreuve du principe de concurrence: analyse et prospective juridique, in Revue 
politiques et management public, 2002, p. 121.  
102 Chevallier, L’évaluation législative: un enjeu politique, cit. at 86, 20-21. 
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only information but also communication activities because “to be 
effective regulations need to be well designed, communicated and 
enforced”103. Furthermore, it is necessary for such communication 
to be “as fair and accurate as possible”104.  
On the other hand regulators should consider the problem 
of the side effects of regulations, now accompanied by the more 
pernicious creative compliance105, which aims to use rules as 
instruments to pursue prohibited results. In this framework 
evaluation “identifies unintended and unexpected 
consequences”106 and can help discover opportunistic use of 
available legal schemes. 
How is it possible to take into account these several 
elements, in order to adopt and to maintain rules properly? Some 
conditions must be satisfied. 
Firstly, regulations must be built and adopted to be 
maintained. Rules should not only be clear, coherent and 
accessible (formal quality of rules), but should also be built on an 
informative basis, which is available to the stakeholders and to the 
citizens to allow monitoring and evaluation of the impacts, 
because there “should be a continuous loop: a good evaluation 
should be influenced by the quality of the preparation which went 
into an intervention”107. 
Secondly, good quality regulation should be strengthened 
as a political task, in the sense that it should become an important 
part of legislative work at every level of Government. This is the 
case for the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making108 
at the EU level. This is also the case for the constitutional reform 
issued in 2008 in France, which made it obligatory to dedicate 
                                                 
103 HM Government, The Government’s Forward Regulatory Programme, 2010. See 
also European Commission, Communication “Strenghtening the foundations of 
Smart regulation – improving evaluation”, p. 9. 
104 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,“Disclosure and simplification as 
Regulatory Tools”, 2010 
105 See Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation. Theory, Strategy and 
Practice, cit. at 4, 70. 
106 European Commission, Communication “Strenghtening the foundations of 
Smart regulation – improving evaluation”, p. 3. 
107 Ibid., p. 5. 
108 European Parliament-Council-Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement on 
better law-making, 2003/C 321/01: see in particular the section dedicated to 
“Improving the quality of legislation”. 
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specific moments of Parliamentary activities to public policy 
evaluation. This is the case for Italian Regions or German Länder 
which have promoted good quality regulation in the activities of 
their assemblies. 
Thirdly, good quality regulation should be an 
administrative (or technical) task. Good quality regulation should 
be organized as a real administrative function, regulated by law 
and performed by professionals operating in dedicated offices, 
inside every kind of regulator (legislative assemblies, 
administrations, independent agencies). 
Finally, in maintaining rules, it is necessary to consult the 
targets of regulations, in order to improve the informative basis of 
the regulatory process and in order to achieve compliance and 
prevent litigation. 
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THE INCIDENTAL LEGALITY REVIEW OF REGULATIONS IN 
ITALY  
 
Marco Macchia *  
 
 
Abstract  
This article discusses the legality review of secondary rules 
in Italy. In the era of the vast administrative state there are 
numerous situations in which some activities are covered by rules 
emanating from government, departments of state or other 
governmental agencies. They are like a delegate is invited to stand 
in the shoes of the legislature. Governmental rules have two-fold 
nature. Regulations, on the one hand, are sources of law similar to 
primary legislation. On the other hand, secondary rules are 
administrative instruments that supplement the executive power, 
that is, they are an inherent feature of public authority. The two-
fold nature affects the legality review. Secondary rules may not be 
reviewed by the Constitutional Court. Although regulations are 
legislative instruments, their administrative set-up plays a key 
role in the application of procedural rules. Indeed, the judicial 
review of secondary rules is up to administrative courts, which 
can intervene mainly after a regulation is challenged. Because of 
this flexibility, administrative judicial proceedings are suitable for 
challenging regulations on account of the hybrid nature of 
regulations, which are halfway between legislative instruments 
and tools inherent in the exercise of public authority. The aim of 
this article is to demonstrate how administrative law courts seized 
with the review of regulations. The judicial review by 
administrative courts appears to be quite similar to that of the 
Constitutional Court, as it is modeled after an objective approach 
to jurisdiction. Judges must disapply regulations that infringe 
laws and they can adjust themselves to and admit of innovative 
approaches.  
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1. Foreword: The Judicial Review of Secondary Sources.  
Parliament does not have the monopoly on law-making 
power. Government, ministerial bodies, Regions, local 
administrative bodies, and independent authorities are 
empowered to adopt acts of legislative nature. This means that 
sources of law do not derive exclusively from representative 
bodies; norm creation is indeed conferred to various public 
subjects and is developed through complex processes, in which 
hierarchical and competence criteria constantly overlap and 
replace one another. This is an instance of the so-called “legislative 
polycentrism”1. Legislatures delegate power because they cannot 
possibly fulfill the expectations of the modern citizen through 
primary legislation2. Governmental rules are secondary sources: 
they are different from primary legislation (i.e. laws and 
equivalent acts) both in nature and legal status3.  
                                                 
1 On the creation of acts of legislative nature by independent administrative 
authorities see Council of State, regulatory instruments division, decision no. 
11603/04, dated to 25 February 2005.  
2 P. Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope, 
(2012), 2.  
3 On the controversial nature of regulations and on the difference from general 
administrative instruments see G. della Cananea, Gli atti amministrativi generali, 
(2000). Considering such different legal status, it is often the Government that 
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This article is concerned with secondary rules. It does not 
focus on parliamentary legislation, but on rules emanating from 
government, that is on the array of rules produced by the 
departments of state or other governmental agencies. This, 
necessarily, involves considering how the use of rules «as tools of 
government» can be gauged4. The law-making power of public 
administrative bodies is currently in a chaotic situation, because of 
the presence of an irrational and contradictory set of applicable 
rules. There are numerous situations in which a delegate is invited 
to stand in the shoes of the legislature. But there is no systematic 
statutory framework.  
This law-making power relies on a general model, 
composed of governmental regulations combined with special 
instruments – varying from the regulations issued by local 
authorities to those of independent authorities. Secondary rules 
have legal force and are produced in exercise of a power to 
legislate that is conferred by an act of Parliament.  
The government’s secondary source legislative power is 
regulated by Article 17, Law no. 400/1988 that disciplines the type 
of power and its decisional procedure, above and beyond 
anything provided for by Constitutional regulations. A 
government regulation may be proposed by one or more 
Ministers, but it must be deliberated by the government’s collegial 
                                                                                                                       
has to decide - depending on the sector involved - whether to start the 
procedure for passing a law or to adopt a regulation; this decision ultimately 
determines the type of jurisdictional protection. On the origins of the 
Government’s regulatory functions see F. Cammeo, Della manifestazione della 
volontà dello Stato nel campo del diritto amministrativo. Legge ed ordinanza (decreti e 
regolamenti), in Primo trattato completo di diritto amministrativo, edited by V.E. 
Orlando, (1907), III, 71 and ff. On the secondary sources of law see G. Tarli 
Barbieri, Il potere regolamentare del Governo (1996-2006), in Osservatorio sulle fonti 
2006, (2007), 205 and ff.; U. De Siervo, Il potere regolamentare alla luce 
dell’attuazione dell’art. 17 della legge n. 400 del 1988, in Dir. pubbl., 1996, 82. On 
local (de-centralised) sources of law, see M. Di Folco, La garanzia costituzionale 
del potere normativo locale. Statuti e regolamenti locali nel sistema delle fonti fra 
tradizione e innovazione costituzionale, (2007). The secondary rules of independent 
authorities are examined by S. Foà, I regolamenti delle autorità amministrative 
indipendenti, (2002); F. Politi, Regolamenti delle autorità amministrative indipendenti, 
in Enc. giur., XXX, 2001.  
4 On the idea of rules as a governmental tool, and particularly on the creation of 
different forms of regulatory regimes employing different forms of rule, R. 
Baldwin, Rules and Government, (1995).  
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body after receiving the State Council’s obligatory but not binding 
opinion. Once this procedure is complete, the President of the 
Republic issues the regulation as a Presidential Decree Law 
(Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica), submits it to the Court of 
Accounts for preventive control and filing, and publishes it in the 
Official Gazette.  
Despite a series of legal provisions enshrined in laws, 
systematic and open consultation of the public on governmental 
regulatory initiatives is not provided by law. In practice open 
public consultation, through “notice and comment” procedures, 
remain seldom used and coexist with traditional forms of closed-
door consultation and negotiation. However greater awareness of 
the necessity to enhance consultation practices as an integral part 
of decision-making is emerging. The government would devote 
more attention to public consultation in the preparation of 
normative acts, and is preparing a new regulation which is 
expected to cover consultation in ex ante and ex post evaluation5. 
                                                 
5 Oecd, Better Regulation in Europe: Italy 2012. Transparency through consultation 
and communication, revised edition, June 2013, 59. Otherwise United States 
procedures for developing regulations derive from the U.S. Constitution and 
the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA constrains executive 
rulemaking, not only because the agency can only act within the limits set by 
statutes, but also because it must follow specified procedures. In particular, it 
must provide notice to the public of the proposed action and take into 
consideration public comment before issuing a final rule. The APA describes 
two types of rulemaking – formal and informal. Formal rulemaking is typically 
used by agencies responsible for economic regulation of industries, and is only 
required when a statute other than the APA specifically states that rulemaking 
is to be done “on the record”. Informal rulemaking, or notice and comment 
rulemaking, is the most common process used in the U.S. by agencies for 
writing, or “promulgating” regulations. On public involvement, see S.G. Breyer, 
R.B. Stewart, C.R. Sunstein, A. Vermeule, Administrative Law and Regulatory 
Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases, (2006), 479 and ff. As noted P. Cane, 
Administrative Law, (2004), 139, «the main advantages of a more formal 
procedure of rule-making are said to be that it gives the citizen a greater chance 
to participate in decision-making and that it improves the quality of the rules 
made. However, unless participation leads to greater satisfaction with and 
acceptance of the rules themselves, it is of doubtful value. If the participants 
object to the rules made, despite extensive involvement, and feel that 
participation has only “worked” if the result they favour is reached, then 
participation by itself is of limited value. The more formal procedures used in 
the United States do not seem to have reduced dissatisfaction with 
administrative rule-making. It may be that Americans are much less happy than 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW – VOL. 5 ISSUE 2/2013 
 
 265
Otherwise public consultation practice by regulatory agencies is 
quite advanced. All of them apply notice and comment and 
publish the inputs received as well as their general feedback on 
the consultation findings. Systematic involvement of stakeholders 
in the adoption of general type acts is required by law.  
Administrative bodies’ law-making power is free from 
formal constraints, since the models may be set forth in general 
terms not only by laws, but also by secondary rules. These latter 
may also surreptitiously take a different form6. In other terms, 
primary laws usually set out substantive standards applicable to 
“legislative acts” issued by public administrative bodies. At the 
same time, ad-hoc measures adopted by the Parliament waive 
these standards, ultimately enabling those bodies to adopt 
“legislative acts that do not have the force of regulations”7. Over 
the past thirty years, there has been a veritable proliferation of 
non-typical regulations, which is partly due to the lack of 
constraints placed by our Constitutional Charter on this subject-
matter. This makes it necessary to rely on interpretative 
approaches, moving from a solid substantial ground, in order to 
focus on the actual contents of the considered regulatory 
instruments8.  
                                                                                                                       
the British about having their lives regulated by government at all, and that 
this, rather than the actual content of the regulation, is the main source of the 
discontent. No amount of formalized procedure can overcome this problem».  
6 There is no single system of secondary sources, but rather a system of 
independent secondary sources of the State, Regions and local bodies. A more 
thorough analysis of the these briefly examined, but fundamental questions, 
can be found in L. Carlassare, Il ruolo del Parlamento e la nuova disciplina del potere 
regolamentare, in Quad. cost., 1990, 24 and ff.; G.U. Rescigno, Note per la 
costruzione di un nuovo sistema delle fonti, in Dir. pubbl., 2002, 789 and ff.; N. 
Lupo, Dalla legge al regolamento, (2003); C. Tubertini, Riforma costituzionale e 
potestà regolamentare dello Stato, in Riv. trim. dir. pubbl., 2002, 935 and ff.  
7 On this kind of source see A. Moscarini, Sui decreti del Governo «di natura non 
regolamentare» che producono effetti normativi, in Giur. cost., 2008, 5075 and ff.; G. 
Sciullo, Potere regolamentare, potere «pararegolamentare» e pubblica amministrazione: 
gli orientamenti dopo la l. 400/1988, in Le Regioni, 1993, 1277 and ff. Decrees 
without force of regulations that deal with organizational issues are analyzed 
by L. Torchia, Il nuovo ordinamento dei ministeri: le disposizioni generali (articoli 1-
7), in La riforma del Governo, edited by A. Pajno, L. Torchia, (2000), 130.  
8 For example, delegislation is translated into the adoptions regulations (Article 
17, Law no. 400/1988), which substitute a law in the absence of an absolute 
constitutional statutory limit, giving it an apparent abrogative effect on primary 
laws. In reality the mechanism is as follows: the law authorises the government 
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Such a chaotic situation is also a consequence of the two-
fold nature of the regulations: on the one hand, they are sources of 
law similar to statutory laws; on the other hand, they are 
administrative instruments that supplement the executive power – 
being an inherent feature of public authority. This two-fold 
nature, first and foremost, impacts on their legal status. Since the 
law-making power of administrative bodies is not specifically 
regulated, it is unclear whether their status should be applied to 
all sources of law by analogy (inasmuch as they constitute a form 
of legislation), or whether they should be subject to the rules 
regarding the forms of exercise of public authority (as they share 
various features with such exercise, including the fact that they are 
issued by a public body through identical procedures)9.  
On the other hand, the regulations’ two-fold nature affects 
judicial review. Although they are legislative instruments, their 
administrative origin plays a key role in the application of 
procedural rules. Regulations’ judicial review is indeed up to 
administrative courts, which normally intervene after a regulation 
is challenged. The rules concerning the right of individuals to 
                                                                                                                       
to exercise regulatory power to determine general provisions regulating the 
subject matter and to abrogate the current law once the regulation enters into 
effect. This should provide greater flexibility and faster adaptability to the real 
situation. The relationships with the Italian Costitution and the principle of 
legality are examined by S. Cassese, Le basi costituzionali, in Trattato di diritto 
amministrativo, in Diritto amministrativo generale, S. Cassese (ed.), I, (2003), 215 
and ff.; G. Amato, Rapporti fra norme primarie e secondarie (aspetti problematici), 
(1962), 130; G.U. Rescigno, Sul principio di legalità, in Dir. pubbl., 1995, 259 and 
ff.; L. Paladin, Le fonti del diritto italiano, (1996), 190.  
9 Is not obvious to show where does legislation stop, and where does 
administrative action begin. «Surely legislation has certain fundamental 
characteristics – principally the laying down of rules which are of general 
application and which can be enforced by courts – that make it readily 
identifiable. Anything falling short of this paradigm lacks the necessary 
characteristics of legislation, and is therefore merely administrative in nature. 
Reality, however, is more complicated; many measures now emanate from 
government which cannot easily be classified according to a simple 
legislative/administrative dichotomy», M. Elliot, J. Beatson, M. Matthews, 
Administrative Law, Third edition, (2005), 638. Since no specific legal rule applies 
to the process of issuing regulations, procedural rules are often debated by legal 
scholars. See, for instance, Council of State, Division VI, decision no. 1215 dated 
2 March 2010 as regards the possibility not to subject proceedings based on 
regulations to the general rule dispensing from the need to provide the reasons 
for a decision.  
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challenge regulations remain unprejudiced. Even the annulment 
of a regulation (a remedy that typically involves the 
administrative courts) is adapted in order to rely on a specific 
legal rule10.  
Thus, there is no clear-cut distinction – unlike, for instance, 
in the German legal system – between the power of administrative 
bodies to adopt implementing measures and their law-making 
powers11. Whilst the former is regulated by the Act on 
administrative procedure, such Act is utterly irrelevant to law-
making powers. Invalidity is also regulated differently, depending 
on whether an administrative measure or an administrative 
regulation is found to be illegitimate: in the former case, the 
measure can be set aside, whilst in the latter illegitimacy focuses 
on nullity and voidness of the secondary rule and setting aside 
cannot even be conceived. Hence, administrative regulations that 
are in conflict with primary legislation are null and void.  
As regards the review of law-making powers in order to 
establish consistency with higher-level sources of law, no clear-cut 
legislative framework is available. In fact, this issue has never 
been tackled by Parliament, not even on the occasion of the recent 
re-codification of the legislation concerning the administrative 
                                                 
10 On the general principles of judicial review, M. Elliot, The Constitutional 
Foundations of Judicial Review, (2001). On procedural rules see G. Morbidelli, La 
disapplicazione dei regolamenti nella giurisdizione amministrativa, in Dir. amm., 
1997, 578; F. Cintioli, Potere regolamentare e sindacato giurisdizionale, (2007), 98 
and ff.; M. Massa, Regolamenti amministrativi e processo. I due volti dei regolamenti e 
i loro riflessi nei giudizi costituzionali e amministrativi, (2011).  
11 The rationale for this distinction can be explained with the different functions 
fulfilled. Regulations are instances of the legislative powers vested in the 
executive; accordingly, the relevant law-making process is differently 
structured from the so-called standard proceeding as set forth in the Act on 
administrative proceedings. For these proceedings special importance is 
attached to public participation, decision-making procedures implemented by 
municipal bodies, or to the fact that the opinion of expert committees is sought. 
If procedural rights are breached, the flaw(s) which cause(s) nullity and 
voidness must be evident and essential in nature - this is the case whenever a 
requirement set forth by the law-maker in respect of the given proceeding in 
order to ensure that the specific instrument takes shape appropriately is 
breached to a substantial degree in terms of its function. A necessary referral 
should be made to the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, dated 12 
October 2010, in NVwZ 2011, 289, §128, as quoted by E. Schmidt-Aßmann, 
L’illegittimità degli atti amministrativi per vizi di forma del procedimento e la tutela del 
cittadino, in Dir amm, 2011, 481.  
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judicial proceedings. There are no statutory rules for the 
administrative regulations review through ad-hoc measures. 
Nevertheless, derogations from the general model and specific 
provisions have been developing over the years, at least through 
case law and practice, especially with reference to the procedural 
approach to regulations. The exceptions to standard rules are 
meant to allow to shape safeguards, which are tailored to the 
specific type of instrument that is being challenged.  
In general, the review of the sources of law different from 
primary legislation is committed in full to judicial authorities. 
There is only one statute that explicitly authorizes incidental 
review. It dates back to 1865, it applies to all administrative 
instruments, including those different from regulations, and it 
explicitly refers only to ordinary (i.e. non-administrative) courts. 
For the remainder, safeguards against illegitimate regulations 
have been developed through case law. The applicable rules in 
challenging regulations derive from judicial decisions, which have 
expanded or reduced the scope of judicial review on a case-by-
case basis12.  
The purpose of this article is to examine the judicial review 
of secondary rules. It begins by drawing a general distinction 
between direct review of secondary rules and indirect (or incidental) 
review. The decision to focus on incidental review stems not 
merely from a concern to impose limits on this essay but from a 
special interest in the problems of legitimating incidental judicial 
controls over administrative rule-making processes.  
 
 
2. The Judicial Review of Secondary Rules.  
2.1. The Lack of Constitutional Review.  
Secondary rules cannot be reviewed by the Constitutional 
Court. Under Article 134 of the Constitution, the Court has 
jurisdiction – and may be incidentally seized by citizens – 
exclusively over the instances of primary legislation (i.e. Acts 
                                                 
12 See, in this respect, E. Cannada Bartoli, L’inapplicabilità degli atti amministrativi, 
(1950); A. Romano, La pregiudizialità nel processo amministrativo, (1958); G. 
Morbidelli, La disapplicazione dei regolamenti nella giurisdizione amministrativa, cit. 
at 10, 665; F. Cintioli, Giurisdizione amministrativa e disapplicazione dell’atto 
amministrativo, in Dir. proc. amm., 2003, 95. See generally C. Forsyth (ed.), 
Judicial Review and the Constitution, (2000).  
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passed by Parliament, regional laws, decree-laws, and legislative 
decrees); the Court cannot review the legitimacy of regulations13. 
This is the reason why the Constitutional Court can be defined as 
the “judge of laws” rather than the “judge of constitutional 
compliance”. The Court has applied this rule by drawing a unique 
clear-cut distinction between laws and regulations, based on 
formal criteria such as sources, decision-making process, and the 
formal features of the regulation. The Court has never relied on 
substantial criteria, which might have resulted into different 
outcomes about the acts to be reviewed by the Constitutional 
Court; this has factually limited the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction to laws, except for particular cases14.  
Conversely, ordinary judges have jurisdiction over 
regulations. In this context, a general distinction between direct 
review and indirect (incidental) review must be drawn.  
 
 
2.2. Direct Review by Administrative Courts.  
The legislative nature of regulations enables all courts to 
deal with interpretative issues; conversely, the direct review of 
regulations is exclusively reserved for administrative courts, since 
regulations emanate from administrative entities15. Secondary 
legislation is subject to judicial review under the Article 113 of the 
                                                 
13 During the meetings of the Constituent Assembly, Costantino Mortati and 
Egidio Tosato were in charge of drafting the text of Article 134; they clarified 
that the members of the Constituent Assembly meant to rule out that the 
Constitutional Court could review the legitimacy of regulations. The incidental 
review of regulations by the Constitutional Court is supported by C. Mortati, 
Atti con forza di legge e sindacato di costituzionalità, (1964).  
14 A particular case  concerns the direct review conducted by the Constitutional 
Court: if a regulation – like any administrative instrument or measure – 
encroaches upon the State’s or a Region’s scope of competences as set forth in 
the Constitution and/or other constitutional acts, it is open to direct review by 
the Constitutional Court, when the State or a Region were to claim a conflict of 
competences. In the latter case, the Court’s decision on the conflict in question is 
not to be complied with by ordinary judges.  
15 In the legal systems of Western countries, the competence to annul 
regulations is frequently devolved to administrative courts: see M. Fromont, 
Droit administratif des Etats européens, (2006), 274. In France, regulatory 
instruments may be challenged on grounds of excès de pouvoir. On incidental 
review models see B. Marchetti, L'eccezione di illegittimità del provvedimento 
amministrativo. Un'indagine comparata, (1996).  
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Constitution, just as all the other acts adopted by public 
administrative bodies. If a regulation is found to be illegitimate, 
the court annuls it – i.e., sets the regulation aside, and declares its 
effects null and void from inception (ex tunc).  
A regulation may be challenged per se, if it is immediately 
detrimental, that is, if the negative impact on certain interests is to 
be traced directly back to a provision contained in that 
regulation16. If this is not the case, the regulation must be 
challenged together with the implementing measure thereof17. In 
general, the direct challenge of regulations is the exception, whilst 
the joint challenge of a regulation and the relevant implementing 
measure(s) is the rule.  
Thus, in order to challenge a regulation before an 
administrative court within the applicable deadline, regardless of 
any related implementing measures, two conditions have to be 
fulfilled: a) it produces detrimental effects on third parties’ legal 
interests; b) the detrimental effects in question are produced 
despite the implementing measures adopted by an administrative 
                                                 
16 In literature, a distinction is drawn between “volition-action” regulations, that 
is, regulations that can be challenged directly, and “preliminary volition” 
regulations. Whilst the former have an impact on the personal sphere of the 
individuals concerned, the latter need an implementing instrument. This 
widely-received definition was coined by A. Romano, Osservazioni sulla 
impugnativa dei regolamenti della pubblica amministrazione, in Riv. trim. dir. pubbl., 
1955, 882; reference has often been made to it in case law as well: see Regional 
Administrative Court, TAR Lombardia, Milan, 17 June 2009, decision no. 4056; 
TAR Puglia, Lecce, 6 May 2008, decision no. 1290.  
In the Italian legal system it is still necessary to prove that harm was caused to 
the individual petitioner/claimant. This is not in line with the approach 
developed in EU law, which regulated the admissibility of individual claims for 
annulment via the Lisbon Treaty, by mitigating the stringent provisions that 
were previously in force. Under the current text of Article 263 of the TFEU, any 
legal or natural person lodging a judicial claim for annulment of “regulatory 
provisions [....] that do not entail any execution measures” has only to show 
that he is “directly” affected, without any consideration being given to 
individual harm.  
17 Since the right to directly challenge a regulation is closely related to the 
principle of the individual’s interest to take legal action, an individual is to 
lodge a two-fold claim in order to have both the implementing measure and the 
relevant regulation reviewed judicially; indeed, the implementing measure 
specifies the detriment caused to the individual and, thereby, accounts for the 
individual’s interest in  taking legal action. On this issue see Council of State, 
Division VI, decision no. 663 dated 12 February 2001.  
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body18. This circumstance has to be factually established 
considering both the contents and the nature of the regulatory 
provision in question, and the effects produced.  
When an illegitimate regulation directly challenged is 
annulled by the administrative court, its effects, as said, are 
declared null and void from inception (ex tunc) and erga omnes. 
Since any measure or act inherent to the regulation is inseparable 
from the latter, the annulment of the regulation “is binding on the 
administrative body with regard to all the entities to which the 
measures or acts in question are addressed and accordingly pre-
empts and makes unsubstantiated any claim possibly made by the 
said administrative body on the same matters through a separate 
judicial proceeding”; “on the other hand, annulment of the 
regulation entails that the latter instrument is cancelled from the 
realm of the law, so that no other court may ever be seized to rule 
on the legitimacy of the said regulation”19.  
If a regulation is annulled, the effects already produced are 
null and void too: this occurs with regard to the whole gamut of 
the specifically addressed rights and interests, as well as to the 
rights and interests already come into existence – providing they 
have not yet been defined20. Unlike what is generally the case, 
these consequences are not limited to the parties in the relevant 
litigation. By derogating from the general rule, whereby the 
judgment is only enforceable between the litigating parties, 
judicial annulment of a provision contained in a regulation applies 
to all potential addressees of the said provision – that is, it should 
be classed as a judicial decision of general reach, and not a case-
specific one21. Even when the requirements of publicity are not 
met, such as those concerning Constitutional Court’s decisions, the 
ultimate effects are similar to those produced by a judgment 
setting aside a specific piece of legislation. Public authorities are 
under the obligation to inform the citizens on the annulment of 
                                                 
18 TAR Lazio, Rome, Division II ter, 25 February 2008, decision no. 1685.  
19 Council of State, Division IV, 19 February 2007, decision no. 883; Id., Division 
IV, 12 May 2006, decision no. 2671. An interim order issued by the court to stay 
application of a regulation is also enforceable in general, still on account of its 
“ontological inseparability”: see Council of State, Division VI, 6 September 2010, 
decision no. 6473. 
20 Council of State, Division VI, 12 March 1994, decision no. 332.  
21 Council of State, Division IV, 23 April 204, decision no. 2380.  
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legislative instruments, even if nothing is specifically provided to 
that end22.  
Considering the general and non-specific nature of such 
decisions, annulment of “general regulations, which are a source 
of law and, accordingly, are legislative in nature”, is different from 
the annulment of “individual acts of administrative and judicial 
authorities, which should be regarded as executive and judicial in 
nature”23. The decisions in question are enforceable ultra partes [i.e. 
beyond the parties concerned], because the legal obligation 
originating from the source of law at issue is related to the exercise 
of authority – that impacts also on the entities unrelated to the 
considered judicial proceeding.  
 
 
2.3. Incidental Review of Regulations.  
Judicial review of regulations is often contained in a special 
discipline, which marks a clear distinction from general 
procedural provisions. Because of the peculiarities of these acts, 
which are “legislative by nature”, though “administrative by set-
up”24, it is generally accepted that the legitimacy of secondary 
legislation can be reviewed on an incidental basis, even ex-officio. 
In such case, the litigation is not necessarily devolved to 
administrative courts, as also ordinary judges may be seized of an 
incidental claim. The reason of this rule is that not the regulation’s 
legitimacy is at stake, but a different petitum, which involves the 
regulation’s legitimacy assessment as  preliminary question.  
Lower courts are empowered to review, on an incidental 
basis, the legitimacy of a regulation in both civil and criminal 
proceedings under section 5 of Act no. 2248, “on setting aside 
                                                 
22 There is no provision that specifies publicity arrangements. By analogy, 
section 14 of Presidential decree no. 1119 dated 24 November 1971 (on the 
lodging of extraordinary complaints with the Head of State) is considered to be 
applicable. Accordingly, if general administrative instruments of a legislative 
import are annulled, the administrative body has to publish such annulment 
“according to the same publication arrangements as applied to the instruments 
that were annulled”. The issue of extending these provisions to the decisions 
that grant claims on conflicts of jurisdiction is addressed in Council of State, 
Division VI, 30 November 1993, decision no. 954.  
23 C. Esposito, La validità delle leggi, (1964), 119. 
24 This definition was devised by E. Cheli, Potere regolamentare e struttura 
costituzionale, (1967), 436.  
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litigations”, dated to 20 March 1865 (Annex E thereof). Should the 
judge, in adjudicating the main litigation, find that the regulation 
is illegitimate – regardless of whether the said regulation was 
challenged or not – it shall refrain from applying it and decide as 
if such a regulation was non-existent25. This shows how incidental 
ruling is exclusively functional to adjudicating the case under 
scrutiny; accordingly, the decision is not regarded as final, and 
may only be enforced against the parties; indeed, the regulation is 
not set aside per se. Such a ruling does not produce any specific 
legal effects – in particular, it does not start up a new time limit 
period to challenge the given regulation, nor does it allow to lodge 
a claim for annulment of the said regulation26.  
                                                 
25 In civil proceedings the judge refrains from applying an illegitimate 
regulation, if assessing legitimacy of such regulation is part of the issues that 
the judge has to settle before adjudicating the case and declaring whether a 
given claim is to be granted or not. Conversely, in criminal proceedings 
consideration is given to an administrative instrument to insofar as the latter is 
part of the statutory definition of the criminal offence at issue. The lenient 
approach to such cases only allows to refrain from the application of the given 
regulation in bonam partem, that is, for the defendant's benefit, in order to avoid 
imposing criminal punishments. However, part of the case-law (see Court of  
Cassation, Criminal Law Division III, 17 February 2004, decision no. 1443; 
Division III, 24 February 2001, decision no. 1537) also admits to refrain from the 
application of a flawed regulation in malam partem – whereby the statutory 
definition of the offence is amended and the illegitimate instrument is equated 
to a non-existent instrument. See, in this regard, C. Franchini, Il controllo del 
giudice penale sulla pubblica amministrazione, (1998), 75. 
26 As clarified by the Joint Divisions of the Court of Cassation in decision no. 
22217 dated 28 September 2006, “in the context of setting aside administrative 
litigations, refraining from the application of illegitimate administrative 
measures was justified by the prohibition for judicial authorities to revoke, 
amend, or annul administrative measures – such power being conferred 
exclusively on the competent administrative authorities that received the claim 
lodged by the party concerned. Together with the consequent introduction of 
administrative jurisdiction, aiming to protect the citizens’ legitimate interests, 
the power in question only exists with regard to litigations between individuals 
– if the administrative measure at issue does not underlie the judicial claim 
made and is only relevant in terms of logical sequence, so that it gives rise to a 
preliminary question of a technical nature, which can be assessed on an 
incidental basis”. Other decisions by the Court of Cassation followed this 
approach (no. 2588 dated 22 February 2002; no. 18263 dated 10 September 2004;  
no. 1373 dated 25 January 2006). However, there are also decisions upholding 
the incidental review performed by non-administrative courts, which 
accordingly refrained from applying illegitimate administrative instruments in 
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Specifically, administrative courts are empowered to refrain 
from applying any administrative act to the extent that they take 
review of the administrative instrument as an underlying 
assumption rather than as the material object of the decision, 
which, conversely, consists in the legal relationship between the 
parties27. However, a non-administrative court may only refrain 
from applying an illegitimate regulation, if the administrative 
instrument does not impact directly on the legal relationship 
submitted to the court’s scrutiny and is only a precondition 
thereof, without making up the judicial claim. This means that the 
non-administrative court reviews the legitimacy of the instrument 
in question on an indirect, incidental basis rather than directly28.  
The incidental evaluation before administrative courts 
follows the same rules, although no legislative provision allows 
these courts to carry out such a review29. Even the recent 
                                                                                                                       
connection with actions instituted against public administrative bodies, if the 
judicial claim made concerns a right and the latter remains so, because the 
regulatory instrument at issue is not such as to turn the right in question merely 
into a legitimate interest, which is the case if the regulatory instrument must be 
compliant with specific legal requirements and, accordingly, does not represent 
an instance of authoritative, discretionary powers. This was the decision made 
in cases brought by users of public facilities that challenged the amount charged 
to them (see decision no. 4584 dated 2 March 2006 by the Court of Cassation).  
27 See M.S. Giannini, Discorso generale sulla giustizia amministrativa, part. II, in 
Riv. dir. proc., 1964, 14. The power to refrain from applying regulatory 
instruments as part of administrative proceedings is addressed by R. Dipace, La 
disapplicazione nel processo amministrativo, (2011), 149 and ff.  
28 See Joint Divisions of the Court of Cassation, decision no. 22217 dated 28 
September 2006. Alternatively, the criterion consists in the protection of 
individuals’ rights; indeed, a court that has to decide on an administrative 
measure that impacts on individuals' rights is certainly empowered to perform 
an the incidental review of the instrument underlying the measure that is being 
challenged, without acting ultra vires (see Joint Divisions of the Court of 
Cassation, decision no. 20125 dated 18 October 2005).  
29 On the application of section 5 of the Act setting aside litigations to 
administrative proceedings, see E. Cannada Bartoli, L’inapplicabilità degli atti 
amministrativi, cit. at 12, 192. 
Conversely, the following judicial decisions ruled out the possibility to refrain 
from applying a regulatory instrument in administrative proceedings: Council 
of State, Division IV, 11 June 1909; Id., Division V, 14 February 1941, decision 
no. 93; Id., Division V, 10 July 1948 decision no. 500; Id., Division V, 28 June1952 
decision no. 1032; Council of the Region of Sicily 30 September 1965 decision 
no. 130; Council of State, sitting in plenary, 8 January 1966, decision no. 1; 
Council of the Region of Sicily 21 February 1968 decision no. 49; Id., Division 
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consolidation of the rules applying to judicial administrative 
proceedings, based on the legislative decree no. 104, dated 2 July 
2010, fails to address the power to refrain from applying 
illegitimate regulations. The decree does not refer to the incidental 
review of legality, nor to the possibility, for a court, to declare that 
the instruments adopted by a public authority are null and void 
for the purpose of adjudicating a case – without exceeding the 
scope of the specific claim30.  
The possibility for administrative courts to review the 
legality of regulations on an incidental basis is taken into 
consideration in judicial decisions dating back to 1992. Before that 
period, judges were not empowered to intervene, if a regulation 
was not challenged within the sixty-day deadline from its 
adoption – as the expiration of such deadline barred any further 
challenging of the instrument31. Starting from the early 1990’s, 
however, administrative courts were allowed to refrain from 
applying a regulation incompatible with higher-level legislation, 
irrespective of whether the regulation in question had been 
expressly challenged or not. This was due to a change in the stance 
taken by the Council of State on this subject-matter, such as to 
attach the appropriate importance to the legislative force of 
regulations.  
                                                                                                                       
IV, 20 April 1971 decision no. 463; Id., Division IV, 2 October 1989 decision no. 
664; TAR Sicily, Catania, 6 June 1986, decision no. 625; Council of State, Division 
V, 12 September 1992 decision no. 782; TAR Veneto 16 February 1995 decision 
no. 300; TAR Abruzzo, Pescara, 20 July 1995 decision no. 263; Council of State, 
Division V, 24 May 1996 decision no. 597; Court of Cassation, Employment 
Division, 14 February 1997, decision no. 1345.  
30 Comments on the recent legislation can be found in A. Pajno, La giustizia 
amministrativa all’appuntamento con la codificazione, in Dir. proc. amm., 2010, 119; 
L. Torchia, I principi generali (Il nuovo Codice del processo amministrativo, Decreto 
legislativo 2 luglio 2010, n. 104), in Giorn. dir. amm., 2010, 1117. With the new 
Consolidated Statute, administrative proceedings are no longer limited to 
protecting legitimate interests - pursuant to the principle that multiple actions 
may be appropriate to grant the petitioner’s claim; to this regard, see Council of 
State, sitting as a plenary, 23 March 2011, decision no. 3. As regards the actions 
that may be brought in court, see L. Torchia, Le nuove pronunce nel Codice del 
processo amministrativo, in Giorn. dir. amm., 2010, 1319. 
31 Over the years, the stringent requirement of complying with the deadline in 
question led administrative courts to limit their reliance on this tool as for 
regulatory provisions; by doing so, they played down the executive functions of 
such provisions whilst emphasizing their legislative nature. 
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The stringent requirement of complying with the deadline 
for challenging regulations – that is, with the so-called 
“precondition” – led administrative courts to limit their reliance 
on this tool; by doing so, they played down the executive 
functions of such provisions whilst emphasizing their legislative 
nature.  
The regulation must not be the main subject of the 
litigation; rather, it should be an obstacle to the appropriate 
establishment of the parties’ legal standing. The administrative 
court finding an illegitimate regulation may refrain from applying 
it, without annulling it. Pursuant to the principle of hierarchy 
within the sources of law, an administrative court may directly 
assess the possible conflict between an administrative measure 
and primary norms, irrespective of whether the regulation has 
been challenged32.  
In any case, being sources of law, regulations are subject to 
the hierarchical principle as well as to the procedural principle 
known as iura novit curia [i.e. the court knows the law]. 
Accordingly, in case of conflicts between different sources of law, 
the administrative court must be in the position to refrain from 
applying a regulatory instrument that is in conflict with a higher-
level source, even if such instrument has not been expressly 
challenged. In this way, it can determine, by its own motion, the 
legal rule applicable to the case under scrutiny, without any 
constraint whatsoever33. This is also allowed by the circumstance 
                                                 
32 Council of State, Division VI, 3 October 2007, decision no. 5098; Council of 
State, Division VI, 12 April 2000, decision no. 2138. Conversely, challenging of 
the provision by the petitioner in the first-instance proceeding is necessary 
according to Council of State, Division V, 1 September 2009, decision no. 8387. 
33 The possibility to refrain from applying a legal rule could, therefore, be 
introduced into administrative proceedings thanks to the peculiar legal features 
of regulations. For the same reason, such a possibility was not admitted by 
courts with regard to case-specific administrative provisions, because it would 
have jeopardized the continuity of administrative activities, the rule whereby 
an administrative measure is assumed to be legitimate, and the soundness of 
legal relationships - even if the breach at issue concerned an EU instrument. The 
most significant decision in this regard is the one by the Council of State, 
Division V, dated 10 January 2003 (no. 35), whereby refraining from applying 
the regulatory provision in such cases would undermine “the soundness of 
legal relationships based on public law along with the principles of stability, 
reliability, and continuity of administrative activities and the presumption of 
legitimacy principle”; Council of State, Division IV, 21 February 2005, decision 
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that the respect of the established deadline to challenge the 
regulation – which is formally an administrative instrument – is 
irrelevant in such cases.  
Having established that a regulation is illegitimate in 
relation to higher-level legislative provisions, whether issued by 
the State or by the EU, the decision adopted by the court is not 
considered final, is only enforceable in respect of the litigation at 
issue and only between the concerned parties. Actually, cancelling 
the legal effects produced by the regulation in question might be 
prejudicial to third parties’ interests.  
In this way, the judicial review by administrative courts 
appears to be quite similar to that of the Constitutional Court, as it 
is modeled after an objective approach to jurisdiction. This is all 
the more true in peculiar cases such as those concerning delegated 
regulations – i.e. those cases where Parliament delegates the 
executive power to lay down the rules applying to a specific case, 
without adequately setting out the reference benchmarks. In spite 
of their being instruments of secondary legislation, delegated 
regulations set provisions that are independent from specific 
legislative constraints. Accordingly, their functions are distant 
from the typical ones of executive instruments; this means that 
they should be classed as regulations exclusively from a formal 
standpoint.  
 
 
3. The Review Process by Public Administrative Bodies.  
Let us now consider the role played by public authorities in 
applying a secondary source of law breaching a higher-level rule. 
An administrative body required to apply a regulation considered 
to be illegitimate pursues different lines of conduct, depending on 
whether it fathered the regulatory instrument at issue or not.  
An administrative body called for the implementation of its 
own regulatory instrument may not refrain from applying it 
automatically, because it is obliged to rely on self-protection tools 
– in particular, the remedy of ex-officio annulment – in order to 
introduce any modification. Indeed, only after instituting the 
relevant proceeding and having checked the interests vested in the 
                                                                                                                       
no. 579. See also M.P. Chiti, L’invalidità degli atti amministrativi per violazione di 
disposizioni comunitarie e il relativo regime processuale, in Dir. amm., 2003, 687.  
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addressees and counterparts, may an administrative body, by its 
own motion, set aside a regulatory instrument in conflict with 
higher-level norms (including the effects that it produced since 
inception). Pursuant to the contrarius actus principle, the formal 
and procedural rules that apply to an annulment proceeding are 
the same as those that apply to the adoption of the instrument that 
should be set aside34.  
An administrative body may find that a regulation is null 
and void ex officio also when it is supposed to implement such a 
regulation; however, that administrative body is obliged to abide 
by the self-protection regime in order to legally set aside a flawed 
regulation. As already pointed out, it may not simply refrain from 
applying it. Nor may an Italian administrative body – contrary to 
the German or Spanish cases – act on the assumption of a sort of 
unlawfulness exception. Indeed, in Germany and Spain 
illegitimate regulations are considered per se null and void, whilst 
in our legal system they must be set aside35. Accordingly, textual 
conflicts between a regulation and higher-level legislation may be 
claimed by public administrative bodies at any time (in line with 
the approach to nullity and voidness), since administrative 
regulations inconsistent with the law are generally null and void 
ex lege.  
It is unclear whether the role played by involved the 
administration can be analogous to the one a court – that is, 
whether it may “sort out” the sources of law just as a court and 
find that a regulation conflicting with a higher-level legislation is 
                                                 
34 Council of State, Division V, decision no. 7218, dated to 12 November 2003; 
TAR Abruzzo, L’Aquila, decision no. 603, dated to 2 October 2007. The 
application of this principle is not without exceptions, because it does not 
concern procedural requirements that are irrelevant to the review procedure.  
35 On the legal status of regulations in Spain see E. Garcìa de Enterrìa, T.-R. 
Fernàndez, Curso de derecho administrativo, I, (2006), 227 and ff. A decision, 
which finds that an illegitimate regulation is null and void, is enforceable erga 
omnes and retroactively, whilst the same publicity rules apply, as in the case of a 
measure that is set aside. On Germany see F. Hufen, Verwaltungsprozessrecht, 
(2003), 391; E. Schmidt-Aßmann, L’illegittimità degli atti amministrativi per vizi di 
forma del procedimento e la tutela del cittadino, cit. at 11, 481. In particular, public 
authorities are not empowered in the German system to autonomously refrain 
from applying illegitimate instruments. This is the reason why they rely on an 
ad-hoc procedure – called Normenkontrollverfahren – in which the main cause of 
action consists in assessing the legitimacy of the regulation issued by the 
Länder or the local authorities.  
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null and void. An interesting development occurs in France, 
where an administrative body is required to repeal any regulation 
found null and void from its inception, in front of a claim lodged 
by a subject legally interested in avoiding the regulation’s 
application36.  
An administrative body is required to set aside a regulatory 
act (relying on the ex-officio annulment procedure, under section 
21-nonies of Act no. 241/1990) even if it has already been declared 
illegitimate by an incidental decision of either an ordinary judge 
or an administrative court – because, as already pointed out, this 
form of incidental decision would not produce the annulment of 
the regulatory instrument in question. In any case, the 
administrative body is not really obliged to do so, since no clear-
cut legal requirement is applicable in this regard: rather, it will 
have to assess the available options on a discretionary basis, by 
balancing public and private interests. If the administration opts 
for the setting aside, relying on the self-protection regime it will 
consider requirements such as cost-containment, efficacy, and 
effectiveness of administrative activities: in this way, it will avoid 
the adoption of further administrative measures liable to be 
challenged by third parties because of their contrast with a general 
rule.  
Conversely, if an administrative court has directly (not 
incidentally) set aside a regulation with a final decision, an 
administrative body is obliged to refrain from applying such 
regulation to any pending cases, under penalty of incurring 
liability37.  
On the other hand, if the regulation originates from an 
administrative body different from the one responsible for its 
implementation, the latter seems required to apply the regulation 
in question – but nothing is expressly provided in this regard. This 
                                                 
36 Conseil d’État, 3 February 1989, Compagnie Alitalia.  
37 See TAR Emilia-Romagna Region, Bologna, 8 June 1984, decision no. 334; 
Court of Cassation, Division III, 25 November 2003, decision no. 17914, a 
decision which concerned a regulation set aside by a decision that had not yet 
become final, whereupon the Court ruled out any liability as vested in an 
administrative body that had applied such regulation. The latter decision fails 
to take into due account the uncertainty arising from applying or refraining to 
apply a regulation whose illegitimate nature has not yet been established 
finally.  
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is due to the fact that our legal system does not consider 
administrative bodies as entities empowered to review the 
legitimacy of the regulations that they are expected to apply 
(except for EU law)38. Nevertheless, if an incidental decision finds 
that the given regulation is illegitimate, the administrative body 
might refrain – in a collaborative perspective – from applying it, 
and thereby abstain from issuing a measure that would be invalid 
from the start. The literature on this matter is rather scarce, since 
this is not a topic addressed neither in jurisprudence, nor in case 
law; consequently, there is no argument that supports a different 
approach.  
Against this backdrop, one should consider two major 
derogations from the stance described above. First, when the 
higher-level legislation is part of the EU law, since refraining from 
application is an obligation imposed on public authorities - as 
repeatedly affirmed by the EU Court of Justice39. Second, when the 
conflict with the higher-level legislation entails an ultra vires 
decision of the administrative body in issuing that regulatory act, 
then the regulation is declared null and void rather than being set 
aside; in this case, having the regulation been found null and void, 
it would not be capable to produce valid effects, with the 
consequence that any administrative body, as much as any private 
subject, might autonomously refrain from applying it.  
It is questionable whether applying an illegitimate 
regulation gives rise to liability as vested in administrative body. 
Here one should return to the already drawn distinction between 
                                                 
38 The innovative features of the European administrative framework and the 
composite mechanisms relied upon by the EU to achieve the relevant objectives 
are addressed by C. Franchini, Autonomia e indipendenza nell’amministrazione 
europea, in Dir. amm., 2008, 87 and ff.  
39 The obligation to refrain from applying domestic legislation that does not 
conform with the EU law has been imposed on administrative bodies since the 
well-known decision in the Fratelli Costanzo case (case C-103/88), dated to 22 
June 1989, paragraph 30. The conflict between domestic and EU sources of law 
can be reconciled through two legal approaches that rely on a hierarchy 
criterion. On the one hand, national administrative authorities are required to 
refrain from applying domestic rules that do not conform with EU law; on the 
other hand, EU legality generally takes priority over domestic legality. In this 
way, the principle is reaffirmed whereby the legality rule entails that 
administrative authorities’ activities are subject, first, to EU law and, second, to 
domestic law, providing the latter is in conformity with the former.  
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the case where an administrative body adopts an illegitimate 
regulation and the one where it merely implements such an 
illegitimate regulatory instrument. If an incidental decision has 
found the regulation to be illegitimate, the administrative body 
that adopted it may be liable under tort law - when the relevant 
preconditions are met. However, this liability only arises because 
it has adopted the illegitimate regulation, not because it has applied 
it40. Conversely, if a different administrative body is involved, it is 
hard to imagine that tort liability may arise, considering that there 
is no legal obligation to refrain from applying a regulation found 
to be illegitimate but not set aside – not even if the parties 
concerned notify this circumstance to the administrative body that 
applies such regulation. Since no obligation exists, no unjust harm 
may be caused in breach of legal rules – and thus the precondition 
for tort liability would lack. This holds true regardless of the 
nature of the instrument at issue, and whenever a court has 
already found it to be illegitimate; conversely, the mere 
circumstance that a regulation was challenged before a court 
assuming its illegitimacy is utterly irrelevant.  
Like administrative bodies, private bodies may not refrain 
from abiding by an regulation found to be illegitimate by a court - 
unless they are parties to the proceeding.  
 
 
4. The Sources Relied upon As Benchmarks.  
In the context of a regulation’s incidental assessment, the 
judicial review may focus on compliance with any item of primary 
legislation, including decrees that have the force of laws and 
legislative decrees, or, conversely, with EU law, applicable 
international law or immediately enforceable international law 
provisions.  
                                                 
40 In recent plenary sittings too, the Council of State re-affirmed that challenging 
an illegitimate regulation is an appropriate remedy to establish a legal claim, 
even if seeking its annulment is legally barred. This means that the 
conventional approach, whereby annulment was indispensable if a regulatory 
instrument had been found to be illegitimate, has been overcome and a flexible 
system of safeguards, which allows establishing the illegitimate nature of a 
regulatory instrument with a view to claiming damages (Council of State, 
Plenary sitting, decision no. 3 dated 23 March 2011), has been developed.  
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In doing so, the court has to consider the multiple sources 
which set the boundaries of administrative activities - such as the 
provisions contained in Treaties, sometimes subject to diverging 
interpretations, the judgments of the Court of Justice, which go in 
several directions and are sometime interpreted in a way that 
gives rise to slightly diverging rules, and so on41. If jointly applied, 
these sources may fail to point to the same legal rule. In such a 
case, to assess compliance of a regulatory instrument with a 
legislative benchmark, i.e. reviewing compliance with the legality 
principle, is a daunting task, given that no unified guidance can be 
identified.  
From this perspective, one could argue that legality may 
take the form of “reviewing the criterion for selecting the right 
law”42. The focus is not so much on establishing compliance with 
laws that impose limitations on public authority, but on reviewing 
the assessment made by the public administrative body in order to 
determine the applicable rule. The mechanistic view of the legality 
principle, whereby public administrative bodies only execute the 
intent of the law, is no longer true. If one endorses this extension 
of the scope of the legality principle, the benchmark applied by 
administrative courts needs to be different. The Courts search for 
the law in case law, based on the stare decisis principle, rather than 
in law, and “scholars’ activities contribute to giving form to the 
law”, so that “the law grows and slowly evolves”43.  
The review applies to all instruments of regulatory nature 
adopted by the Government, individual Ministers, or other 
administrative bodies, at State or local level – including 
municipalities – as much as by independent authorities. The scope 
of the review also includes by-laws or other sources of secondary 
                                                 
41 That the judgments by the EU Court of Justice are sources of law was ruled 
by the Constitutional Court since its decisions no. 113, dated to 23 April 1985, 
and no. 389, dated to 11 July 1989. As consistently found by administrative 
courts, the judgments of the EU Court of Justice are directly enforceable in 
Member States’ legal systems like regulations, directives and Commission's 
decisions; accordingly, they are binding on domestic courts, which are required 
to refrain from applying any domestic provisions that are in conflict with them. 
See, in this connection, Cons. giust. amm. Sicilia, decision no. 470 dated 25 May 
2009; Council of State, Division V, decision no. 4440 dated 13 July 2006.  
42 S. Cassese, Alla ricerca del Sacro Graal. A proposito della rivista Diritto pubblico, 
in Riv. trim. dir. pubbl., 1995, 796.  
43 All the quotations are from S. Cassese, Le basi costituzionali, cit. at 8, 222.  
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legislation. “Regulation” actually means an instrument that sets 
forth rules – which should be as general and theoretical as 
possible – adopted by any public administrative body44. 
Conversely, Parliamentary rules of procedure fall outside the 
scope of this definition, since they are peculiar sources of law that 
take priority over primary legislation.  
The incidental review is strictly limited to administrative 
instruments of regulatory nature; in no case may such a review be 
performed in respect of laws or instruments that have the force of 
law, which may only be checked by the Constitutional Court on 
the basis of constitutional principles – pursuant to Article 134 of 
the Constitution. On the other hand, incidental review is an 
alternative to direct assessment, because, if no direct evaluation is 
permitted, the court is empowered under procedural rules to rely 
on incidental review as a remedy. Indeed, the Constitutional 
Court clarified that it is unquestionable that any court that is 
expected to apply regulatory provisions that are found to be 
illegitimate, because they are in conflict with the Constitution 
may, indeed must refrain from applying them – for instance, 
whenever such provisions are found to be illegitimate on account 
of their being in conflict with primary legislation – in pursuance of 
section 5 of Act no. 2248 (annex E), dated to 20 March 186545.  
The modus operandi is also different. Whilst the 
Constitutional Court relies on parliamentary records to review all 
the instruments having the force of law, administrative courts are 
not required to rely on the regulatory impact assessment – where 
this is available – to establish whether regulations are legitimate. 
This entails that there is a wide gap between impact assessment 
and the reasons underlying legal instruments. Relying on impact 
assessment would translate into conferring a two-fold role on the 
tools that are meant to ensure the quality of law-making, which 
                                                 
44 A peculiar case is that of legislative simplification regulations, which are 
substantively enforceable as laws, although they are not formally considered 
instruments that have the force of laws. If the Article 134 of the Constitution is 
to be construed extensively, these instruments might fall under the scope of the 
Constitutional Court’s review, namely because of their peculiar features.  
45 Decision no. 72 by the Constitutional Court dated 27 June 1968, as 
commented by V. Onida, Sulla «disapplicazione» dei regolamenti incostituzionali (a 
proposito della libertà religiosa dei detenuti), in Giur. cost., 1968, 1031. 
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would cease being tools to merely check the draft instruments, 
and become tools to also check the instrument per se46.  
The incidental review of legality may be carried out both by 
ordinary and administrative courts, in accordance with the current 
mechanism for the distribution of jurisdiction, which is based 
partly on the right or interest at stake, and partly on the subject of 
the claim. Accordingly, administrative courts have jurisdiction 
over all the disputes that involve public administrative bodies 
exercising public authority47.  
There is not a defined list of regulations subject or 
undergone to judicial review – their number cannot be 
determined. Only courts verify – on a case by case basis – whether 
a regulation is compliant with the higher-level legislation that 
applies to the case under scrutiny. No derogation from or 
exception to the rule of the incidental review of legality is 
envisaged, either based on legislative instruments or on case law; 
                                                 
46 B.G. Mattarella, Analisi di impatto della regolazione e motivazione del 
provvedimento amministrativo, paper from the Observatory on Regulatory Impact 
Assessment, www.osservatorioair.it, September 2010 (also published in Astrid 
Rassegna, no. 123/2010). Indeed, as shown by administrative provisions, 
providing the reasons for a legal instrument pursues several objectives. This is 
meant not only to enable judicial review, but also to ensure transparency and 
public scrutiny. Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) can lend itself very well 
to fulfilling this objective; as well as being helpful to courts, it could be relied 
upon by Parliamentary opposition and, in general, the public opinion. Thus, it 
should be included in the preamble to all legislative instruments as part of the 
underlying reasons, but it should also be published without being regarded as 
an internal step in governmental law-making. The concept that regulatory 
options should rely on regulatory impact assessment is examined in Council of 
State, Division VI, decision no. 5026, dated to 16 October 2008.  
47 In general, jurisdiction falls to ordinary or administrative courts as follows: if 
the claim made concerns a right, ordinary courts have jurisdiction; if the claim 
made concerns legitimate interests, administrative courts have jurisdiction – 
without prejudice to specific issues over which administrative court has 
exclusive jurisdiction.  
On the issue of civil law courts refraining from the application of regulatory 
instruments see A. Romano, La disapplicazione del provvedimento amministrativo da 
parte del giudice civile, in Dir. proc. amm., 1983, 22; S. Cassarino, Problemi della 
disapplicazione degli atti amministrativi nel giudizio civile, in Riv. trim. dir. proc. 
civ., 1985, 864; G. De Giorgi Cezzi, Perseo e Medusa: il giudice ordinario al cospetto 
del potere amministrativo, in Dir. proc. amm., 1998, 1023. On the issue of criminal 
law courts refraining from the application of regulatory instruments, see R. 
Villata, Disapplicazione dei provvedimenti amministrativi e processo penale, (1980); C. 
Franchini, Il controllo del giudice penale sulla pubblica amministrazione, cit. at 25, 77. 
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consequently, that rule is applicable to any and all regulatory 
instruments.  
As already clarified, the incidental review of legality is in 
full committed to the courts, which bear overall responsibility for 
it. There is no relationship between the framework of regional 
authorities and the incidental review of legality.  
 
 
5. Sanctions Relating to the Incidental Review of Legality.  
If during an incidental review a higher-level legislative 
instrument is breached, the remedy consists in refraining from 
applying the regulatory measure; this means that a court may 
decide on the validity of a regulation exclusively to settle the 
dispute between the parties involved, without affecting the act per 
se. As already pointed out, refraining from the application of a 
regulatory instrument is a power vested in judicial authorities 
whereby an illegitimate - though enforceable - administrative 
instrument is “devitalised”; and this power  concerns exclusively 
the effects related with the object of the judicial claim48.  
The declared invalidity implies the refrain from applying a 
regulatory instrument, which will not produce any effect in the 
individual case; this situation is different from the case in which 
the competent subject fails to apply it – where the refusal to apply 
the instrument could be irrespective of whatever assessment or 
evaluation49. After declaring the invalidity, the court decides on 
the case as if the regulation did not exist, tamquam non esset. This 
might also entail enforcement of a previous regulatory measure – 
which would be almost resuscitated – if one desists from applying 
the provisions that repealed the previous regulatory measures.  
Two fundamental reasons allow to rely on this measure, 
which can be considered exceptional in the context of the 
administrative process. Both reasons permit the non-application of 
the standard rule, which provides a deadline of 60-day in order to 
                                                 
48 A. De Roberto, Non applicazione e disapplicazione dei regolamenti nella recente 
giurisprudenza amministrativa, in Impugnazione e disapplicazione dei regolamenti. 
Atti del convegno organizzato dall’Ufficio studi e documentazione del Consiglio di 
Stato e dall’Associazione studiosi del processo amministrativo, (1998), 21. 
49 According to E. Cannada Bartoli, L’inapplicabilità degli atti amministrativi, cit. at 
12, the power not to apply an instrument results from the invalidity of that 
instrument, just as the power to declare it null and void.  
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challenge a regulatory instrument - since that rule, in the 
considered grounds, would not allow achieving the purposes for 
which it is intended50.  
The first ground concerns the hierarchical structure of the 
sources of law, and the legislative nature of regulatory 
instruments. Refraining from the application of a regulation is 
allowed because a private subject’s legitimate expectations cannot 
rest on an act not compliant with higher-level sources of law but 
fit to produce repeatable effects. Consequently, a regulation only 
produces effects when it is valid. There is no need for enhancing 
the stability of the exercise of public authority along with its 
effects, because the secondary norm will be liable to new 
applications, as it will be challengeable by an indefinite number of 
affected subjects. Thus, the “principle” of equivalence – whereby 
an illegitimate measure is evaluated as a legitimate one in terms of 
the produced effects – does not apply to regulations, as it happens 
with administrative measures, since a secondary rule conflicting 
with primary norms does not produce effects of loss, 
extinguishment or modifications to the rights vested in private 
individuals, and thus cannot be legitimately relied upon by these 
latter51.  
The second ground concerns the predicate instrument 
criterion. The judicial system admits this extraordinary remedy as 
far as the flaw that affects the regulation challenged results from 
another act that has not been challenged yet52. A judicial authority 
may decide on a case incidenter tantum, if there is an act on which 
that case can be predicated – that is to say, if the claimed violation 
is related to a specific regulation and can be traced back to another 
different instrument, on which the former is predicated, i.e. to a 
predicate instrument. From this perspective, refraining from 
applying a regulatory instrument on an incidental basis is 
                                                 
50 The relationship between refraining from application of administrative 
measures and claims for damages is addressed in F. Francario, L’inapplicabilità 
del provvedimento amministrativo e azione risarcitoria, in Dir. amm., 2002, 23.  
51 This shows that “the rules on jurisdiction and decision-making powers (that 
is, the way in which a judicial proceeding is structured), cannot be consistent 
with the claim made in such a proceeding as much as with the relevant 
purposes” – see F.G. Scoca, Sulle implicazioni di carattere sostanziale dell’interesse 
legittimo, in Scritti in onore di Massimo Severo Giannini, (1988), III, 674.  
52 C.E. Gallo, Questioni pregiudiziali, in Enc. giur., 1991, XIX.  
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grounded in the existence of a predicate instrument. Overall, such 
predicate instruments are general in scope.  
This is basically the “illegality exception” mechanism, 
whereby illegality results from a flaw affecting the predicate 
instrument and may generally be claimed without any time 
constraints, that is, it is perpétuelle53. The possibility to claim 
illegality of regulations incidentally allows the judicial authority to 
take full cognizance of the specific legal relationship; on the other 
hand, this results into a judicial decision, whose effects go beyond 
the parties to the specific dispute54.  
Whenever instruments of a different hierarchical level are 
found to be in conflict, refraining from application allows one to 
give priority to the higher-level instrument in pursuance of the 
hierarchical structure of sources of law – that is, it works as a 
mechanism to declare the lower-level provisions invalid as much 
as being a de-centralized mechanism to settle the conflicts between 
sources of law, since every judge involved in the relevant case is 
empowered to do so. This approach to judicial review is the 
ultimate outcome of the lack of a centralized system for settling 
such conflicts, possibly grounded in the initiative of a single court 
empowered to declare a given instrument invalid on account of its 
being in breach of constitutional provisions. That is to say, 
refraining from application is meant to fill the gap resulting from 
the lack of an incidental review of constitutionality as for the 
justiciability of regulations.  
The operational features of the decision to refrain from 
applying a regulatory instrument are straightforward. The judicial 
                                                 
53 In the French legal system there is the exception d’illegalité, which is considered 
to be receivable only with regard to regulatory measures containing general 
provisions (R. Chapus, Droit du contentieux administratif, (2006), 667). It is 
unclear whether granting this illegality exception is a decision that is final in 
nature, so as to prevent challenging anew the illegitimate nature of the 
regulation as established by the court, or it has only relative value and, 
therefore, allows new determinations in respect of the relevant regulation.  
54 Council of State, Division V, 26 February 1992, decision no. 154, as 
commented by S. Baccarini, Disapplicazione dei regolamenti nel processo 
amministrativo: c’è qualcosa di nuovo oggi nel sole, anzi d’antico, in Foro amm., 1993, 
466. By refraining from applying a regulatory instrument, administrative courts 
exercise their power to trace back the instruments on which the challenged 
instrument is predicated, whereby they are enabled to probe into the features of 
the dispute between individual citizen and public administrative body.  
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authority establishes, on a preliminary basis and by its own 
motion, that the lower level source of law is illegitimate, because it 
is not in conformity with the higher level one; the case is 
consequently decided, as if the invalid piece of legislation did not 
exist and could not be enforced in the dispute at issue. Although 
this power is exercised ex officio, the principle of actionability on 
request is not breached, because the judicial authority steps in on 
the basis of the iura novit curia principle and the rule that the 
higher-level source is to be prioritized. If the court did not refrain 
from applying the regulatory instrument, there would be no other 
way to ensure that the higher-level source of law takes priority.  
Where the judicial review finds that a regulation is in 
breach of either the Constitution or primary legislation, that 
regulation is not applicable; however, it remains in force because 
the judicial decision rendered incidentally only applies to the 
dispute at issue and is not to be regarded as a final judgment55. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to ensure that legal relationships are 
straightforward; therefore, our legal system seems to prefer – 
albeit non-specifically – to timely set aside illegitimate instruments 
for the sake of the legality principle as it is set forth in Article 97 of 
our Constitution as much as in pursuance of the rule of law 
principle, so that private entities and individuals are not required 
to defend themselves against multiple instances of application of 
an illegitimate regulation.  
As for the effects produced on the legal situation that 
applies to the entities addressed by the administrative instruments 
at issue, it should be clarified that refraining from applying a 
regulation based on an incidental review may entail annulment of 
the administrative measure implementing such regulation, 
because the invalidity of the illegitimate legislative instrument 
(that is, the regulation) attracts invalidity of the measures 
grounded in it. The annulment in question may be ordered by an 
administrative court at the instance of the party concerned; 
alternatively, it may be ordered by the public authority that had 
adopted the unlawful regulation ex officio.  
                                                 
55 A. Lugo, La dichiarazione incidentale d’inefficacia dell’atto amministrativo, in Riv. 
trim. dir. proc. civ., 1957, 646 and ff., believes that refraining from application is 
not suitable for meeting the public interest in setting aside an instrument that is 
illegitimate.  
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The flawed use of regulatory powers – due to the adoption 
of a regulation in breach of higher-level legislation – may give rise 
to the administrative body’s tortious liability. However, there is no 
legislative framework; indeed, there is no single legal provision to 
rely upon in order to regulate this subject matter; moreover, there 
is not even case law to be used in this regard. One can 
unquestionably argue that the type of tortious liability 
(“aquiliana”), mentioned in Article 2043 of the Civil Code, may be 
invoked – whereby an administrative body’s liability may be said 
to arise if regulatory powers are exercised illegitimately so as to 
cause unjustified harm to citizens. Starting from these 
assumptions, one can appreciate that the negligence element 
would appear to be the most difficult one to outline. Negligence, 
in this case, may not be construed as negligent conduct by the civil 
servant that drafted the illegitimate legislative instrument; rather, 
one should envisage a specific instance of negligence. Drawing 
upon the model of the lawmaker’s liability for breach of EU law, 
negligence here might be related to the unquestionable existence 
of a severe violation, or to the violation of rules of law intended to 
protect rights vested in individuals56. Criminal liability is 
obviously out of the question, because the facts at issue do not 
amount to any criminal offence.  
In refraining from applying a regulation, the court acts as if 
the illegitimate regulation did not exist. One may argue that the 
legislative instruments previously in force have to be applied – 
providing they are in conformity.  
The mechanism which consists in the court’s refraining 
from application of an illegitimate regulation does not deprive the 
petitioner of any procedural safeguard; in fact, it may allow the 
petitioner to lodge a judicial claim for the annulment of the 
measure that implements the regulation which was found to be 
illegitimate on the basis of its incidental review. It is actually 
                                                 
56 An overview of the liability vested in lawmakers can be found in A. Barone, 
R. Pardolesi, Il fatto illecito del legislatore, in Foro it., 1992, IV, 148. Regarding the 
individual issues, see R. Bifulco, La responsabilità dello Stato per atti legislativi, 
(1999), 127 and ff.; E. Scoditti, La responsabilità dello Stato per violazione del diritto 
comunitario, in Danno resp., 2003, 5 and ff.; V. Roppo, Appunti in tema di illecito 
«comunitario» e illecito «costituzionale» del legislatore, in Danno resp., 1998, 970 
and ff. Reliance on aquiliana tortious liability is addressed in C. Castronovo, La 
nuova responsabilità civile, (2006), 235 and ff.  
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unquestionable that an implementing measure – despite not being 
challenged within the relevant deadline – may not be regarded as 
legitimate per se, since it is issued on the factual and the legal 
assumption of the existence of an instrument that does no longer 
produce legally enforceable effects, because it has been found to 
be illegitimate57. At all events, no mechanisms are available in our 
legal system to allow to turn an incidental finding that a 
regulation is illegitimate into the annulment of such regulation.  
Under certain circumstances, the illegitimate nature of a 
regulation found by a court on an incidental basis might be also 
claimed by the entities addressed by such regulation, if they are 
aware of that finding, as a reason to elude enforcement of an 
administrative measure. However, it is up to the administrative 
body in charge to assess the relevant reasons and possibly 
terminate the enforcement of the measure on the basis of such 
reasons.  
 
 
6. The Value of an Incidental Finding of Illegality.  
An incidental finding of illegality does not take on res 
judicata value. Since its boundaries with the fact of refraining from 
application of an illegitimate regulation are blurred, the finding in 
question has a relative value – that is, it only applies to the parties 
to the given proceeding – rather than being absolute in nature. The 
finding of illegality leaves the regulation in place and does not 
impact directly on third parties’ rights as far as they are concerned 
by the application of the illegitimate regulation on any other 
grounds.  
                                                 
57 According to A. Amorth, Impugnabilità e disapplicazione dei regolamenti e degli 
atti generali, in Problemi del processo amministrativo, (1964), 574, as regards the 
entities that are not involved in the specific action, it would not be utterly 
groundless to argue that, since they had failed to challenge the implementing 
measures that violated legal interests vested in them, or to challenge the direct 
application of the regulation that violated such legal interests, they had 
consented to them and thereby exempted the administrative body from any 
obligation to do away with the effects produced by the measures or application 
in question. Hence, as regards such entities, setting aside the regulation does 
not restore the previous situation, which only occurs once the administrative 
body is no longer in a position to apply the annulled regulation in pursuance of 
the relevant judicial decision.  
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Conversely, the Council of State has consistently ruled that 
judicial annulment of a regulation by an administrative court is 
enforceable erga omnes. This means that, contrary to the general 
rule, the judicial decision is not enforceable only with regard to 
the litigants, as its effects include all the addressees of the 
regulation considering the factual components of the judicial 
decision – that is, its operative part, the underlying reasons, and 
the claim made before the court58.  
The only piece of legislation that empowers judicial 
authorities to refrain from applying illegitimate regulations (i.e. 
section 5 of Act no. 2248, dated to 20 March 1865, Annex E) does 
not refer in any way to the res judicata concept. Both jurisprudence 
and case law agree that the effects produced by an incidental 
finding only apply to the parties to the given proceeding.  
The fact that such decisions should be regarded as res 
judicata is unrelated to the type of decision; however, it may be 
necessary to extend the scope of effectiveness of such judicial 
decisions to the entities concerned, since regulations are involved. 
These decisions, whether rendered by standard or administrative 
courts on any issue, and whether they are rendered on a 
preliminary basis or not, only produce their effects within the 
framework of the specific dispute.  
This is due to various reasons. First, since justiciability is 
meant to afford protection to individual parties – so that 
refraining from application is merely a tool to afford full 
protection to the rights vested in such individual parties – there is 
no reason for extending the scope of the decision to entities that 
                                                 
58 Council of State, Division IV, 23 April 2004, decision no. 2380; Council of 
State, Division VI, 26 June 1996, decision no. 854; TAR Lazio, Division I, 12 May 
2000, decision no. 3918, where it is clarified that judicial annulment of a 
regulatory instrument is enforceable erga omnes and applies from inception (ex 
tunc), since it impacts on the regulation as a whole, that is, as it is also related to 
the entities that are not directly concerned by the judicial decision and with 
regard to their respective rights. Consequently, if a regulatory instrument, 
whose contents can be considered general and indivisible, is challenged and the 
court subsequently annuls it together with either the predicate instrument(s) or 
the implementing measure(s), the annulment in question will quash the 
instrument as a whole – so that it will have to be regarded as non-existent both 
by the petitioner(s) and by any other entity.  
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are not concerned by it59. On the other hand, the petitioner’s 
interest is protected by recognizing the right vested in him/her, 
or, otherwise, by annulling the instrument violating that interest 
and establishing that it is illegitimate. This is the part of the 
judicial decision setting out the appropriate interpretation of the 
law; thus, apparently there is no need to annul (where this is 
possible) a regulatory instrument that does not immediately 
violate any interest. Second, one can unquestionably argue that 
the lawmaker has failed to take in due account this incidental 
remedy, given that the only applicable piece of legislation dates 
back to 1865, that is, when no administrative law court had been 
set up on the basis of the legislative framework in force then.  
Third, a direct remedy is available in our legal system, 
whereby an administrative court may be seized to claim 
annulment of an illegal regulation; accordingly, the incidental 
review remedy is to be regarded as a residual one, to which minor 
importance is attached. Its specific features are related to non-
applicability, and this remedy is mostly actionable, if it is 
necessary to protect the legal situation of the individual entities 
concerned. Fourth, the finding by a court, on an incidental basis, 
that a regulation is illegitimate is ancillary to the operative part of 
the judicial decision, since it is only contained in the reasons for 
the decision and it is not even adequately publicized - since no 
specific legislative provision is applicable in this regard. Fifth, the 
relative nature of such a finding can also be accounted for by the 
risk that the administrative body’s defenses might be undermined 
in the course of a proceeding before non-administrative courts.  
An incidental finding of illegality does not involve, per se, 
any publicity requirements. The decisions rendered in this regard 
by ordinary and/or administrative courts do not share any of the 
features that apply to the decisions taken by the Constitutional 
Court in terms either of their formal structure or of their effects. 
This considerably affects the rule of law principle and the 
                                                 
59 As regards, for instance, administrative law proceedings, since justiciability is 
meant to protect interests vested in individual entities, such interests represent 
both a fundamental precondition for seizing the court and a constraint placed 
on the scope of justiciability. That is to say, if an administrative court may only 
intervene insofar as the interests have been violated, it should also intervene 
only as long as this is necessary in order to protect the interests vested in 
specific entities, after establishing the violation of such interests.  
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assurance of legally treating identical cases by legally identical 
standards. No specific arrangement is envisaged in respect of 
incidental findings (e.g. publication in newspapers or on online 
media) to ensure that their effects are generally binding.  
 
 
7. Mandatory or Optional Nature of Review and Sanctions.  
The requirement that a regulation should be found in 
judicial conformity with a higher level rule is related, in general, 
to the public order concept; however, the requirement has no 
specific implication. There is no specific legislation whereby public 
order is linked to incidental findings of illegality; yet, it is 
unquestionable that “setting aside an illegitimate statutory 
provision is a requirement that goes beyond individual interests, 
since it concerns society as a whole for the sake of the rule of 
law”60.  
Albeit resulting from the challenge made by an individual 
entity, which claims the violation of individual interests, the 
review of regulations mainly focuses on establishing and 
overcoming conflicts between sources of law differently ranked. 
This is the reason why we believe that the findings made in the 
judicial decision are general in scope and lend themselves to being 
regarded as binding in nature.  
Thus, any court, whatever its competences, is empowered 
to claim non-conformity of a regulation with a higher-level 
legislative instrument of its own motion (ex officio) – namely 
because the review of legality is closely related to the need for 
protecting the rule of law. Since the incidental review of legality is 
only allowed with regard to regulations, which are always 
administrative instruments in terms of their formal features, no 
court might be empowered to challenge legislative instruments for 
their “legality” – or, rather, for their being conform to 
constitutional principles.  
 
 
                                                 
60 See R. Meregazzi, L’annullamento giurisdizionale dei regolamenti, in Scritti in 
memoria di Antonino Giuffrè, III, (1968), 610, who also adds that only with regard 
to the annulment of regulations could one support the view that the 
jurisdictional powers allocated to the Council of State are mainly intended to 
ensure the legitimacy of public administrative activities.  
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8. Peculiarities of Domestic Law in Case of Breaches of European 
Law.  
If European law is breached, the legal approach to 
regulations is rather different. First, if the regulatory instrument is 
in conflict with European law, the lower courts may refrain from 
applying it by their own motion and at any time – just as it 
happens to any item of domestic primary legislation61. This is a 
direct consequence of the primacy of European law.  
Moreover, administrative bodies are also empowered to 
refrain from applying regulations that are in breach of European 
law, inasmuch as they are branches of a Member State that has 
undertaken to fully implement European law. Indeed, public 
administrative bodies and judicial authorities are bound to act in 
respect of  EU law and, therefore, refrain from applying any item 
of legislation that is not compliant with it – and one can hardly 
imagine that things should be in any way different with 
regulations – as long as they come into play in the administrative 
case to be decided upon; in order to do so, they do not have to 
await the repeal of Parliament or the preliminary ruling issued by 
the Constitutional Court62.  
                                                 
61 As clarified by Council of State, Division VI, 23 May 2006, decision no. 3072, 
domestic courts are in any case required to refrain from applying a domestic 
instrument, including a regulation, that is in conflict with EU law. This stance is 
supported by Council of State, Division VI, 25 September 2009, decision no. 
5765; Council of State, Division VI, 23 July 2008, decision no. 3642. The 
importance of legal rules in the European legal system is discussed by G. della 
Cananea, C. Franchini, I principi dell’amministrazione europea, Second edition, 
(2013), 86.  
62 European Court of Justice, Case C-103/88, Fratelli Costanzo – judgment of 22 
June 1988, as commented by R. Caranta, Sull’obbligo dell’amministrazione di 
disapplicare gli atti di diritto interno in contrasto con disposizioni comunitarie, in Foro 
amm., 1990, 1372. That administrative bodies must also refrain from applying 
domestic instruments that are in conflict with EU law is uncontested: see 
Council of State, Division VI , 23 May 2006, decision no. 3072, whereby the 
primacy of EU law requires not only judicial authorities, but also Member 
States as a whole, that is, the whole administrative framework of such Member 
States, to fully implement European laws and refrain from applying domestic 
laws in case of conflicts. This stance is supported in Council of State, Division 
IV, 20 November 2008, decision no. 5742; Id., Division V, 8 September 2008, 
decision no. 4242; Id., Division V, 14 April 2008, decision no. 1600.  
The impossibility to rely on analogy in order to extend this power also to 
administrative measures that are in breach of EU law is expounded in Council 
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From this perspective, an administrative body is not 
required to follow the review procedure as set forth in the Act on 
administrative proceedings in order to refrain from applying a 
regulation that is incompatible with EU law; in this case, the 
emphasis is put on the primacy and effectiveness, principles that 
underlie the protection of rights grounded in European law. 
However, if one considers the legal relationship between a private 
entity/individual and the administrative body, the fact that the 
latter refrains from applying the regulation – without removing 
the rules contained from the realm of law63 – would not seem to 
afford a sound alternative remedy such as to replace the setting 
aside of the regulation in question. Furthermore, the public body 
will have to check in any case that the intervening time span is not 
excessively long, something which can ultimately justify the 
addressee’s reliance on the legitimate nature of the measure in 
question64.  
 
 
9. Concluding Remarks.  
The regulation is an “in betweener”: halfway between a 
source of law and an implement of the executive power. This fact 
creates obstacles to a logical, consistent analysis. If one considers 
the legal status of secondary sources of legislation, apart from 
their respective contents, the administrative components would 
                                                                                                                       
of State, Division VI, 17 October 2005, decision no. 5826; Id., Division IV, 22 
September 2005, decision no. 5005.  
Lower courts have been considered to be empowered to refrain from applying 
domestic provisions that are incompatible with EU law, so as to bring EU law 
into full effect, since the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court on 8 
June 1984 (decision no. 170) – whereby the European and domestic legal 
systems are autonomous and separate systems; however they are mutually co-
ordinated in accordance with the allocation of competences set out in the 
Treaty. Thus, incompatible domestic provisions are neither repealed nor 
derogated from nor null and void: their application is refrained from because 
such provisions belong to a different, autonomous legal system.  
63 E. Cannada Bartoli, L’inapplicabilità degli atti amministrativi, cit. at 12, 35; F. 
Cintioli, Giurisdizione amministrativa e disapplicazione dell’atto amministrativo, cit. 
at 12, 95.  
64 E. Broussy, E. Donnat, C. Lambert, Stabilité des situations juridiques et droit 
communautaire, in Act. Jur. Dr. admin., 2006, 2275; H. Wenander, Withdrawal of 
national administrative decisions under european administrative law, in Eur. Law 
Rep., 2007, 54.  
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appear to prevail over the legislative ones. Moreover, secondary 
rules are not capable of repealing laws, unless ad-hoc laws confer 
this power to them; they may be withdrawn by administrative 
bodies; they may not be challenged before the Constitutional 
Court65. Hence, the predominance of administrative law 
components accounts for the choice made to reserve the 
challenging of regulations for administrative courts.  
However, this paper shows that the general framework of 
judicial review does not fail to take into account the subject to be 
reviewed, since administrative judicial proceedings are 
multifaceted. They are meant to decide both on the challenge 
made and – sometimes – on the right to tangible consideration. 
Because of this flexibility, administrative judicial proceedings are 
suitable for challenging regulations on account of the hybrid 
nature of regulations, which are halfway between legislative 
instruments and tools inherent in the exercise of public authority. 
Indeed, administrative law courts seized with the review of 
regulations can adjust themselves to and admit of innovative 
approaches – such as refraining from applying regulations of their 
own motion (ex officio), which “does away with the obsolete 
equivalence between administrative measures and administrative 
regulations”66. By relying on a standard that applies typically to 
sources of law – i.e., the iura novit curia principle – administrative 
judicial proceedings lend themselves to becoming tools in order to 
settle conflicts between regulatory provisions.  
 
 
                                                 
65 These differences are highlighted by F. Benvenuti, Disegno dell’amministrazione 
italiana, (1996), 246, where it is specified that a regulation is factually legislative 
in nature, although it is an administrative instrument, both substantively and 
formally.  
66 G. Pitruzzella, Atti normativi del Governo e tutela dei diritti, in Tecniche di 
normazione e tutela giurisdizionale dei diritti fondamentali, edited by A. Ruggieri, L. 
D’Andrea, A. Saitta, G. Sorrenti, (2007), 161 and ff.  
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NORMS, OXFORD: HART, 2012, 625 PAGES. 
 
Edoardo Chiti* 
 
This book discusses the increasing involvement of private 
companies in the exercise of military and security public functions 
in the changing international space. It considers two different 
aspects of this phenomenon: the inclination of States to contract 
private companies to perform genuine military and security 
functions within the context of armed conflicts; and the 
employment of these same companies by non-statal bodies, such 
as business corporations or international organizations, in crisis 
situations in which local institutions are unable to guarantee 
security. As a legal research on such developments, it addresses 
three main sets of legal questions. First, how do international, 
European and domestic regulatory measures in this field come 
reciprocally into contact, and what are the results of their 
interplay? Second, what legal issues does this composite 
regulation arise? Third, moving from empirical analysis to 
normative reflection, in what ways could the EU contribute to the 
development of a global regulation of private military and 
security companies, in particular by ensuring that their action 
complies with human rights and international humanitarian law?  
The structure of the book is simple enough. The volume 
opens with a «general overview» of the multilevel regulation of 
private military and security companies, where a synthesis of the 
existing international and EU initiatives is presented (Part I). It 
then moves to the analysis of a variety of national regulatory 
frameworks. This investigation, which represents the core of the 
research, begins with the exam of the regulatory frameworks of 
ten EU Member States, including France and the UK, which have a 
significant practice in contracting military and security companies 
(Part II).  
 
 
 
* Full Professor of Administrative Law, University of Viterbo. 
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It goes on by examining the legislation and case-law of a 
number of «crucial players» outside the EU, such as the US, the 
Russian Federation, Israel, Australia, Canada, Colombia and 
South Africa (Part III). The last part of the volume is devoted to 
two questions arising from the national reports, that is the exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction over private contractors, and the abuse by 
private military and security companies of tax havens (Part IV). 
As it often happens in edited collections, involving a great 
number of disciplinary approaches, it is not possible to identify a 
unitary and coherent argument developed throughout the book. 
This does not mean that the volume does not present a series of 
thesis or hypothesis for further research. 
The general overview provided in Part I highlights the 
incompatibilities between the rationales and substantive 
provisions of the two main international instruments currently 
available, the soft law of the Montreux Document and the binding 
law of the Draft Convention elaborated in the context of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council. The point is made by 
Nigel White that these incompatibilities might lead to a situation 
in which States connected to private military and security 
companies’ industry entrench the Montreux process, while those 
opposing the «privatization of war» support the Draft 
Convention. Moreover, the lack of a specific regulatory framework 
at the EU level is pointed to as a shortcoming of the existing 
multilevel regulation, in consideration both of the direct role of 
the EU in military and security operations and of the EU capacity 
to act as a source of inspiration for other international regulatory 
systems and to influence third countries’ action. The chapters 
written, respectively, by Guido den Dekker, Marco Gestri, Mirko 
Sossai and Christine Bakker suggest that EU regulatory action 
might usefully complement the international and domestic 
initiatives. They also identify the tools and channels available to 
the EU political institutions to develop such regulatory action. 
Finally, the comparative overview of the EU and extra-EU 
national regulation carried out by Ottavio Quirico highlights that 
the emerging common regulatory framework, though promising 
in some respects, is insufficient with regard to military practice, in 
the frequent situations in which the law of the contracting State or 
the State where the company is based does not apply 
extraterritorially and the law of the host State is absent. 
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Parts II and III do not put forward overall theses, but offer a 
detailed and realistic account of principles and rules applicable in 
a wide range of national orders. The reader may perhaps derive 
two main conclusions from the various chapters. First, all EU 
Member States seem to have laws and regulations concerning 
private security services, ranging from registration and licensing 
to minimum standards for personnel selection, monitoring and 
regulation of the use of firearms. The development of these 
regulatory regimes, though, varies from country to country, 
mainly in relation to two factors, the degree of development of the 
private military and security industry within the country, and the 
existence of a public debate on the ever-expanding number of 
problems raised by such industry. Unsurprisingly, it is in the UK 
and in France that the most elaborated regulatory frameworks 
have been established (see, respectively, the chapter by Alexandra 
Bohm, Kerry Senior and Adam White and the chapter by Vanessa 
Capdevielle and Hamza Cherief). Second, the regulatory 
frameworks of the «crucial players» outside the EU illustrate the 
variety of options for governmental control of private security 
services. In the US, for example, the increasing reliance on private 
contractors in the last ten years has been paralleled by the gradual 
establishment of a regulatory regime based upon accountability, 
good management and clear standards, which the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting and the Government Accountability Office 
would like to be further developed (see the accurate account 
provided by Kristine Huskey and Scott Sullivan). Israel’s 
approach to the use and oversight of security contractors, instead, 
is shaped by the more general process of «civilianization» and 
privatization of functions traditionally performed by the Israeli 
Defence Force, which has since Israel’s independence acted as the 
most useful agent in implementing the government’s agenda: the 
emerging regulatory regime of private security services is thus an 
aspect of an overall transformation of the governmental 
machinery (see Yaël Ronen’s chapter). And the Russian Federation 
does not have explicit rules regulating the employment of private 
security companies abroad, although these companies are 
becoming significant players in the protection of private and 
public security. 
As for Part IV, its interest lies mainly in the identification of 
a complex legal issue, that of the jurisdictional competence in 
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cases of crimes committed on foreign soil by civilian contractors in 
military operations. In principle, those cases should be subject to 
the criminal law and jurisdiction of the country in which civilian 
contractors are deployed. Yet, the essays collected in this part, and 
in particular that written by Ieva Miluna, show that the principle 
of territoriality is sometimes set aside, either because a contracting 
State grants immunity from the jurisdiction of the host State or 
because it expands the competence of their military courts to 
civilian contractors. In this second case, the competent jurisdiction 
and relevant criminal law are identified according to the «active 
personality jurisdictional principle», affirmed in the US and the 
UK. Cases of overlapping jurisdictions and jurisdictional conflicts, 
however, are likely to happen. 
This is a rich and stimulating book. As Francesco Francioni 
rightly points out in his Foreword, it offers «a realistic scenario of 
applicable norms and principles as well as patterns of progressive 
development of the law in relation to a very dynamic evolution of 
the market for security and military force» (p. vi). It makes it clear 
that the emerging patterns are both underdeveloped, particularly 
at the international and EU level, and unsatisfactory, as they leave 
open many uneasy issues, ranging from the preservation of the 
principles of the law of armed conflicts to the possible conflicts 
between national laws. By doing so, the book also offers abundant 
material to reflect normatively on the possible improvements of 
the existing law.  
Nevertheless, some critical remarks can be made. One 
problem is that the analysis does not take into account a number 
of relevant variables. The various papers, for example, do not 
distinguish between employment of private companies by States 
and by (private and public) non-statal bodies. They bring together 
recourse to private companies within armed conflicts and within 
«crisis situations». They underestimate the differences between 
the many services provided by military and security companies, 
which range from prisoner detention to mere logistical support. 
These are, though, important variables, whose consideration 
would have allowed the Editors to articulate the inquiry in a more 
precise way, and to identify the legal and institutional issues 
specific to each of the various hypotheses of recourse to military 
and security contractors.  
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Another problem is the insufficient investigation of the 
organizational and procedural interconnections among national, 
EU and international laws. In spite of the sub-title of the book, 
which points to the «interplay between international, European 
and domestic norms», little attention is paid to the multiple forms 
in which national laws come to contact among themselves and 
with EU and international law, as well as to the legal challenges 
inherent to such variety of interconnections.  
A further problem is that of the analytical instruments that 
are used in the various chapters. The employment of military and 
security contractors is analyzed using the traditional lenses of 
public national and international law. Yet, the international law 
paradigm, essentially focussing on inter-States relations, seems 
inadequate to give account of the features of the regulation of 
military and security contractors. For example, it does not fully 
capture the peculiarities of the Montreux process, which exploits 
standards and soft law mechanisms addressed to the industry 
itself, and it is probably unable to govern effectively the 
transnational activities of security contractors. One may wonder, 
in this regard, whether «global administrative law», as developed 
by Sabino Cassese, Benedict Kingsbury and Richard Stewart, 
would have not provided a more appropriate set of tools to 
analyze the relations - at the same time transnational and 
intergovernmental - involved in the action of security contractors, 
to make sense of the existing bits and pieces of national, EU and 
international law, and to orientate future legal developments. 
Finally, the volume seems to reflect a too narrow scientific 
project. The various authors, together with the Editors, limit 
themselves to describe and discuss the current regulation of 
military and security contractors. They do not put this 
development in a historical perspective. Nor do they suggest 
improvements to the existing legal framework. This is, we believe, 
a missed opportunity. The historical perspective would have 
allowed to highlight that the current turn to private operators is 
not only a politically and legally sensitive issue, but also a direct 
challenge to the paradigm of the western State as an entity 
historically emerging from a process of centralization of coercive 
powers. And a systematic reflection on possible improvements 
could have oriented the action of the involved political actors, 
including the EU. 
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DEBATES 
I. THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE LEGAL STATUS  
AND POWERS OF CITIES 
 
DROIT DE LA VILLE. AN INTRODUCTION 
 
Jean-Bernard Auby∗ 
 
 
 
1. The way the book was made owes much to what it came 
from: a lecture given for some years in a Master on Urban Studies, 
whose nearly all attendants are not lawyers. 
When I first gave this course, I thought that the only way of 
permitting that kind of audience a smooth enough access to the 
corresponding rather technical legal issues was to adopt a concrete 
approach. This implied to leave aside the usual conceptual divides 
upon which we are used to build our analyses and which are 
mainly formal: public law/private law, local government 
law/substantive administrative law, planning law/neighbouring 
special fields like the law on public assets or the one on public 
contracts. 
To be honest, this duty to adapt to a particular audience 
was also an opportunity. I belong to scholars who think that 
modern law - public law at least - finds itself in a period of 
profound transformation, due to some contemporary evolutions, 
such as globalization, the growing pluralistic character of our 
public apparatuses and the more and more complex distribution 
of roles between public and private entities. And I believe that, 
because of these evolutions, many of our concepts have become 
less capable to grasp the legal reality. 
If this is true, we have to find new classifications. And, to 
this end, I think the best possible approach consists of starting 
from concrete realities, whose significance is not –or is the least- 
open to discussion.  
                                                           
∗ Professor of Public Law, Sciences Po, Paris, Director, Governance and Public 
Law Centre (Chaire “Mutations de l’Action Publique et du Droit Public”). 
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The City belongs to these realities. While I am not sure I 
know for certain what “planning law” is, I know what a city is: I 
have visited many, I live in one, which I can see around me when I 
am not traveling. 
 
2. Usually, in the French doctrine - and, I believe, in many 
others -, the various pieces that constitute the legal functioning of 
cities are apprehended in a fragmented way, they are left to 
various categories of law - law on property, law on public 
contracts, law on local government, law on local public services, 
and so on -, although one piece has tended to become dominant: 
planning law, or land use law. 
And yet, it proves quite fruitful to assemble all these pieces 
and bridge the gap between them by considering the ways they 
respectively contribute to the overall functioning of cities. 
It must be stressed that this can be made without having all 
the bits brought together under the flag of planning law. It is true 
that, in some doctrines at least, planning law has shown an 
“imperialistic” stance and tried to appear as the only possible 
synthesis of “the law of cities”. But it was a failure, only leading to 
excessive complexity. 
The law of cities can be simply apprehended as the law 
applicable to the various essential dimensions of cities 
functioning: public and private spaces, infrastructure, land 
occupation, local economic development, local public services, 
local government, and so on. And it is possible to go through these 
various issues without too much wondering whether you are in 
the field of constitutional law, administrative law, planning law or 
whatever: you will even possibly come across private law issues, 
and still you will not have lost your way! 
 
3. The interesting is that this synthetic and concrete 
approach helps discern, within the overall topic of cities legal 
functioning, a range of cross-cutting functional logics and some 
common principles. 
Among the functional logics it makes appear, I would first 
mention the trend towards a constant contribution of private 
actors to the pursuit of general interest aims. The private sector 
plays a growing role in the production of local public goods, 
especially in the social and cultural fields, while local democracy 
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makes itself ever more participative and thus more reciprocal, 
consisting more and more in a permanent dialogue between 
citizens and local powers, facilitated by the NTIC. 
Another prominent feature of cities legal functioning is the 
importance acquired by issues concerning public spaces. Urban 
growth generates a tension on public spaces, which increasingly 
longed for by economic, cultural, political competing users. 
Planning law, the law on public assets and the one on public order 
must work together in order to regulate this competition. 
What a transversal approach of the law of cities also show 
is that a wide range of difficult issues it contains stem from the 
fact that, in general, local government structures do not fit with 
the real dimensions of contemporary urban entities. To a large 
extent, these structures were designed in periods when our 
societies were essentially rural and, even if they have been 
transformed in the modern area, they never or nearly never were 
adapted to the effective shape of contemporary urbanization. This 
insufficient institutional match raises issues which are quite 
apparent in the field of local governance as well as in the one of 
infrastructure management and provision of local public services. 
 
4. The “concrete and synthetic” approach of the law of cities 
also denotes that there are some principles which could constitute 
an important part of its contemporary layout. At least, four groups 
of these principles tend to emerge.  
Firstly, there are principles which seem to govern the law 
on public spaces. Fundamentally, our legal systems have admitted 
a general principle of free use, but this essential rule must 
nowadays compose with other ones, concerning a certain degree 
of (ideological, religious) neutrality in the occupation of public 
spaces and concerning the economic development of them. 
Secondly, there are principles related to the production and 
the organization of the services provided by cities. Here, law finds 
itself in tension between a logics of competition and an old 
tradition of solidarity - in Europe at least, the first hospitals were 
set up by local governments -, between the need for public 
intervention in order to make sure that the essential services are 
provided and a distribution of functions which leaves a wider and 
wider room for private actors action. 
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Thirdly, there are principles which are in connection with 
the institutional complexity of local governance. The fact that local 
institutions are in general ill adapted to the real size of urban 
issues, combined with the fact that laws on local government 
organization tend to be very much unstable - our countries tend to 
reform their local government quite frequently -, imposes more 
and more some kind of “multilevel governance” and of network 
functioning, in which governing constantly requires the 
cooperation of several centers of administrative decision and 
action. 
 
5. The fourth type of principles which emerge are the ones 
which can be connected to the common idea of a “right to the 
city”. 
This concept has two origins. The first one comes from the 
observation that, among services provided by cities, some can be 
considered as essential, in the sense of essential means of human 
beings: housing, mobility, security, the basic domestic facilities -
water, power, gas -. The second one derives from the realization 
that, because a large majority of us live in towns - 80 % in Europe -
, our fundamental rights must be to some extent related to the 
urban reality. 
The outcome is a concept of “right to the city” - promoted 
in particular by UN Habitat -, on the basis of which it is possible to 
upgrade to the status of fundamental rights the right to the basic 
urban amenities: thus, possibly, a right to housing, a right to 
mobility, a right to security, a right to access to water distribution, 
and so on. 
 
6. Finally, the “law of cities” approach places us on the way 
of an important historical phenomenon, already highlighted by 
many studies in sociology and political science: the political 
renaissance of cities. 
The idea which can these studies plead is that, in the 
current era of deconstruction and reassembling of public action 
structures, one may detect symptoms of a reemergence of cities in 
the position of major levels of government. 
In the international ambit, these symptoms are, in 
particular: a growing number of city-states (Dubaï, Singapore …), 
a development of various networks of cities, a more and more 
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marked interest shown by international institutions for urban 
affairs. In domestic systems, they concentrate mainly in the 
frequent signs, here and there, of a new recognition, both political 
and economic, of metropolises. 
We, lawyers, must realize that this political and economic 
reemergence of cities has its implications in law. Cities have 
become ‘central markets’ in the business of satisfying collective 
needs. A growing number of legal abilities participating in the 
conduct of public affairs are situated at their level. The 
intensifying - generally speaking - tendency of our public 
apparatuses to accommodate a higher degree of pluralism, 
combined with the growing interconnection of public issues, lead 
them to constitute more and more partial legal orders. 
These converging evolutions must at least convince us that 
the “law of cities” is one of the groups of realities on which we 
should concentrate our research and our reflection if we want to 
keep up with the transformations which affect public law in the 
current era. 
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BEYOND THE MUNICIPALITY:  
THE CITY, ITS RIGHTS AND ITS RITES∗ 
 
Roberto Cavallo Perin** 
 
 
1. The book by Jean-Bernard is very fine. In common with 
every fine book that is destined to become a classic, it sparks off 
innovatory thinking, which I have attempted to summarise in 
seven theories and in reflection on method. 
First theory. Everyone has stressed the need for a legal space 
for the city. The city may be regarded as an autonomous subject of 
legal discipline. The city1 and the comune (municipality) may be 
seen as two different legal realities, and we should echo Santi 
Romano2 in saying that the city is “Oltre il comune” (“Beyond the 
municipality”). 
This may explain why in treatises on municipalities nobody 
has taken a serious look at the city. A new viewpoint is now 
emerging3, which should not make us criticise the past. The 
                                                           
∗ Paper delivered to the seminar on The City in Administrative Law - Turin, 24 April 2013, 
presenting the book by J.B. Auby, Droit de la Ville. Du fonctionnement juridique des villes au droit à la 
Ville, Paris, 2013 (see seminar video at: http://www.unito.it/media/?content=6156). 
 
 
 
** Full Professor of Administrative Law, University of Torino. 
 
 
1 M. Ascheri, Le Città-Stato, (2006); L. Benevolo, La città nella storia d’Europa, 
(2001); Sir P. Hall, Cities in civilization, (1998); Id., Cities in civilization, (1998); R. 
Ruffilli, Istituzioni, Società, Stato. Il ruolo delle istituzioni amministrative nella 
formazione dello Stato in Italia, (1989); J. Rikwert, The Idea of a Town: The 
Anthropology of Urban Form in Rome, Italy and the Ancient World, (1988); A. Briggs, 
Victorian cities, (1963); L. Mumford, The City in History, (1961); L. Mumford, The 
culture of the cities, (London), 1938. 
2 S(anti) Romano, Oltre lo Stato, in Id., Scritti minori, (1950) vol. I, 419 s.; see also 
Santi Romano, Lo Stato moderno e la sua crisi, Discorso per l’inaugurazione dell'anno 
accademico nella R. Università di Pisa letto il 4 novembre 1909, (1909). 
3 S. Cattaneo, Città, in Enc. dir., VII, 125; J. Kotkin, The city. A global history, 
(2006); G. Pavani, L. Pegoraro, Municipi d’Occidente, Il governo locale in Europa e 
nelle Americhe, (2006); P. Le Galès, European Cities: Social Conflict and Governance, 
(2002); S. Vicari Haddock, La città contemporanea, (2004); Max Weber, Die Stadt, 
erstabdruck imn Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, (1921), 621-772,  tr. 
en. The city¸ (1958) tr. it. La città, (2003); A. Bagnasco, P. Le Galès (eds) Cities in 
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geopolitical reason is topical: at the start of the third millennium, 
the world urban population, those who live in towns, has 
overtaken the world rural population, those who live in the 
country4.  
An old professor once said to me: “the city has everything 
except country”. What he meant was that the city is a large 
container that contains everything, apart from a few things such as 
agriculture that belonged to the rural world5.  
Everything in the city is flowing: everything inside must 
flow out from the city and from outside it must flow in. The city, 
then, is not sufficient unto itself.  
Second theory. Today it can be said more precisely that the 
city is the container of everything because the city is a hub. 
According to many writers it is “a network of networks”; in my 
opinion, it is more precisely a hub of a plurality of networks, which 
may be interconnected by the hub or may be independent or even 
unrelated. The city is always a network locus - a hub that links one 
centre to another6. An individual network normally links a smaller 
centre to a larger one, but it may also just connect centres that are 
equivalent to each other, or middle-sized.  
However, it is only the “network of networks” that 
connects all the centres, from the smallest to the largest. This is 
possible solely because certain hubs serve as hubs for several 
                                                                                                                                              
Contemporary Europe, (2000) (original ed.: A. Bagnasco, P. Le Galès, Villes en 
Europe, 1997); R. Ezra Park, E. W. Burgess, R. D. McKenzie (eds.), The City, 
(1925); L. Gambi, F. Merloni (eds.), Amministrazioni pubbliche e territorio in Italia, 
(1995); A. Harding, P. Le Galès, Villes et États, in V. Wright, S. Cassese (eds.), La 
recomposition de l'État en Europe, (1996); P. Le Galès, Du gouvernement des villes à 
la gouvernance urbaine, in Revue française de science politique, 1995, 1, 57 s. 
4 Commissione di lavoro CSS about “Governo delle città”, Società e territori da 
ricomporre. Libro bianco sul governo delle città italiane. Sintesi del rapporto conclusivo, 
Consiglio italiano per le Scienze sociali, aprile 2011, 6; G. Dematteis (eds.), Le 
grandi città italiane. Società e territori da ricomporre, (2011). 
5 A. Faure, Le village et la politique Essai sur les maires ruraux en action, (1992).  
6 G. Pinson, M. Rousseau, Les systèmes métropolitains intégrés: état des lieux et 
problématiques, Territoires 2040 (DATAR), 3 (2011) 29-58; M. Castells The Rise of 
the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. I. 
(1996), tr. it., La nascita della società in rete, (2008); Id., La città delle reti, (2004); G. 
Catalano, Reti di luoghi. Reti di città, (2005); M. Castells, The Informational City, 
(1989); P. Perulli, La città: la società europea nello spazio globale, (2007); Id., Piani 
strategici: governare le città europee, (2004); C. Salone, Logiche reticolari e politiche 
territoriali, in Urbanistica Informazioni, 1999, n° 166, 32-40. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW – VOL. 5  ISSUE 2/2013 
309 
 
networks: these are the cities. The smaller centres may be rural or 
urban, but the city remains a point of connection for several 
networks. 
In this sense the city is everything; more specifically, it is 
what it can have, but it is also what it can give through 
relationships with others. 
Third theory. As the old professor also told me: “the city is 
very convenient; the soil is hard, one has to bend and do back-
breaking work to cultivate it”. While it is normal in the 
countryside for every family to bake its own bread, even though it 
may be in a communal oven, in the city it is the combined 
presence of many trades that enables individuals to follow just 
one. This has made it possible to specialise in one profession, in an 
art (including the military art) or in a trade, not for oneself but 
necessarily for other people. Specialisation does not happen in a 
country environment. 
The city must be convenient to live in, for the very reason 
that it enables individuals to specialise. The city therefore means 
plurality and differentiation, in other words very many 
corporations or professions, or arts or trades7, are all there side by 
side within the city, whether mediaeval, modern or contemporary.  
The mediaeval guilds have been succeeded in the cities of 
today by the professions, in the sense of “the liberal professions” 
that have their own special discipline, in other words a regulated 
market of producers who are normally organised as a network in 
the cities and between cities, on a local scale and on a potentially 
global scale8, almost always linked with the rest of the world.  
                                                           
7 A. Faure, Les élus locaux à l'épreuve de la décentralisation. De nouveaux chantiers 
pour la médiation politique locale, in Revue française de science politique, 44e année, 
n. 3, 1994, 462-479 (spec. 474 on the idea of an entrepreneurial city). 
8 S. Sassen, Cities in a World Economy, (2012), updated 4th ed. (1st ed. 1994); P. 
Perulli (eds.), Nord. Una città regione globale, (2012); C. Ratti, S. Sassen, Le mega 
città iperconnesse, May 3rd, 2009; Id., Denationalization: Territory, Authority and 
Rights in a Global Digital Age, (2005); Id., The Global city. Introducing a concept, in 
The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 2005, vol. XI, Issue 2; Id. (edt.), Global 
Networks, Linked Cities, (2002); A.J. Scott (eds.), Global city-regions, (2002); B. 
Jouve, C. Lefèvre, Métropoles ingouvernables, (2002); J. Gottmann, Megalopolis. The 
Urbanized Northeastern seaboard of the United States, (1961); Id., Megalopolis, or the 
urbanization of the Northeastern Seaboard, in Economic Geography, 33 (3): 189-200, 
1957. 
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Each professional, however, is at the same time a hub for 
consumers, above all a contact point not just for city clients but 
also for other clients wherever they are located, who connect with 
them through technology or through other professionals to obtain 
ever more specialised services on a wide scale on the consumer 
market.  
Clients from the city and clients from outside the city are 
drawn to the city, which is seen as a network of networks, or more 
precisely to the hub of a plurality of networks that is the city. Again it 
was the old professor who said to me that peasants going to the 
market in the city once a month took the opportunity there to visit 
the doctor for treatment, the lawyer or notary to obtain advice, 
and so on, because it is the city - the network node - that makes it 
possible to go from one network to another, even though the two 
networks are normally segregated. 
Fourth theory. The city is not the resident population; the 
resident community, on the contrary, constitutes the comune 
(municipality); this also explains why the city is not the same as 
the institution of the comune (municipality) and its bodies and 
offices (the consiglio comunale or town council, the giunta or 
executive council, the mayor). But we shall return to this point 
later. 
Since it is the hub of a plurality of networks, the city has 
people who come and go every day, each with their own agenda, 
inflows and outflows of goods, flows of services, more specifically 
flows of producers, as well as flows of consumers and not least a 
flow of capital.  
The city has its own peculiar problems, because levels of 
criticality unknown in other places are created there9. Apart from 
the problems caused by the connection with others (transport, 
telecommunications, energy, etc.), there are critical environmental 
and health and hygiene factors, as well as the criticalities of urban 
planning and housing, compatibility with internal traffic 
conditions, generally due to what are said to be “networked” 
services that, where they remain unaddressed, give rise to critical 
                                                           
9 G. Dematteis (eds.), Le grandi città italiane. Società e territori da ricomporre, (2011); 
Y. Kazepov, Cities of Europe. Changing Contexts, Local Arrangements, and the 
Challenge to Urban Cohesion, (2005); G. Martinotti (ed.), La dimensione 
metropolitana. Sviluppo e governo della nuova città, (1999). 
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problems of public order. Jean-Bernard is right, then: in cities 
there are legal norms that are peculiar to each one. 
The city, then, is made up of all those people who use it, 
live in it, and therefore simply constitute it as a community that is 
the hub of a plurality of networks. People who may belong to 
different municipalities – located throughout the world (in places 
far or near) – but who at least briefly, as a result of travelling, are 
concentrated in the city according to recurrent patterns of 
behaviour. 
The different flows are characterised by differing rates and 
parameters, since the very idea of a flow indicates the behaviour 
not of a single individual but of a group of individuals who 
display a far from random periodicity of behaviours10. What in 
other sciences is said to be a “flow” is, in law, named a community 
– a community of professionals, users, workers, transporters, etc. – 
that on occasions is inaccurately described as dynamic, as opposed 
to a community of residents.  
By now it is clear that every community necessarily adopts 
one or more behaviours for the optimum satisfaction of its own 
needs and organises itself to that end, and is therefore a 
Ordinamento giuridico (legal system) as defined by Santi Romano11. 
Communities or “networks” of professionals, users and workers: 
each one is a Ordinamento giuridico (legal system), and they have 
long since become organised as true professional orders, as unions 
to defend workers or as associations of businessmen, and more 
recently as purchasing groups or associations to uphold users’ 
interests. 
In this sense the city, as a hub of a plurality of networks, fits 
the definition of a system that regulates those who live in it 
together, not as individuals but as ordinamenti giuridici (legal 
systems) in themselves - a ordinamento degli ordinamenti (system of 
systems). 
A system not regulated by law, a system that has the 
special characteristic of allowing systems to coexist in the city 
without problems of public law and order. The city as a territory is 
undoubtedly a place in which many ordinamenti giuridici (legal 
                                                           
10 A. L. Barabàsi, Bursts: The Hidden Pattern Behind Everything We Do, (2010).  
11 Santi Romano, L’ordinamento giuridico, II ed., (1946), reprinted by Giuffrè, 
2013; Tr.: L’ordre juridique, (1975), II ed. 2002; Die Rechtsordnung, (1975); El 
Ordienamento Jurídico, (1963); O Ordenamento Jurídico, (2008).  
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systems) coexist; this cannot be a matter of chance, but it happens 
because the Ordinamento della città (The city legal system) regulates 
everything there. 
Fifth theory. Professor Pericu has reasoned as a jurist based 
on his experience as the mayor of the citizens’ community that is 
Genoa.  
He has told us that he has tackled the tougher decisions 
with the Rector of the University of Genoa, with the President of 
the Union of industrialists, with the Secretaries of the leading 
trades unions or the representatives of the professional bodies, 
with other mayors or with the Presidents of provinces or regions, 
and last but not least with the Archbishop of Genoa or the leaders 
of other religious organisations: briefly, with the spokesmen of the 
systems that coexist in the city. 
The law does not cover their meetings and procedures, nor 
is there any regulation stating which people should meet, or the 
formalities or majorities by which decisions should be taken. 
These are meetings, however, in which the formal institutions, 
through their own office-holders (mayor, president, secretary, 
etc.), decide on issues of great importance to the life of the city, 
following the necessary relevant deliberations.  
The procedures and bodies are not laid down by any 
written provision, law or regulation, but nonetheless the 
development of a city over twenty years may be planned or a port 
redesigned, observing an order of precedence in meetings with the 
various representatives that becomes almost a ceremonial formally 
determining the procedure.  
Whether it is called external coordination, a conferenza di 
servizi (as per article 14 et seqq., Law 241 of 7 August 1990) or 
another workable definition, the example of a council of 
representatives of autonomous institutions has been at the origin 
of many European experiences under the names of Privy Councils, 
Councils of State or, lastly, Councils of Ministers. These too were 
certainly not initially provided for in Constitutiones 
(Constitutions), but they were no less important to kings and to 
the members of the councils: all of them conferred reciprocal 
legitimacy on each other, according to a construct that several 
parties have regarded first as an institutional rule and then a 
constitutional norm. 
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The city of Genoa therefore, as a ordinamento (legal system), 
has selected its own bodies, which can be distinguished from the 
municipal bodies and offices (the consiglio comunale or town 
council, the giunta or executive council, the mayor) and which, 
according to a lay or secular culture of the exercise of public 
authority, almost always choose as their meeting place the salons 
of Palazzo Tursi offered by the Mayor of Genoa, following methods 
and formalities that are ritualistic in nature - lay or secular rites, 
certainly, but no less effective for that.  
Sixth theory. The “right to the city”. Subjectively, therefore, 
the right to the city12 is the individual’s right to participate in a 
complex society, to participate in the “market” for goods and 
services; by contrast, the right to the country is the right to be 
forgotten or to live in ways that have been defined as “happy 
degrowth”13. I do not know whether the right to the city is part of 
the right to life, or of the right of movement and residence or other 
rights, but this descriptor may remind us that in the city the rights 
of man immediately imply complexity. In the city, if the rights to 
housing, or health and hygiene, or movement are not satisfied, 
public order problems inevitably arise14. In the city the “rights of 
man” are co-essential to the definition of security or public order, 
                                                           
12 D. Harvey, The Right to the City, in J. Show, I. Štiks (eds.), Citizenship Rights, 
(2013); H. Lefebvre, Le Droit à la ville, (2nd ed. 1968). 
13 M. Bonaiuti, La Grande Transizione. Dal declino alla società della decrescita, 
preface by S. Latouche, (2013); S. Latouche, Can the Left Escape Economism?, 
Capitalism Nature Socialism, vol. 23, issue 1, 2013. 74-78; B. Muraca, Towards a 
fair degrowth-society: Justice and the right to a ‘good life’ beyond growth, Futures, vol. 
44, issue 6, 2012, 535–545; G. Kallis, C. Kerschner, J. Martinez-Alier, The 
economics of degrowth, in Ecological Economics (in press available online 21 
September 2012); M. Pallante, Meno e meglio. Decrescere per progredire, (2011); Id., 
La decrescita felice. La qualità della vita non dipende dal PIL, (2005); G. Kallis, In 
defence of degrowth. Ecological Economics, vol. 70, issue 5, 15 March 2011, 873-
880; S. Savioli, Alla città nemica, Diario di una donna di campagna, (2008). 
14 B. Secchi, La città dei ricchi e la città dei poveri, (2013); D. Harvey, Rebel Cities: 
From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution, (2012), tr. it. Città ribelli. I 
movimenti urbani dalla Comune di Parigi a Occupy Wall Street, (2013); G. Pinson, H. 
Reigner, Différenciation et standardisation dans la(es) politique(s) urbaine(s), in A. C. 
Douillet, A.Faure, C. Halpern, J. P. Leresche, L'action publique locale dans tous ses 
états: différenciation et standardisation, (2012), 163-178; N. Houard, Politique de la 
Ville, Perspectives françaises et ouvertures internationals, (2012); H. T. Andersen, R. 
van Kempen (eds.), Governing European Cities: Social Fragmentation, Social 
Exclusion and Urban Governance, (2001). 
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as in 1789. It is not by chance that, in the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen15, the “right to security” supplements the 
definition of the rights to liberty (art. 2 and art. 12).  
Seventh theory. The city as a stress test of the effectiveness of 
the rights of man16. Many instances of non-discrimination are 
collated in Auby’s book. It is well known that France is very 
conscious of this issue, particularly in its cities and above all in 
Paris. Non-discrimination among different peoples of different 
cultures, different religions, but also, more simply, of different 
mental and physical conditions.  
A classic example is the elimination of architectural barriers 
for the disabled, something that is hard to obtain from the urban 
transport operators; others have mentioned the importance of 
social services, in particular care for the elderly or day-care centres 
for children, the lack of which considerably restricts the capacity 
of individuals.   
If, as a father or mother, I am unable to find efficient day-
care centres, I do not have the time to specialise and increase my 
professionalism, with a systemic effect that reduces the difference 
between town and country. Auby’s book offers numerous 
examples that enable us to reflect on many questions.  
Lastly, reflection as to method. I was tidying up my 
bookshelves and I came across a sociologist’s book entitled “The 
end of cities”. I looked at Auby’s book and said to myself: this 
time the sociologists have got it wrong. In terms of method, his is 
                                                           
15 We adopt the most common translation - according to the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica among others  - of the Declaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen 
in place of the quite less known phrase Declaration of Human and Civic Rights. 
16 S. Sassen, La città aperta e i suoi nemici, in La Repubblica, 4 aprile 2011; 
Commissione di lavoro CSS sul “Governo delle città”, Società e territori da 
ricomporre. Libro bianco sul governo delle Città italiane, Consiglio italiano per le 
scienze sociali, aprile 2011, cit.; P. Costanzo, Note introduttive alla Carta europea 
dei diritti dell'uomo nella città (quali competenze per gli statuti locali in materia di 
diritti?), in Giur. it., 2011, 6; A. Chabrot, La Charte européenne des droits de 
l'homme dans la ville: un exemple d'acte «pré-juridique, in Revue de Droit Public et 
de la Science Politique, 2007, 355 ss.; G. M. Flick, La Carta Europea dei Diritti 
Umani nella Città nel sistema universale dei diritti umani, in Atti della Terza 
Conferenza per la Carta Europea dei Diritti Umani nella Città, 2002, 
www.comune.venezia.it; Tuzla Declaration: adopted on the Seventh Conference on the 
European Charter of Human Rights in the City held in Tuzla, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 2010, in www.cities-localgovernments.org; L'Engagement de 
Barcelone, 1998, in www.droitshumains.org. 
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a fine book because it does not conceal the jurist’s difficulties, but 
at the same time it is as a jurist that he confronts them, aware of 
the limitations of our science. It is a fine way of beginning. It may 
be argued that more studies are needed, but I feel that in a time of 
crisis this is methodologically useful, because the analysis of 
problems cannot be deferred ad infinitum and we have to begin by 
marshalling the facts, since - again, according to the classic legal 
maxim - ex facto jus oritur, the law arises out of the fact. 
316 
 
II. LAW, LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 
 
THE CHOICE OF TEACHING “ONLY IN ENGLISH” IN AN ITALIAN 
PUBLIC UNIVERSITY  IS A SIGN OF INTELLECTUAL SUBJECTION 
AND IS CONTRARY TO THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE  
 
(An Answer to G. della Cananea∗) 
 
 
Diana-Urania Galetta∗∗ 
 
 
The decision taken by the Polytechnic of Milan last year (via 
a resolution of the Senate upholding the three-year plan 2012-2014) 
according to which, starting from the academic year 2014/2015, 
"the official language of the advanced two years’ degree programs and of 
PhD programs is English, only" was not a good step in the direction 
of internationalization of Italian universities. Such a decision was 
rather another clear sign of that intellectual subjection to the 
English native speakers' world, which affects at present time a 
large part of the Italian ruling class, also within the universities. 
But, most of all, the above mentioned administrative decision was 
wrong from a legal point of view and contrary to the principle of 
proportionality. 
From this point of view it is pretty unfair to accuse of 
awkwardness the Administrative Court of Milan, because of its 
decision of May 2013 1 , which annuls the administrative act 
adopted by the Academic Senate of the Polytechnic of Milan in 
20122. As a matter of fact, the decision of the Administrative Court 
of Milan is nothing less than a correct application of the 
                                                           
∗ See Editorial, Law, Language and Culture, in IJPL, vol. 5, Issue 1/2013 
(http://www.ijpl.eu/) 
 
 
∗∗ Full Professor of Administrative Law, University of Milan. 
 
 
1TAR Lombardia, decision n. 1348/2013 of 23/05/2013. 
2So does G. della Cananea in his Editorial in IJPL, Issue 1/2013, p. 2. 
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proportionality principle which, at present, is one of the most used 
general principles by Italian Administrative Courts when revising 
administrative acts3.   
This principle implies that the concrete measure chosen by 
the Administration to put in execution law provisions needs not 
only to be appropriate for the attainment of the goal which it seeks, 
but it also needs to match the criterion of necessity, therefore not 
having to go beyond what is necessary to achieve the goal4. 
From this point of view it must been taken into account that 
the law provision, which was the concrete point of reference for the 
decision of the Academic Senate of the Polytechnic of Milan, 
mentions "the teachings in a foreign language" as just one of the 
possible means to attain the goal of internationalization of the 
Italian university system and leaves broad discretion to the 
universities, in the choice of how to concretely achieve this goal5. 
Discretionary power of Public Administrations is not, however, 
"freies Ermessen"6 but rather a space of decision subject to review by 
the administrative courts, in particular through the review of 
proportionality. 
                                                           
3I cannot give an account in detail of the decision, which may, however, be 
found at: http://www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it/DocumentiGA/Milano/Sezione%203/2012/201201998/Prov
vedimenti/201301348_01.XML  
4See D.U. Galetta, ll principio di proporzionalità, in M. Renna, F. Saitta (Eds.), Studi 
sui principi del diritto amministrativo (2012) p. 389 ss. 
5See law of 30 December 2010, n. 240 (law Gelmini) for the revision of the 
Statutes of Italian’s Universities, art. 2, par. 2. It is one of the many cases in 
which the law Gelmini, respecting the statutory autonomy of universities, 
indicates only a very general set of criteria, with the aim of achieving a specific 
goal: the internationalization of the Italian university system. See on this point 
D.U. Galetta, Autonomia universitaria e processi di internazionalizzazione degli 
Atenei dopo la legge n. 240 del 2010: una “anglicizzazione” necessaria? Riflessioni 
critiche dalla prospettiva del diritto (amministrativo), in Giustizia amministrativa 
(www.giustamm.it), Febbraio/Marzo 2013. 
6 I refer to that concept, historically dated, used in particular by the German 
speaking public law doctrine until about 1945, to indicate the area of substantial 
freedom that the public administration was to enjoy, both in front of the 
legislature and in front of the judicial power. See in particular the two well 
known contributions of F. Tezner, Über das freie Ermessen der 
Verwaltungsbehörden als Grund der Unzuständigkeit der Verwaltungsgerichte, (1892) 
e W. Jellinek, Gesetz, Gesetzesanwendung und Zweckmäßigkeitserwägung, (1913). 
See on this point S. Cognetti, Profili sostanziali della legalità amministrativa, (1993), 
70 ss. 
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To be consistent with the principle of proportionality the 
concrete choice on how to achieve the goal of internationalization 
should have properly taken into account all other interests at stake, 
in order to allow the achievement of the goal of 
internationalization with the least possible sacrifice of other 
conflicting interests.  
In particular, as the administrative Court’s decision stresses, 
the decision of the Academic Senate should have taken into 
account the interest of the Professors to be able to exercise their 
constitutionally enshrined right of freedom of teaching art and 
science (Articles 33 and 34 of the Italian Constitution), as well as 
the right of the students to an education in the language that our 
system identifies as the expression of the cultural and linguistic 
heritage of our state. Those rights cannot be subjected to a 
linguistic diktat such as the use of “solely English language” in 
teaching activities at university level: even if it is certainly true 
that in the Italian Constitution there is not a specific norm 
according to which Italian is “the” official language of our 
country, nevertheless a systematic interpretation unequivocally 
leads to this result7!  
 
The principle of proportionality used by the Italian 
Administrative Court to revise the decision of the Polytechnic of 
Milan is the ripe fruit of a long time development of this principle 
within the case law of the EU Court of Justice. It is a clear sign itself 
of the fact, that Italian judges are not living in a close-minded 
world: most of them are open-minded to a trans-national debate, 
and do take part in the so called trans-national community of 
lawyers and judges8. 
                                                           
7I cannot agree with G. della Cananea’s point of view, according to which the 
strict constitutional analysis shows and emphasizes that in our Constitution 
there is not such thing as an explicit and univocal choice of language (Editorial, 
p. 3). 
8Clear evidence of this are the meetings organized on a regular basis, for now 
almost twenty years, by the AGATIF (Association of German, French and 
Italian administrative judges). S. http://www.agatif.org/. See also the ACA 
(Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions 
of the European Union), whose activity started already in 1963, thanks to the 
personal engagement of the President (at the time) of the Italian “Consiglio di 
Stato”, Bozzi. See in http://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/historique-en 
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The Administrative Court’s decision at issue is not 
“excluding any possibility to teach law in English in our country”9: it is 
only stressing the need, according to a correct use of the principle 
of proportionality, not to take such an administrative decision 
without taking into account all rights concretely at stake and 
without putting them into adequate balance. From this point of 
view, I must strongly disagree with Giacinto della Cananea’s point 
of view: even if the use of “solely English language in teaching 
activities” at Italian Public Universities (financed with Italian 
public money) could be beneficial to create a common frame of 
reference for researchers and teachers (which is not at all sure and 
still needs to be proved), this is still not enough to overcome the 
objections regarding non-compliance with the principle of 
proportionality. That’s why the Administrative Court decision is 
correct and is not at all an “institutional” one10. 
 
To conclude, it is my opinion that the choice of neglecting 
our own language and our own legal culture would be a strong 
sign of cultural decline of our country. The process of 
internationalization of our universities - while necessary and 
desirable - can be considered compatible with our system only to 
the extent that it will not have the effect of placing the Italian 
language in a marginal position, compared to other languages: 
English cannot be an exception to this golden rule. 
                                                           
9This is rather the personal opinion of G. della Cananea (Editorial, p. 2). 
10So G. della Cananea (Editorial, p. 4). 
 
